The plan for the upcoming Nazi offensive. German operation "citadel" on the Kursk Bulge

After the defeat of selected troops at Stalingrad, Hitler thirsted for revenge. The Kursk Bulge seemed to him the most suitable place for the new Cannes. The configuration of the terrain in the form of a huge protrusion, deepening two hundred kilometers to the west of the general front line, in the Kursk direction, seemed to contribute to this. At the beginning of April 1943, the fascist German command began careful preparations for a strategic offensive operation under the code name "Citadel" .

OPERATIONAL ORDER N 6

OKH, General Staff of the Ground Forces Operations Department (1) X. 430246/43

Printed in 13 copies.

"Soviet secret.

For command only.

Conveyed only through an officer I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel Offensive, the first offensive of the year. This offensive is given decisive importance. It must end with quick and decisive success. The offensive should give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year. In this regard, all preparatory activities must be carried out with the greatest care and energy. The best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition must be used in the direction of the main attacks. Every commander, every ordinary soldier must become aware of the decisive significance of this offensive. The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world. I order:

1. The goal of the offensive is a concentrated strike, carried out decisively and quickly by the forces of one shock army from the Belgorod area and another from the area south of Orel, through a concentric offensive to encircle the enemy troops located in the Kursk area and destroy them...

2.Required:

a) make extensive use of the moment of surprise and keep the enemy in the dark, primarily regarding the time of the start of the offensive;

b) ensure the maximum massing of striking forces in a narrow area in order... to break through the enemy’s defenses with one blow, to achieve the connection of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring... Hitler." In total, there were thirteen points in the operational order * 6. Further they set out the tasks: Army Group "South" to break through the front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line and unite at Kursk with the troops of Army Group "Center" advancing towards them; Army Group "Center", delivering a massive blow from the Troena-Maloarkhangelsk line, break through the defense in the Fatezh-Veretinovo sector and connect with the shock army of Army Group "South" near Kursk and to the east. The order devoted significant space to measures aimed at misleading the Russians and maintaining the secrecy of the operation. Only those persons whose involvement was intended were privy to its plan absolutely necessary.

In addition, preparations were underway for a false Operation Panther in the Army Group South zone. For the purpose of successful disinformation, the deployment of tanks, the concentration of transport means, radio communications, agent actions, and the spread of rumors were envisaged.

The Wehrmacht leadership carefully developed and prepared the operation, which received the code name "Citadel". Hitler sought at all costs to regain the strategic initiative that had eluded him after Stalingrad, otherwise losing the war was inevitable. This operation was planned as a “single throw” aimed at encircling and lightning-fast defeat of Soviet troops in the Kursk region.

Hitler's command set the troops the task

"...to ensure the maximum massing of striking forces in a narrow area, so that, using local overwhelming superiority in all offensive means (tanks, assault guns, artillery, mortars, etc.), with one blow, break through the enemy’s defenses, achieve the unification of both advancing armies and thus close the encirclement ring." The main line of Soviet defense was supposed to be broken through within two days, and by the end of the fourth day of the offensive, the Wehrmacht strike groups were supposed to unite east of Kursk. By encircling and defeating a group of more than a million Soviet troops in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the fascist German command intended to take revenge for Stalingrad.

At Kursk, the question had to be decided whether the initiative would finally pass into the hands of the Soviet Armed Forces or whether the Germans would be able to regain it. During the preparation of the operation, the timing of the German offensive was postponed several times by Hitler. The attack, scheduled for May, was then postponed until a brigade of new Panther tanks arrived. In May, in Munich, Hitler held a meeting with the commanders of the armies and army groups "Center", "South" and the Wehrmacht generals to finalize the composition of the strike forces. An attack from the south on Kursk was planned with ten tank, one motorized and seven infantry divisions. Seven tank, two motorized and nine infantry divisions were to take part in the offensive from the north. All reserves of the fascist German command were sent to this section of the front. However, at the meeting, one of Hitler’s close associates, Colonel General Guderian, expressed his doubts about the need for an offensive near Kursk. This shook Hitler; he was forced to change the timing of the offensive, but continued to blindly believe in the successful outcome of the operation.

“Never before have the German troops in Russia,” said the Fuhrer, “been so well equipped with heavy tanks as they are now...”

Two thousand aircraft and two thousand seven hundred tanks were to fall on the troops of the Central Front of the Rokossov and Voronezh Fronts of Vatutin, which accounted for fifty percent of all enemy tanks and aircraft available on the Soviet-German front. (During the battle, the Germans planned to additionally bring in almost the same number of troops, tanks and aircraft from the reserve.)

At the end of June, in the Oryol and Belgorod directions, our reconnaissance discovered large movements of enemy armored and infantry formations. On July 2, the Headquarters informed the commanders of the Voronezh and Central Fronts that the Germans were about to go on the offensive. This is already the third warning. The first two were at the beginning and end of May, but turned out to be untenable. The tension associated with the long wait reached its limit. Excitement gripped everyone - from the soldier to the front commander. This was the case when everyone wanted the enemy to go on the offensive as quickly as possible. Otherwise, the Soviet command made a major miscalculation, giving the Germans time to organize a defense in depth.

On the night of July 4, the situation changed dramatically; the Nazis intensified their reconnaissance activities in front of the defense front of the 60th and 65th armies. The intelligence chief reported to Chernyakhovsky that sixteen search groups of Germans hunting for “tongues” were found on the right wing, in the defense zone of General Kiryukhin’s corps, and twelve on the left wing, in the defense zone of General Lazko’s corps. At the junction of these two buildings, German sappers cleared our minefields. The obvious activation of the enemy alerted Chernyakhovsky. And he immediately reported to Rokossovsky on HF: “The enemy conducted twenty-eight reconnaissance searches on the night of July 4th, before that the number of such searches was five, six times less.” How is Pukhov doing? - In front of the front of Pukhov’s formations, the enemy has not yet shown activity. Rokossovsky thought about it.

The commander of Army Group Center could deliver the main blow in the defense zone of Chernyakhovsky and Batov. Such a strike, designed to dismember the battle formations of our troops, followed by their encirclement, also posed a serious danger. Moreover, when the main forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were aimed against the enemy offensive at the neck of the Kursk ledge. Finally, Rokossovsky asked Chernyakhovsky: “What conclusion did you come to yourself?” - Ensure full readiness to repel the Nazi offensive! - Undoubtedly, we must be prepared, but it seems to me that Hitler’s generals are being cunning. The same situation is on the left wing of the defense of Batov’s army! On the night of July 5, at the junction of the armies of Pukhov and Romanenko, our scouts discovered a group of German sappers clearing passages in minefields. Several enemy sappers were killed, two fled, and one was captured.

At two o'clock in the morning Rokossovsky became aware of the prisoner's testimony:

“The offensive is scheduled for 3 o’clock on July 5...” Consequently, only twenty minutes remained before the start of the artillery barrage planned by the enemy. The question on the agenda for the Military Council of the Central Front was: to believe this data or not? The adoption of a responsible decision to conduct counter-artillery preparation, designed to suppress the enemy at the initial positions for the offensive, depended on this. And, of course, it was carried out with the aim of disrupting the offensive plans of the fascist German command. But it could have turned out that the intelligence information was erroneous and the troops of Army Group Center did not take up their initial positions for the attack. In this case, half of our ammunition, mines and shells could have been fired into empty space.

There was no time left for reflection and agreement with Headquarters. It was the greatest risk, but Rokossovsky ordered to open fire at two hours and twenty minutes on July 5!

Links:
1. Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa without any preparation!
2. Formation of the Kursk Bulge
3.

PLAN" BARBAROSSA ". In the evening December 18, 1940. Hitler signed a directive on the deployment of military operations against the USSR, which received the serial number 21 and the code name option " Barbarossa"(Fall" Barbarossa"). It was made in only nine copies, three of which were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were locked in OKW safes.

It outlined only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to Directive N21, the plan included directives and orders of the Supreme High Command and the main commands of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation of the theater of operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents. Among these documents, the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces was especially important. dated January 31, 1941. It specified and clarified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive N21.
"Plan" Barbarossa"provided for the defeat of the Soviet Union during one short-term campaign even before the war against England was over. Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donetsk Basin were recognized as the main strategic objects. A special place in the plan was given to Moscow. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the entire war. " The ultimate goal of the operation, - stated in Directive N21, - is the creation of a protective barrier against Asian Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial area remaining with the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with the help of aviation". To defeat the Soviet Union, it was planned to use all German ground forces, excluding only the formations and units necessary to conduct occupation service in the enslaved countries. The German Air Force was tasked with "freeing up such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign, so that one could count on rapid completion of ground operations and at the same time limit to a minimum the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft." For combat operations at sea against the three Soviet fleets of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea, it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the navies of Finland and Romania "According to plan" Barbarossa"152 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and two brigades were allocated for the attack on the USSR. Germany's allies fielded 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, if we take two brigades as one division, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition, ", two-thirds of Germany's air force and significant naval forces were involved in the war against the USSR. The ground forces intended to attack the Soviet Union were consolidated into three army groups: " South" - 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and 1st tank group; " Center" - 4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups; " North" - 16th and 18th and 4th Panzer Group. The 2nd Separate Field Army remained in the OKH reserve, army" Norway"received the task of acting independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.
"Plan" Barbarossa"contained a somewhat refined assessment of the USSR Armed Forces. According to German data, at the beginning of the German invasion (on June 20, 1941), the Soviet Armed Forces had 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank brigades. Of these, as stated by the fascist command, 118 rifle, 20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades were stationed in the western border districts, 27 rifle, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1 brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in the Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation consisted of 8 thousand combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6 thousand were in the European part of the USSR. Hitler's command assumed that Soviet troops deployed in the west would use field fortifications on the new and old state borders, as well as numerous water barriers, for defense, and would enter the battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to maintain air and naval bases in the Baltic states, and rely on the Black Sea coast with the southern wing of the front. " In case of unfavorable development of operations south and north of the Pripyat swamps, - noted in the plan " Barbarossa ", - the Russians will try to stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper, Western Dvina rivers. When trying to eliminate German breakthroughs, as well as in possible attempts to withdraw threatened troops beyond the Dnieper, Western Dvina line, one should take into account the possibility of offensive actions from large Russian formations with using tanks".






According to Mr. Barbarossa"large tank and motorized forces, using aviation support, were supposed to deliver a swift strike to great depths north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy disparate groups of Soviet troops. North of the Pripyat marshes it was planned the offensive of two army groups: " Center F. Bock) And " North"(Commander Field Marshal V. Leeb) . Army Group" Center"dealt the main blow and was supposed to, concentrating the main efforts on the flanks where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, carry out a deep breakthrough with these formations north and south of Minsk, reach the Smolensk area planned for connecting the tank groups. It was assumed that with the entry of tank formations into the Smolensk region, the preconditions will be created for the destruction by field armies of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently, when the main forces reach the line of Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk, the army group " Center"had to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left fails to quickly defeat the troops defending in front of it, the army group was supposed to turn its tank formations to the north, and conduct an offensive eastward towards Moscow with field armies. If the group armies" North"will be able to defeat the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, army group" Center"It was necessary to immediately strike Moscow. Army Group" North"received the task, advancing from East Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Daugavpils, Leningrad, to destroy the troops of the Soviet Army defending in the Baltic States and, by capturing ports on the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic Fleet of its bases. If this group of armies It would not be possible to defeat the group of Soviet troops in the Baltic states; the mobile troops of the army group should have come to its aid." Center", the Finnish army and the formations transferred from Norway. The army group thus strengthened" North"it was necessary to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it. According to the plan of the German command, the operation was a reinforced army group" North"provided for the army group" Center"freedom of maneuver to capture Moscow and solve operational-strategic tasks in cooperation with the army group" South".
South of the Pripyat marshes army group offensive was planned" South"(Commander Field Marshal G. Rundstedt ) . It delivered one strong blow from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kyiv and further south along the Dnieper bend. As a result of the strike, in which powerful tank formations were to play the main role, it was supposed to cut off the Soviet troops located in Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, and seize crossings across the Dnieper in the Kyiv area and south of it. In this way, it provided freedom of maneuver to develop an offensive in the eastern direction in cooperation with troops advancing to the north, or to advance to the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions. Troops of the right wing of the Army Group" South"(The 11th Army) was supposed to, by creating a false impression of the deployment of large forces on the territory of Romania, pin down the opposing troops of the Soviet Army, and later, as the offensive on the Soviet-German front developed, prevent the organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond the Dniester.
In respect of " Barbarossa"it was planned to use the principles of combat operations that had proven themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. However, it was emphasized that Unlike actions in the West, the offensive against Soviet troops must be carried out simultaneously along the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. "Only this way, - said the directive of January 31, 1941, - it will be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of combat-ready enemy forces and destroy them west of the Dnieper-Dvina line".






"Plan" Barbarossa"took into account the possibility of active counteraction by Soviet aviation to the offensive of German ground forces. The German Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force from the very beginning of hostilities and supporting the offensive of ground forces in the directions of the main attacks. To solve these problems in the first stage of the war, it was envisaged to use almost all German aviation allocated for actions against the Soviet Union. Attacks on the rear industrial centers of the USSR were planned to begin only after the troops of the Soviet Army were defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine. Army group offensive" Center"it was planned to support the 2nd Air Fleet," South" - 4th Air Fleet, " North" - 1st Air Fleet.
The Navy of Nazi Germany had to defend its coast and prevent the ships of the Soviet Navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was envisaged to avoid major naval operations until the ground forces captured Leningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Subsequently, the naval forces of Nazi Germany were tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea and supplying the troops of the northern wing of the ground forces. The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941.
Thus, according to plan" Barbarossa"nearest The strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was the defeat of the Soviet Army in the Baltic states, Belarus and Right Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, the Central Industrial Region and the capital of the Soviet Union in the center, and to capture all of Ukraine and the Donetsk basin as quickly as possible in the south. The ultimate goal of the eastern campaign was the entry of fascist German troops to the Volga and Northern Dvina.
February 3, 1941. at a meeting in Berchtesgaden Hitler in the presence Keitel and Jodl heard a detailed report Brauchitsch and Haider about the plan for war against the USSR. The Fuhrer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be successfully implemented: " When Plan Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze". The armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland, allies of Nazi Germany, were supposed to receive specific tasks immediately before the start of the war. The use of Romanian troops was determined by the plan " Munich", developed by the command of German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. June 20, Romanian dictator Antonescu Based on it, he issued an order to the Romanian armed forces, which outlined the tasks of the Romanian troops. Before the outbreak of hostilities, Romanian ground forces were supposed to cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and with the outbreak of war, pin down the group of Soviet troops located on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Prut River line, which was believed to follow the advance of the German Army Group" South", the Romanian troops had to move on to vigorous pursuit of units of the Soviet Army. If the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions along the Prut River, the Romanian formations had to break through the Soviet defense in the Tsutsora, New Bedraz sector. Tasks for the Finnish and German troops deployed in Northern and Central Finland have been identified OKW directive of April 7, 1941. and announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as by the directive of the army commander " Norway"dated April 20. The OKW directive stipulated that the Finnish armed forces, before the offensive of Hitler's troops, were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the Wehrmacht going on the offensive, pin down the Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. With the release of the army group" North"on the line of the Luga River, Finnish troops were to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as between Lakes Onega and Ladoga, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region. German troops deployed in Finland, according to the directive of the army commander "Norway" was given the task of attacking in two groups (each consisting of a reinforced corps): one on Murmansk, the other on Kandalaksha. The southern group, having broken through the defenses, was supposed to reach the White Sea in the Kandalaksha region, then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north, in order to, in cooperation with the northern group, destroy the Soviet troops located on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye.Aviation support for the Finnish and German troops advancing from Finland was entrusted to the 5th Air Fleet of Germany and the Finnish Air Force.
At the end of April, the political and military leadership of Nazi Germany finally set the date of the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy forces that participated in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece to the borders of the USSR.
Preparing the war against the USSR, Hitler's leadership outlined major measures to restructure its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to increase the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Wehrmacht, including the reserve army and SS troops, should have had about 250 fully equipped divisions. Particular attention was paid to strengthening mobile troops. It was planned to deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and increase the level of infantry motorization. For this purpose, it was planned to allocate an additional 130 thousand tons of steel for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles at the expense of the fleet and aviation. Big changes were planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program, the most important task was the production of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. It was also envisaged to significantly increase the production of aircraft of those designs that had stood the test during battles in the West. Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of military operations. In the directive of August 9, 1940, which received the code name " Aufbau Ost" ("Construction in the East"), it was planned to transfer supply bases from west to east, build new railways and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc. in the eastern regions, expand and improve airfields, and communication networks.
In preparations for aggression against the USSR, the Nazi leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring the surprise of the attack and the secrecy of every preparatory measure, whether it concerned economic restructuring, strategic planning, preparing a theater of military operations or the deployment of armed forces, etc. All documents related to planning the war in the East were prepared with the utmost secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and rapid deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, Hitler's leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration and deployment of a multi-million army with a huge amount of military equipment near the Soviet borders. Therefore, it resorted to a broadly conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task was to mislead the government of the Soviet Union and the command of the Soviet Army about the plan, scale and time of the outbreak of aggression.


Both the operational-strategic leadership and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence) took part in the development of measures to disguise the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the east. The Abwehr drafted a directive signed on September 6, 1940 by Jodl, which specifically outlined the goals and objectives of disinformation. Directive N21 - option also contained instructions on the secrecy of preparations for aggression Barbarossa"But perhaps the treacherous tactics of the Nazis are most fully revealed by the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941." The purpose of disinformation is, - stated in the directive, -h to hide preparations for Operation Barbarossa". This main goal should form the basis of all measures to disinformation the enemy."The camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. First stage- approximately until mid-April 1941 - included the camouflage of general military preparations not related to the massive regrouping of troops. Second- from April to June 1941 - camouflage the concentration and operational deployment of troops near the borders of the USSR. At the first stage, it was envisaged to create a false impression regarding the true intentions of the German command, using various kinds of preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for the operation " Marita" (vs. Greece) and " Sonnenblum"(in North Africa). The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned to be carried out under the guise of normal army movements. At the same time, the tasks were set to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was in the south of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north relatively small. At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, it would no longer be possible to hide preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union, the concentration and deployment of forces for the eastern campaign was planned to be presented in the form of false events, allegedly carried out with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England The Nazi command presented this diversionary maneuver as “the greatest in the history of war.” At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for the landing in England were continuing, but in a different form - allocated for this purpose troops are withdrawn to the rear until a certain point. " Necessary, - the directive said, - to keep as long as possible even those troops destined for action directly in the east in confusion regarding actual plans". Importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of disinformation information about non-existent airborne corps, supposedly intended for the invasion of England. The upcoming landing on the British Isles was to be evidenced by such facts as the secondment of English translators to military units, the release of new English topographical maps maps, reference books, etc. Among the officers of the army group " South" Rumors were spreading that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to wage a war to capture the British colonies. The OKW Directive on disinformation of the enemy indicated that the more forces were concentrated in the east, the more efforts must be made to keep public opinion misleading about German plans.In the instructions of the OKW Chief of Staff of March 9, it was recommended to present the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east and as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landing in England and operations in the Balkans.


Hitler's leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the plan " Barbarossa", which, around the spring of 1941, began the detailed development of further plans for conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme Command of the Nazi Armed Forces for February 17, 1941, Hitler’s demand was stated that "after the end of the eastern campaign, it is necessary to provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an attack on India"Based on these instructions, the OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were planned to be carried out in the late autumn of 1941 and the winter of 1941/42. Their plan was outlined in the project Directive N32 "Preparing for the Post-Barbarossa Period", sent to the Army, Air Force and Navy on June 11, 1941. The project provided that after the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Wehrmacht would seize British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the Mediterranean basin, Africa, the Near and Middle East, the invasion of the British Isles, the deployment of military operations against America. G Hitler's strategists expected to begin the conquest of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal area, and then India, where they planned to unite with Japanese troops, already in the fall of 1941. The fascist German leadership hoped, by annexing Spain and Portugal to Germany, to quickly accept the siege of the islands. The development of Directive N32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat of the USSR and the decision " English problem"The Nazis intended an alliance with Japan" eliminate Anglo-Saxon influence in North America". Capture of Canada and the United States of America it was supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assault forces from bases in Greenland, Iceland, the Azores and Brazil - on the east coast of North America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - on the west. In April-June 1941, these issues were repeatedly discussed at the highest headquarters of the German armed forces. Thus, the fascist German leadership, even before the aggression against the USSR, outlined far-reaching plans for conquest of world domination. The key positions for their implementation, as it seemed to the Nazi command, were provided by the campaign against the USSR.
In contrast to the preparation of campaigns against Poland, France and the Balkan states, the war against the USSR was prepared by the Hitlerite command with special care and over a longer period of time. Aggression against the USSR according to plan" Barbarossa"was planned as a short-lived campaign, the ultimate goal of which - the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the destruction of the Soviet Union - was supposed to be achieved in the fall of 1941 .
The military operations were supposed to be conducted in the form of a blitzkrieg. At the same time, the offensive of the main strategic groupings was presented in the form of a continuous offensive at a rapid pace. Short pauses were allowed only to regroup troops and bring up lagging rear forces. The possibility of stopping the offensive due to resistance from the Soviet Army was excluded. Excessive confidence in the infallibility of one's plans and plans." hypnotized"fascist generals. Hitler's machine was gaining momentum to win victory, which seemed so easy and close to the leaders of the "Third Reich".

August 23 in Russia is the Day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, which took place in 1943. This was the greatest tank battle of World War II.

The intensity of the struggle in the Kursk Bulge region was due to a number of political, economic and strategic factors. By the summer of 1943, the Great Patriotic War had reached an important turning point. Under the blows of the Soviet Armed Forces, already in the battle of Moscow, the fascist plans for a “blitzkrieg” war collapsed. A year later, the Nazi armies suffered a crushing defeat at Stalingrad. Our Armed Forces acquired diverse combat experience in fighting a strong and experienced enemy, and their combat power increased every day. The active army received more and more weapons and military equipment from industry, which was restructured on a military basis. In the summer of 1943, Hitler's army was still a powerful force capable of withstanding a long, intense struggle, and the political and military leadership of Germany was eager to take revenge for Stalingrad. In order to restore their prestige and eliminate the discord that had begun in the camp of their allies, the fascist rulers needed a major victory, and they did everything to achieve it at any cost. However, by that time the Wehrmacht was only able to advance in one strategic direction. The plan for the upcoming offensive of the Nazi troops near Kursk is set out in sufficient detail in Order No. 6, signed by Hitler on April 15, 1943. According to this order, the objective of the offensive was to destroy Soviet troops in the area west of Kursk through a “concentric offensive” with the goal of encircling the Soviet fronts. One blow was planned to be delivered from the area south of Orel with the main forces of Army Group Center and another - from the area north of Kharkov with the main forces of Army Group South.

“This offensive,” Hitler’s order said, “is given decisive importance. It must end with quick and decisive success. The offensive should give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year... The best formations, the best weapons, the best commanders and a large amount of ammunition should be used in the direction of the main attacks... The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world.” Already in the spring of 1943, the Soviet Supreme High Command had information about the impending summer offensive of fascist German troops in the Kursk Bulge area. Intelligence data arrived with exceptional speed and accuracy. The direction of the enemy's main attack was also precisely determined. It was in this regard that in the rear of the Soviet troops east of the Kursk ledge at the line of Tula, Yelets, Stary Oskol, Rossosh, the Headquarters concentrated large strategic reserves. Formations and associations that participated in the battle of Stalingrad, in the battles near Leningrad, as well as in other sectors of the Soviet-German front were withdrawn to the indicated areas. Initially, all these troops were united into the Reserve Front, which from April 15, 1943 became known as the Steppe Military District, and from July 10, 1943 it became the Steppe Front. There has been almost no case in the history of wars when such powerful strategic reserves were created, united by a single front command. By the beginning of the defensive battle, the Central and Voronezh fronts included up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, up to 3,600 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 2,370 aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, in guns and mortars by 2 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 1.3 times. Thus, the grouping of our troops, concentrated in the Kursk direction, made it possible to solve, indeed, not only defensive, but also offensive tasks. During the preparation for the battle, intelligence provided the command with all the necessary information about the impending enemy offensive and the steps that the German command was taking.

Day after day(48.5 MB)

On July 1, Hitler announced the final decision to launch an offensive on July 5. As at the beginning of the war, the fascist command counted on a surprise attack, which, according to Hitler, should have been facilitated by a large number of new tanks and assault guns. These plans became known to the Soviet command. On July 2, the start of the operation was determined, about which the Headquarters immediately informed the commanders of the Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. On the night of July 5, scouts captured German prisoners, who confirmed that the offensive was scheduled for 3 o'clock on July 5. The commanders of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, with the participation of representatives of the Headquarters, decided to immediately conduct artillery counter-preparation. On the Voronezh Front, artillery counter-preparation was carried out twice: a five-minute fire raid on July 4 and July 5 from 3 hours to 3 hours 30 minutes - already during the artillery and air preparation of the enemy attack, which began at 2 hours 30 minutes. On the Central Front, artillery counter-preparation was also carried out on July 5 twice - at 2 hours 20 minutes and at 4 hours 35 minutes - both times for 30 minutes. On both fronts, the first powerful fire strike was delivered against the main means of attack. However, it was not possible to disrupt the enemy’s offensive, although the interaction between the main forces and means of the enemy’s first echelon was disrupted, and the force of his initial strike was significantly weakened. With the enemy reaching the front edge of the main defense line of the 6th Guards Army, the position of the enemy troops was determined more accurately, and this required repeated counter-preparation. Air battles near Kursk continued continuously. On July 5 alone, about 200 group and individual air battles took place. Our aviation was able to gain air supremacy, which had a very positive effect on the advancement and entry into battle of the troops of the Steppe Front.

Already the first hours of the offensive of Hitler’s troops, which unfolded on July 5 at 5:30 a.m., showed that it was not proceeding as planned by the fascist command. The enemy's tank divisions, thrown into pre-prepared defenses, suffered heavy losses, and the pace of the offensive was low. The Battle of Kursk lasted forty-nine days - from July 5 to August 23, 1943. The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper. After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote: “This battle was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front."

In mid-July 1941, the situation at the front continued to be unfavorable for the Soviet Army. The fighting took place 120 km from Leningrad, in the Smolensk region and on the outskirts of Kyiv. The enemy created an immediate threat of capturing these large administrative centers. Only in the north (the Arctic and Karelia) and in the south (Moldova) the advance of fascist German troops was insignificant.

Soviet troops suffered serious losses and needed reorganization and replenishment with men and weapons. Meanwhile, it became obvious that industry, due to the ongoing relocation of many enterprises from threatened areas, would not be able to satisfy the growing needs of the Armed Forces in the near future.

The Soviet active army in mid-July included 212 divisions and 3 rifle brigades ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 33, l. 82a.). Of these, only 90 were fully equipped.

The shortage of military equipment and weapons, the beginning of the formation of many reserve units and formations, as well as the highly maneuverable nature of military operations, confronted the Soviet command with the need to make major changes to the organizational structure of the troops.

Headquarters on July 15, in a directive letter to the commanders-in-chief of troops of strategic directions, commanders of fronts, armies and military districts, indicated the need, at the first opportunity, to gradually, without prejudice to current operations, prepare the transition to a system of small armies “in five to a maximum of six divisions without corps commands and with direct subordination of divisions to the army commander" ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 77, l. 59.). The same letter outlined the decision to disband the mechanized corps and change the staffing structure of rifle, cavalry and aviation formations and units.

According to the staff approved on July 29, the number of rifle divisions was reduced by 30 percent, the number of artillery in it by 52 percent, and vehicles by 64 percent. The combat capabilities of the rifle division in terms of firepower and maneuverability were greatly reduced. Compared to the German infantry division, it now had 1.5 times less people, 1.4 times less small arms, 2.1 times less guns and mortars ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5. pp. 242, 243, 704.). In fact, there were even fewer personnel and weapons in the rifle division.

The situation was no better with tank, cavalry and aviation formations and artillery units.

To restore and maintain their combat effectiveness, mechanized corps required a large number of tanks, and industry was not yet able to provide them. Therefore, these corps were disbanded. The lack of armored vehicles did not allow the preservation of individual tank divisions.

The main tactical formation of the armored forces became a brigade, and the cavalry - a division of about 3 thousand people. In aviation, three-regiment air divisions were replaced by two-regiment ones, with the number of aircraft in regiments being reduced from 60 to 30, and then to 22.

The artillery also underwent serious organizational changes. The insufficient supply of anti-tank artillery equipment forced the brigades to be disbanded and instead regiments of five batteries and then four batteries of 16 guns each were created. The cannon and howitzer regiments of the reserve of the High Command (RGK) were transferred to reduced staffing levels. In this regard, their fire capabilities decreased by 2 times.

The forced transition to the formation of units and formations with a reduced number of weapons, almost without mechanized vehicles, sharply reduced their combat power and maneuverability.

The lack of weapons and the resulting reorganization of troops forced commanders of all levels to look for appropriate tactical techniques for conducting combat operations, new forms and methods of using military branches and various types of weapons. Thus, for a more expedient and centralized use of limited aviation forces, reserve aviation groups subordinate to the Supreme High Command began to be created in August. They solved combat missions independently or were recruited to strengthen the air forces of the fronts. In order to more effectively use artillery weapons in battle and operations, assignment of tasks to artillery units and responsibility for their implementation were assigned to artillery commanders, who were appointed deputies to combined arms commanders and commanders.

The reorganization of troops at the tactical and operational levels in accordance with the requirements of the directive letter from Headquarters did not take place as a one-act event. In contrast to the restructuring of the highest military governing bodies and the central apparatus, which was carried out in a relatively short time, it continued almost until the end of 1941.

Due to the increased need for command personnel, the system of their training has changed significantly. The work of military educational institutions was completely restructured. A wide network of short-term courses was deployed at military academies, schools, front and army headquarters. The training system for junior command personnel of the Soviet Army was expanded.

The need to make up for combat losses, recruit a large number of new military units for the front and create reserves required the call-up of additional contingents of USSR citizens. In August, the mobilization of military personnel from 1890 to 1904 was announced. and conscripts born before 1923. The size of the Armed Forces also increased due to the creation of the people's militia, which was a special expression of the patriotism of the Soviet people - a manifestation of a sense of high civic responsibility for the fate of the Motherland.

Despite their deep advance into the country, the Nazis in the initial period of the war, faced with increasing resistance from Soviet troops day by day, were unable to defeat the main forces of the Soviet Army in the western regions of the USSR, that is, to solve the immediate task of the Barbarossa plan.

By mid-July, the enemy had 182 divisions on the Soviet-German front. Fourteen divisions were in the reserve of the main command of the German ground forces.

Fascist troops continued to carry out the tasks assigned to them in the directive on strategic concentration and deployment. The closest of them were: for the German army group "North" and the Finnish armies - the capture of Leningrad, for the army group "Center" - the defeat of Soviet troops in the Smolensk-Moscow direction and for the army group "South" - the capture of Kyiv and the encirclement of Soviet troops on the Right Bank Ukraine. At the same time, Army Group "Center" was supposed to encircle the armies of the Western Front with a bilateral envelopment and, having broken their "last organized resistance... open the way to Moscow" ( F. Halder. War diary, vol. 3, book. 1, p. 101.).

Advancing with the main forces of Army Group Center on Moscow, the Nazis hoped, after capturing the area between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, to send its mobile troops - the 3rd Panzer Group of General G. Hoth - to help Army Group North or to the east to attack Moscow , and the 2nd Panzer Group of General G. Guderian - in a southern or southeastern direction to support the offensive of Army Group South.

The Finnish armies, which went on the offensive on July 10, were supposed to advance on both sides of Lake Ladoga and assist German troops in capturing Leningrad. At the same time, they were entrusted with the task of capturing Soviet Karelia.

The Soviet command, in order to prevent the enemy from further advancing deeper into the country, continued to take measures to stabilize the front and strengthen the active army. Having timely determined that the decisive direction was the western, where the enemy was rushing through Smolensk to Moscow, it sent there up to 80 percent of all troops deployed from the depths of the country. Most of them, who arrived in the first half of July, were already fighting in the Smolensk battle that had begun.

By order of the Headquarters of July 14, 1941, to ensure the junction between the troops of the North-Western and Western directions, the 29th and 30th armies were deployed from Staraya Russa to Olenino, consisting of 10 divisions, and to the east - in the areas of Torzhok, Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Kalinin, Ruza, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Naro-Fominsk, the formation of the 31st and 32nd armies was completed. Together with the troops of the previously advanced 24th and 28th armies, they united in the front of the reserve armies with the task of “occupying the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk and preparing for a stubborn defense” ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 77, pp. 55-57.). Here, east of the main defensive line, which ran along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers and had already been broken through by the enemy, a second line of defense was created.

On July 18, the Headquarters decided to deploy another front on the distant approaches to Moscow - the front of the Mozhaisk defense line under the command of General P. A. Artemyev. It included three armies, formed from divisions of the border and internal troops of the NKVD and the Moscow people's militia (33rd, 34th) and from the front of the reserve armies (32nd). The front received the task of preparing and defending the line west of the line Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Kaluga ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 77, pp. 65-66.).

The same events, although on a smaller scale, were carried out in the North-Western and South-Western strategic directions.

During the strategic defense, the Soviet Army had to wear down enemy strike forces, stop their advance and prepare for offensive actions. Soviet soldiers were determined to carry out the orders of the Motherland. Military councils of fronts, armies, navies and flotillas, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations have launched a great deal of work to improve the moral and political training of soldiers, their psychological stability and perseverance in defense. The advanced experience of combat activities of troops was widely promoted and introduced into the practice of units and formations. Tank destroyer detachments were created from the most courageous and experienced fighters, commanders and political workers; 40-60 percent of the personnel of these detachments were communists and Komsomol members ( Archives of the Moscow Region, f. 208, op. 2526, d. 46, l. 204.). In party political work, much attention was paid to familiarizing newly arriving reinforcements with the heroic exploits of Soviet soldiers, the nature of the enemy’s actions, his tactics, and characteristic techniques for using tanks, aircraft, and automatic weapons; mobilization of young fighters to quickly master the most effective methods of fighting the enemy, strict implementation of the Headquarters order of July 14, 1941 on the preservation of weapons.

The Communist Party, using various forms and methods of political work in the army and navy, strengthened the faith of soldiers and commanders in victory, in their ability to defeat the enemy. Military councils, commanders, commissars and political agencies explained to the personnel the just nature of the Patriotic War, exposed fascism and the aggressive aspirations of the aggressor and instilled in the soldiers hatred of him and a readiness to overcome all difficulties in the name of victory. The educational work was based on the requirements of the GKO resolution of July 16, the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters of August 16 and the directives of the main political departments of the Soviet Army and Navy to strengthen discipline in the troops ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5456, pp. 1-2; Archives of the Moscow Region, f. 32, op. 795436, no. 1, ll. 191 - 192; op. 920265, no. 3, l. 200.). At party and Komsomol meetings of divisions and units, meetings of the party activists of formations, at meetings of the command staff, specific measures were discussed and outlined to ensure the vanguard role of communists and Komsomol members in carrying out combat missions, strengthening order, and fighting cowards and alarmists. These decisions were persistently implemented. The pages of the military press regularly published materials about loyalty to military duty and the Soviet Motherland, and explained the requirements of the military oath and military regulations.

Due to the fact that individual commanders and political workers replaced political and educational work with administration, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order on October 4 in which he demanded a radical improvement in the education of soldiers, strengthening discipline through methods of persuasion, and the full deployment of agitation and propaganda work. Measures were taken to improve the training of propaganda personnel and to replenish the ranks of agitators with experienced, politically literate soldiers.

The ranks of army and naval communists were replenished through general civil and party mobilizations and the admission of the best fighters and commanders into the party. In accordance with the resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 27 and 29, 1941, during the first 2.5 months of the war, eight party mobilizations were carried out, as a result of which the army and navy received about 94 thousand political fighters (60 percent communists and 40 percent Komsomol members). 58 thousand of them joined the active army, the rest were sent to newly formed units, to military courses and schools ( N. Kirsanov. Party mobilizations to the front during the Great Patriotic War. M., 1972, pp. 39-41.). As the political department of the Western Front noted, political fighters joined “parts of the front in the most difficult moments of the fighting... and were a great force in strengthening the stability of our troops” ( Archives of the Moscow Region, f. 208, op. 2526, no. 25, pp. 282-283.).

In the active army, the influx of applications to party organizations for admission to the party increased. “We want to go into battle as communists,” said many soldiers and commanders.

By the end of 1941, compared with the beginning of the war, the ranks of communists in the active army more than doubled ( History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, vol. 5, book. 1, p. 373.).

In mid-July, a new, extremely difficult stage in the struggle of the Soviet Armed Forces to disrupt Hitler’s plans began. It lasted 2.5 months. During this period, the battles near Leningrad, in the regions of Smolensk, Kyiv, Odessa, as well as in the Far North and Karelia were especially intense.

Due to the critical situation on the outskirts of the capital, on October 20 Moscow was declared in a state of siege. The defense of the lines 100-120 kilometers away was entrusted to the commander of the Western Front, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and at its closest approaches - to the head of the Moscow garrison P.A. Artemyev.

Due to the critical situation on the outskirts of the capital, on October 20 Moscow was declared in a state of siege. The defense of the lines 100-120 kilometers away was entrusted to the commander of the Western Front, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, and at its closest approaches - to the head of the Moscow garrison P.A. Artemyev. The need to strengthen the rear and to intensify the fight against the subversive actions of enemy agents was pointed out.

The population of Moscow was actively involved in the construction of defensive structures around the capital and inside the city. In the shortest possible time, the city was surrounded by anti-tank ditches, hedgehogs, and forest rubble. Anti-tank guns were installed in tank-dangerous areas. From Muscovites, militia divisions, tank destroyer battalions, and combat squads were formed, which, together with regular army units, participated in battles and in maintaining order in the city.

Enemy air raids on Moscow were successfully repelled. By the beginning of the Battle of Moscow, the capital's air defense had a coherent system based on the principle of all-round defense, taking into account the most dangerous directions - the western and southwestern, as well as on the maximum use of the combat capabilities of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons, which closely interacted with each other.

Fighter aircraft fought against enemy air at distant approaches. Its airfields were located within a radius of 150-200 kilometers from Moscow, but as the Germans approached the capital, they relocated closer and closer. During the daytime, fighters operated throughout the entire depth of the defense, and at night, within the light searchlight fields.

On the immediate approaches to Moscow, German planes were fired upon and destroyed by predominantly medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. Its fire was controlled in sectors, each of which housed one anti-aircraft artillery regiment. The regiments formed battle formations in three lines, which had considerable depth. Units and subunits of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and anti-aircraft machine guns were used to provide air cover for important objects inside the city (the Kremlin, train stations, power plants).

Retreating, the German bombers dropped their deadly cargo anywhere.

In October, the enemy carried out 31 raids on Moscow, involving 2018 aircraft, of which 278 were shot down. Moscow air defense troops fought an intense battle with the air enemy and defended the capital from destruction.

The control of Moscow air defense forces and means was carried out centrally from the command post of the 1st Air Defense Corps. The commander of the Moscow air defense zone was General M. S. Gromadin.

In October, fascist aviation carried out 31 raids on Moscow. About 2 thousand aircraft took part in them, but only 72 were able to break through to the bombing targets 1. While repelling the raids in air battles and anti-aircraft artillery fire, 278 German aircraft 2 were shot down.

In the second half of October, it was possible to delay the advance of fascist German troops in the Bryansk Front. This allowed the 3rd and 13th armies, which had been engaged in heavy fighting behind enemy lines for almost three weeks, to break out of encirclement on October 23 and, by order of Headquarters, retreat to a line east of Dubna, Plavsk, Verkhovye, Livny.

The actions of the front troops pinned down the 2nd Tank Army in the Tula direction. She was able to resume attacks only at the end of October, when the offensive of the 4th Army of Army Group Center had already stalled. The enemy's tank divisions advanced from Mtsensk to Tula by October 29, but were stopped here. “The attempt to capture the city on the move,” Guderian wrote after the war, “ran up against strong anti-tank and air defense and ended in failure, and we suffered significant losses in tanks and officers.” For three days, the Nazis furiously attacked Tula, but the troops of the 50th Army and the Tula combat sector, together with the militia, defended themselves selflessly. Communists and Komsomol members of the city and region joined the ranks of the defenders. Their courage was amazing. The Tula people turned their city into an impregnable fortress and did not surrender it to the enemy. A major role in organizing the struggle for Tula was played by the city defense committee, headed by the first secretary of the regional party committee V.G. Zhavoronkov, who in those days was a member of the Military Council of the 50th Army.

The defense of Tula ensured the stability of the left wing of the Western Front on the far southern approaches to the capital. It also contributed to stabilizing the situation on the Bryansk Front.

Thus, the October offensive of fascist German troops on Moscow failed. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive on the line Selizharovo, Kalinin, Tula, Novosil.

The most important condition for thwarting the enemy's intentions was the creation of reserves in a short time, most of which were brought into battle in the Western Front at the turn of the Mozhaisk defense line.

Along with the ground forces, the Soviet Air Force played a huge role in repelling the fierce onslaught of the Nazis. In the first nine days of the enemy offensive on Moscow alone, Western Front aviation, the 6th Air Defense Aviation Corps and DVA units carried out 3,500 sorties, destroying a significant number of enemy aircraft, tanks and manpower. In total, from September 30 to October 31, the Air Force carried out 26 thousand sorties, of which up to 80 percent were to support and cover troops.

The enemy also experienced the force of powerful attacks from Soviet tanks and artillery. Tank brigades blocked the path of fascist troops in particularly dangerous directions.

To disrupt the enemy's offensive, anti-tank areas and strongholds, as well as various engineering obstacles, were set up.

Soldiers of all branches of the military in the battles on the outskirts of Moscow showed examples of fulfilling military duty and the irresistible strength of moral spirit, and showed mass heroism. In these battles, units of the rifle divisions distinguished themselves: the 316th under General I.V. Panfilov, the 78th under Colonel A.P. Beloborodov, the 32nd under Colonel V.I. Polosukhin, the 50th under General N.F. Lebedenko, the 53rd 1st Colonel A.F. Naumov, 239th Colonel G.O. Martirosyan, as well as the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division Colonel A.I. Lizyukov, the cavalry group of General L.M. Dovator, tank brigades led by M.E. Katukov, P. A. Rotmistrov, I. F. Kirichenko, M. T. Sakhno, and many other compounds.

The results of the October offensive did not please the Nazis. The main goals of Operation Typhoon - the destruction of the Soviet Army and the capture of Moscow - were not achieved. The outcome of the bloody battles was unexpected not only for the soldiers, but also for the Wehrmacht generals.

The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops was the main reason for the hesitation that appeared among the Wehrmacht command, the divergence of opinions in determining the ways of further waging the war against the Soviet Union. At the beginning of November, Franz Halder, at that time the chief of the German General Staff, wrote in his diary: “We must, by analyzing the current situation, accurately determine our capabilities for conducting subsequent operations. There are two extreme points of view on this issue: some consider it necessary to gain a foothold on the achieved positions, others demand to actively continue the offensive.”

But in fact, the Nazis had no choice. Winter was approaching, and the goals of Plan Barbarossa remained unfulfilled. The enemy was in a hurry, trying at all costs to capture the capital of the Soviet Union before the onset of winter.

The plan of the fascist German command to continue the offensive in November contained the same idea as in October: with two mobile groups, simultaneously deliver crushing blows to the flanks of the Western Front and, quickly bypassing Moscow from the north and south, close the encirclement ring east of the capital.

In the first half of November, the fascist German command regrouped its troops: from near Kalinin it transferred the 3rd Tank Group to the Volokolamsk-Klin direction, and replenished the 2nd Tank Army with more than a hundred tanks, concentrating its main forces on the right flank to bypass Tula .

Army Group Center by November 15, 1941 included three field armies, one tank army and two tank groups, numbering 73 divisions (47 infantry, 1 cavalry, 14 tank, 8 motorized, 3 security) and 4 brigades.

The task of enveloping Moscow from the north (Operation Volga Reservoir) was assigned to the 3rd and 4th German tank groups consisting of seven tank, three motorized and four infantry divisions, and from the south to the 2nd Panzer Army consisting of four tank, three motorized and five infantry divisions. The 4th Army was to conduct a frontal offensive, pin down the main forces of the Western Front, and then destroy them west of Moscow. The 9th and 2nd armies, shackled by the troops of the Kalinin and Southwestern fronts, were actually deprived of the opportunity to take part in the November offensive. In total, the fascist German command allocated 51 divisions, including 13 tank and 7 motorized, directly for the capture of Moscow.

Assessing the current situation, the Soviet command clearly understood that the relative weakening of tension on the front near Moscow was temporary, that although the enemy had suffered serious losses, it had not yet lost its offensive capabilities, retained the initiative and superiority in forces and means, and would persistently strive to capture Moscow. Therefore, all measures were taken to repel the expected attack. At the same time, new armies were formed and deployed at the line of Vytegra, Rybinsk, Gorky, Saratov, Stalingrad, Astrakhan as strategic reserves.

The headquarters, having determined the enemy’s intentions and capabilities, decided

strengthen the most dangerous areas first. She demanded

from the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the Kalinin and right wing of the Southwestern Front, to prevent a bypass of Moscow from the north

west and south. His armies were reinforced with anti-tank artillery and

guards mortar units. In Volokolamsk and Serpukhov

in these directions the reserves of the Headquarters were concentrated; The 16th Army was re-

three cavalry divisions were given; the 2nd Cavalry Corps (two divisions) arrived in the Podolsk, Mikhnevo area from the Southwestern Front, part

which additionally included rifle and tank divisions. For the first

half of November the Western Front received a total of 100 thousand.

Kalinin Front - 30th Army.

The German shock groups were opposed by the 30th, 16th and partly the 5th armies on the right and the 50th and 49th armies on the left wing of the Western Front.

The command of the Western Front, having strengthened the troops operating north-west and south-west of Moscow, organized counterattacks in the 16th Army zone towards Volokolamsk and in the Skirmanovo area, as well as in the 49th Army zone - in the Serpukhov direction. According to the fascist command, the counterattack in the 49th Army zone did not allow the 4th German Army to go on the offensive here in the second half of November 3.

In total, the troops of the Western Front (including the 30th Army) by mid-November included 35 rifle, 3 motorized rifle, 3 tank, 12 cavalry divisions, 14 tank brigades. As before, the Soviet divisions were significantly inferior in number to the German ones. Despite the strengthening of the troops of the Western Front, the fascist German armies in November continued to maintain an overall numerical superiority in men and military equipment near Moscow, especially in the directions of the main attacks. So, in the Klin direction, against 56 tanks and 210 guns and mortars that the 30th Army had, the enemy had up to 300 tanks and 910 guns and mortars.

By concentrating about 1,000 aircraft near Moscow (although many of them were of outdated types), the Soviet command created a quantitative superiority over the enemy in aviation. To gain air supremacy, the Headquarters ordered the commander of the Air Force of the Soviet Army to carry out an operation to destroy German aviation at airfields from November 5 to 8. The air forces of the Kalinin, Western, Bryansk fronts, the 81st division of the DBA and the aviation of the Moscow defense zone were involved in it. 28 enemy airfields were hit, and on November 12 and 15, 19 more, where 88 aircraft were destroyed.

Much attention was paid to the engineering equipment of the area. The troops improved their positions and created operational barrier zones. Intensive construction of defensive lines continued. On the outer border of the Moscow zone alone, by November 25, 1,428 bunkers, 165 km of anti-tank ditches, 110 km of three-row wire fences and other obstacles had been built.

The air defense of the capital continued to be strengthened and improved. According to the decision of the State Defense Committee of November 9, 1941, the country's air defense zones were removed from the subordination of military councils of districts and fronts and were subordinate to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Air Defense, who actually became the commander of the country's Air Defense Forces as an independent branch of the USSR Armed Forces. At the same time, all air defense zones in the European part of the Soviet Union were transformed into divisional and corps air defense areas. The Moscow air defense zone became the Moscow corps air defense region.

In those difficult days, the Soviet people celebrated the 24th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The ceremonial meeting of the Moscow Council of Workers' Deputies on November 6, the parade of troops on Red Square on November 7 and the speeches of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin played an important role in strengthening the confidence of the people and the army that the enemy near Moscow would be stopped, that here, at walls of the capital, the defeat of the Nazi invaders will begin.

Addressing the soldiers leaving Red Square for the front, J.V. Stalin said on behalf of the party and the people: “The whole world is looking at you as a force capable of destroying the predatory hordes of German invaders. The enslaved peoples of Europe, who fell under the yoke of the German invaders, look at you as their liberators.”

After a two-week pause, Army Group Center resumed its attack on the Soviet capital. On the morning of November 15, powerful artillery and aviation preparation began, and then the 3rd Tank Group dealt a strong blow to the 30th Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko. Part of the troops of this army, located north of the Volga Reservoir, by order of the command on November 16, retreated to the northeastern bank of the Volga.

The formations defending south of the reservoir offered stubborn resistance to the enemy. Only in the second half of November 16 was the enemy able to cross the Lama River, losing up to 60 tanks and armored vehicles. By the end of November 17, he managed to reach the Novozavidovsky area. The situation at the junction of the Kalinin and Western fronts became extremely complicated. To eliminate the threat of an enemy breakthrough to Klin, the front command reinforced the 30th Army with two divisions and organized several air strikes in its zone against the advancing enemy troops.

On November 16, in the Volokolamsk direction, the 4th German Tank Group (at least 400 tanks) with massive air support went on the offensive against the 16th Army. Its main blow fell at the junction of the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov and the group of troops of General L.M. Dovator. In decisive battles with the fascists, Panfilov’s heroes immortalized their names. In the area of ​​the Dubosekovo crossing, 28 Panfilov men, having destroyed 18 tanks and dozens of fascists in four hours of unequal battle, did not let the enemy through.

And on the same day, part of the forces of the 16th Army, with the support of aviation, launched a powerful counterattack on the enemy. The defenders of Moscow also fought steadfastly on other sectors of the front. In the Istra direction, the 78th Infantry Division defended itself especially stubbornly.

Events at the front in the period from November 16 to 21 showed that the main forces of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, which had the task of making quick operational breakthroughs and a rapid bypass of Moscow, found themselves drawn into protracted battles. The pace of the enemy offensive continuously decreased and did not exceed 3-5 km per day even among mobile troops. The Nazis had to overcome strong defenses, while repelling counterattacks from rifle, tank and cavalry formations. The enemy's attempts to encircle any division were, as a rule, unsuccessful. To capture each subsequent line, he was forced to organize the offensive anew.

The Western Front was actively assisted by Kalininsky, whose troops firmly pinned down the 9th German field army, not allowing it to transfer a single division to the Moscow direction.

On November 19, the command of Army Group Center, having strengthened the 3rd Tank Group with tank and motorized divisions, demanded that it capture Klin and Solnechnogorsk as soon as possible. To avoid encirclement, Soviet troops abandoned these cities on November 23 after stubborn street fighting.

The enemy's pressure did not weaken in other sectors of the defense either. Particularly stubborn battles were fought by the troops of the 16th and partly the 5th armies at the turn of the Istra River. Soviet divisions held back the fierce attacks of the Nazis here for three days and inflicted great damage on them. However, on November 27, the 16th Army had to leave the city of Istra.

Despite significant losses, the enemy continued to rush towards Moscow, using up their last reserves. But he failed to cut through the defense front of the Soviet troops.

The Soviet command assessed the created situation as very dangerous, but not at all hopeless. It saw that the troops were determined to prevent the enemy from approaching Moscow and were fighting steadfastly and selflessly. Every day it became more obvious that the enemy’s capabilities were not unlimited and as reserves were spent, his onslaught would inevitably weaken.

The assessment of the current situation given by the Wehrmacht leadership in those days can be judged by Halder’s entry in his service diary: “Field Marshal von Bock personally directs the course of the battle near Moscow from his forward command post. His... energy drives the troops forward... The troops are completely exhausted and incapable of attacking... Von Bock compares the current situation with the situation in the battle of the Marne, pointing out that a situation has arisen where the last battalion thrown into battle can decide the outcome battles." However, the Nazis’ calculations for each “last” battalion did not come true. The enemy suffered heavy losses, but was unable to break through to Moscow.

After the capture of Klin and Solnechnogorsk, the enemy made an attempt to develop his attack northwest of Moscow. On the night of November 28, he managed with a small force to cross to the eastern bank of the Moscow-Volga canal in the Yakhroma area north of Iksha.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the command of the Western Front took urgent measures to eliminate the created danger. Reserve formations and troops from neighboring areas were transferred to the Kryukovo, Khlebnikovo, and Yakhroma areas. An important role in changing the situation north of Moscow was played by the timely movement from reserve to the line of the Moscow-Volga canal between Dmitrov and Iksha of the 1st Shock Army under the command of General V.I. Kuznetsov. Its advanced units pushed the enemy back to the western bank of the canal.

At the end of November and beginning of December, the 1st Shock and the newly formed 20th Armies, with the active support of the aviation group of General I. F. Petrov, launched a series of counterattacks against the Nazi troops and, together with the 30th and 16th Armies, finally stopped them further promotion. The enemy was forced to go on the defensive. The threat of a breakthrough to Moscow from the north-west and north was eliminated.

Events on the left wing of the Western Front unfolded extremely sharply and intensely. Here the 2nd German Tank Army was able to resume the offensive only on November 18. After unsuccessful attempts to capture Tula from the south and north-west, the command of Army Group Center decided to launch an offensive in a northerly direction, bypassing the city from the east.

The strike force of the 2nd Tank Army, consisting of four tank, three motorized, and five infantry divisions, supported by aviation, broke through the defenses of the 50th Army and, developing an offensive, captured Stalinogorsk (Novomoskovsk) on November 22. Its formations rushed towards Venev and Kashira. Fierce fighting broke out.

The front commander demanded that the 50th Army “under no circumstances allow the enemy to penetrate into the Venev area.” This city and the approaches to it were defended by a combat group consisting of a regiment of the 173rd Infantry Division, the 11th and 32nd Tank Brigades (30 light tanks), and a tank destroyer battalion formed from the local population. Without breaking the group's resistance with frontal attacks, the 17th German Panzer Division bypassed the city from the east. On November 25, its advanced units found themselves 10-15 km from Kashira.

The other two divisions of the 2nd Tank Army advanced on Mikhailov and Serebryanye Prudy. The Nazis sought to take Kashira as quickly as possible and seize the crossings on the Oka.

To stop the advance of the enemy’s southern attack group, the Western Front command on November 27 carried out a counterattack in the Kashira area with formations reinforced by tanks and rocket artillery of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. As a result of the counterattack, the corps, with the support of front aviation and Moscow air defense units, inflicted a heavy defeat on the enemy's 17th Tank Division and by November 30th threw it back to the Mordves area.

Thus, the stubborn defense of Tula and the persistent resistance of Soviet troops in the areas of Stalinogorsk and Venev thwarted the enemy’s plans. The 2nd Tank Army was unable to capture the crossings across the Oka River.

After this failure, the Nazis made desperate attempts to capture Tula with a blow from the east and northeast. They believed that in the current situation it was impossible to “conduct further operations to the north or east... without first capturing this important communications hub and airfield.”

On December 3, the enemy managed to cut the railway and highway north of Tula. At the same time, he increased pressure on the city from the west at the junction of the 49th and 50th armies. The struggle reached its highest intensity. To eliminate the breakthrough north of Tula, the 50th Army of General I.V. Boldin launched a counterattack on the enemy in the Kostrovo, Revyakino area, where it surrounded part of the forces of the 4th German Tank Division.

Active actions by the troops of the left wing of the Western Front in early December forced the 2nd German Tank Army to begin withdrawing. At the critical moment of the battle in the Kashira and Tula regions, she could not receive help from her neighbor on the right - the 2nd Field Army, the main forces of which were drawn into protracted battles with the troops of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Yelets direction.

The enemy suffered setbacks north and south of Moscow. On December 1, he tried to break through to the city in the center of the Western Front. He dealt strong blows in the Naro-Fominsk area and pushed back the defending divisions. The front command immediately responded to this with a counterattack, using the reserve of the 33rd and its neighboring armies. The enemy was driven back across the Nara River with heavy losses. Thus, his last attempt to save Operation Typhoon failed. The Nazis also failed to carry out their plan to destroy Moscow with air strikes. Strengthening air defense has yielded results. In November, only a few planes broke through to the city. In total, during the period July - December 1941, Moscow air defense forces repelled 122 air raids, in which 7,146 aircraft took part. Only 229 aircraft, or a little more than 3 percent, were able to break through to the city.

The Nazis' attempts to carry out extensive reconnaissance, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities were also unsuccessful. State security agencies neutralized about 200 fascist agents in the capital and its suburbs. In addition, in the combat area of ​​the Western Front, border guard units for rear protection detained over 75 spies and saboteurs, and eliminated several enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups. In the Moscow direction, the enemy did not manage to commit a single sabotage in the rear of the Soviet troops, disrupt the work of industrial enterprises, transport, or disrupt the supply of the active army. Using captured and self-confessed enemy agents, Soviet counterintelligence officers, together with the military command, misinformed enemy intelligence about the location and redeployment of formations and formations of troops, their command posts, and the work of the Moscow road junction. As a result, the Nazi command did not have reliable data on the deployment of reserves to the Moscow region.

The end of November - beginning of December was a period of crisis in the Nazi offensive on Moscow. The plan to encircle and capture the Soviet capital was a complete failure. “The attack on Moscow failed. All the sacrifices and efforts of our valiant troops were in vain. We suffered a serious defeat,” Guderian wrote after the war. The enemy was completely exhausted, his reserves were exhausted. “The information we had said that all the reserves that von Bock had were used and drawn into battle,” noted Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky. The failure of Operation Typhoon became a fait accompli.

In those difficult, decisive days of the battle for the capital, Pravda wrote: “We must at all costs thwart Hitler’s predatory plan... Our whole country is waiting for this... The defeat of the enemy must begin near Moscow!”

Trains with weapons and ammunition were arriving at the front in a continuous stream. Fresh reserves of the Headquarters were concentrated in the areas northeast and southeast of the capital. Moscow and Tula became front-line arsenals of the fighting troops.

An important measure in disrupting the new enemy onslaught near Moscow was the counteroffensive organized by Headquarters in mid-November near Tikhvin and Rostov-on-Don. The Nazi Army Groups North and South, repelling the advance of Soviet troops, were deprived of the opportunity to assist Army Group Center in the decisive days. These were the first serious harbingers of great changes on the entire Soviet-German front.

So, the offensive of the Nazi troops on Moscow in November also ended in complete failure.

Army Group Center failed to achieve the objectives of Operation Typhoon. Its troops were drained of blood and lost their offensive capabilities. During the battles from November 16 to December 5, the Wehrmacht lost 155 thousand soldiers and officers, 777 tanks, hundreds of guns and mortars near Moscow. Frontline aviation and Moscow air defense forces shot down many aircraft in air battles and destroyed them at airfields. During two months of defensive battles, the Soviet Air Force carried out more than 51 thousand sorties, of which 14 percent were to provide air cover for the capital. Here, in the Moscow direction, by December 1941, they for the first time won operational supremacy in the air. The Air Guard was born in the skies of the Moscow region. The 29th, 129th, 155th, 526th Fighter, 215th Attack and 31st Bomber Aviation Regiments received the title of Guards.

On December 4-5, 1941, the defensive period of the Battle of Moscow ended. The Soviet Armed Forces defended the capital, stopping the advance of the fascist hordes.