The fate of the gold reserves of Tsarist Russia. Valery Kurnosov - a journey behind the secret of Tsar's gold The story of Tsar's gold

1 part. About Russian gold during the First World War

In the history of Russian gold during the First World War, many dramatic events in the internal and international life of the Russian Empire were reflected like a drop of water.

Gold reserves of the Russian Empire on the eve of the war.

By the beginning of the First World War, Russia had a fairly large reserve of gold - 1233 tons in the vaults of the State Bank of the Russian Empire. This does not count the approximately 300 tons of “yellow” metal that was in circulation in the form of coins. On the eve of the First World War, Russia was in second place in the world in terms of the volume of centralized gold reserves, second only to the United States. In 1915 (data at the beginning of the year) it continued to maintain its gold reserves, although it lost second place to France.

Official gold reserves of the leading countries of the world in the period 1845-1915. (T)

	Total worldwide	Great Britain		Germany

Notes:

Source : Timothy Green. Central Bank Gold Reserves. An historical perspective since 1845. World Gold Council. November 1999.

Russia has been accumulating its gold for several decades, the rate of accumulation was high. In 1865, when Russia had just embarked on the path of capitalist development, the reserve was only 57 tons. In 1895, as a result of targeted government efforts, it grew to almost 700 tons. Gold was necessary for the monetary reform of 1897; as a result of the reform, the golden ruble was born. Over the next two decades, Russia's gold reserves increased another 1.8 times. After all, the coverage of paper money circulation according to the laws of the Russian Empire was the highest among the countries that established the gold standard (almost 100%). True, the Russian gold ruble was expensive. How did the gold reserves grow?

Firstly, due to the extraction of yellow metal within the country. This is perhaps the main source of reserve formation. According to our estimates, for the period 1891-1914. About 1 thousand tons of yellow metal were mined in Russia.

Secondly, due to the export of Russia's main export product - wheat and some other grains. During the period of the country's preparation for monetary reform (transition to the gold standard), the proportion of harvest distribution between domestic consumption and exports in favor of the latter changed quite significantly. The implementation of the slogan “we’d ​​rather not finish eating, but we’ll take it out” undermined the social foundation of the village, and, therefore, the entire country (its population was predominantly rural).

Thirdly, by attracting gold from abroad in the form of loans. This sharply increased Russia's external debt - primarily to France and Great Britain, and brought it into the category of the main debtor before the First World War. Before World War I, Russia had the largest foreign debt in the world.

Government measures to preserve gold reserves after the outbreak of war.

The First World War made it extremely difficult to support the issue of paper money with a centralized supply of gold. During these years, it was no longer necessary to talk about 100 percent coverage of the issue of credit notes in gold; several times during the war the standards for covering money issues with gold reserves were revised

For 1915-1916 The issuing rights of the State Bank were expanded four times. As a result of this liberalization of the emission policy, the volume of paper money issued during the war years increased almost 4 times, and the purchasing power of the ruble at the beginning of 1917 was less than 1/3 of the level at the beginning of 1914. The backing of paper money with gold by the time of the February Revolution of 1917 was, at best, 13%.

All this contributed to the transformation of the State Bank into a kind of “emission factory”, completely curtailing operations in the commercial loan market.

Unlike the central banks of other European countries, in Russia the State Bank was under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance, which facilitated the task of transforming it into a body for financing military expenditures.

Despite the policy taken to increase emissions, the monetary authorities did not abandon measures to preserve and centralize the gold reserves in the State Bank. The most important of them were the following.

1. Stop the exchange of paper money (credit notes) for gold.

On June 27, 1914, Emperor Nicholas II approved the Law “On the suspension of the exchange of bank notes for gold.” The cessation of the exchange of paper money for gold at this time was carried out in all leading countries of the gold standard with the exception of the United States.

2. Measures against the diversion of gold abroad through private and commercial channels. Among them are tightening the rules for issuing foreign currency when individuals travel abroad, introducing control over foreign trade contracts, payment for which required foreign currency, etc.

3. Refusal to maintain the ruble exchange rate through gold and foreign exchange interventions.

4. Appeal to the population to make contributions in gold in monetary and non-monetary forms for the needs of the war. “Under the influence of the appeal to the population, patriotic contributions in gold coins and gold products began, both as a gift for the needs of the war and in exchange for credit notes, which ensured an increase in revenues in the gold account of the State Bank in coins, bullion and banknotes.” However, this measure had limited effectiveness, because Most of the gold coins that were in circulation before the war ended up in the hands of the population within a short time and were hoarded.

5. Purchases of gold from mining companies and the population. “Along with gold mining, gold bars were purchased for foreign currency at par with an 8% commission, and a little later a premium of 30% was established for gold supplied to the treasury from gold-alloying laboratories and the Mint.”

6. Attracting foreign loans and domestic loans to finance military expenses, and also partly to build up the position of “gold abroad”

Measures to stabilize monetary circulation in wartime conditions.

During the First World War, Russia's foreign debt continued to increase. New loans received from abroad were used not only to finance military expenses. Part of the foreign loans (primarily received from Great Britain) were “frozen” and represented funds that were deposited in the accounts of foreign banks and remained there without movement. In fact, these were fictitious credit transactions that created the impression of growth in that part of the state gold reserve that was classified as “gold abroad.” This fictitious increase in Russia's gold reserves ultimately pursued the goal of increasing the issue of paper money by the State Bank of Russia against the supposedly increased reserves of gold, which was necessary to finance military expenses within the country.

Thus, the following operations were carried out sequentially:

1) transfer of physical gold from Russia to the UK as collateral;

2) provision by Great Britain of “targeted” loans to Russia, secured by the received gold, to increase the volume of “gold abroad”;

3) the issue by the State Bank of the Russian Empire of an additional amount of paper money supply, taking into account the allegedly increased gold reserves of the country.

These operations were of a fairly secret nature, which made it possible to maintain the illusion, both in Russia and especially abroad, of the reliable backing of the Russian currency with gold. This kind of scheme was imposed on Russia by Great Britain and had such unpleasant consequences as an increase in the country’s external debt, a decrease in the state reserve of physical gold, and a depreciation of the Russian ruble in the domestic money market.

The external depreciation of the ruble occurred much more slowly: the illusion of a significant increase in Russia's gold reserves contributed to maintaining its relatively high exchange rate on international markets.

As a result of the export of physical gold and loans received from the “allies”, the item “gold abroad” in the balance sheet of the State Bank increased and amounted to (million rubles):

As of 07/01/1914 - 143.8

As of 01/01/1915 - 172.5

As of 01/01/1916 - 646.1

As of 01/01/1917 - 2146.7.

According to official data, the amount of the gold reserve of the State Bank for 1914-1916. increased from 1695 to 3617 million rubles, however, if at the beginning of this period “gold abroad” accounted for several percent, then at the end of the period it accounted for about 2/3.

Russian gold begins to flow to the British Isles.

During the years of the First World War (until the beginning of 1917), the gold reserve of the Russian Empire (excluding the position of “gold abroad”) decreased by approximately 462 tons. This decrease is almost exclusively due to the transfer of part of the Russian gold reserve to the Bank of England to form a special guarantee gold reserve , as mentioned above. It is known that at the beginning of the war, Russia transferred 498 tons of gold to the Bank of England; 58 tons were soon sold, and the remaining 440 tons were kept in the Bank of England vaults as collateral. In addition, the country's monetary authorities actually lost most of the gold that was in circulation before the war: in the first month of the war, the gold coin disappeared from circulation and was never returned to the treasury. By January 1, 1917, according to the State Bank, there were 436 million rubles worth of gold coins left in the hands of citizens. , which in terms of pure gold is equivalent to 337 tons of metal.

Russia was constantly under pressure from Great Britain and its other “allies,” who demanded additional supplies of Russian gold as a condition for providing military loans at the interstate level. In the first two years of the war, Russia managed to restrain these Western aspirations. Where possible, it resorted to financing military purchases by means that did not require the transfer of precious metal abroad (commercial loans, government loans from the United States and Japan). However, later gold began to leave the treasury outside the country, primarily to Great Britain.

During the war, Russia transferred 498 tons of gold to the Bank of England; 58 tons were soon sold, and the remaining 440 tons were kept in the Bank of England vaults as collateral

According to the Soviet historian A.L. Sidorov, gold deliveries to England were carried out in December 1915, June 1916 and February 1917. As S.M. Borisov notes, “in return, interest-free obligations were issued for a period of 3 to 5 years in returning gold after the war. These obligations were credited to the balance sheet of the State Bank as “Gold Abroad,” which made it possible to use them as formal security for the ongoing issue of credit notes. It is interesting to note that the last shipment abroad in February 1917 of about 147 tons of gold was not reflected in the official statistics of the State Bank: on October 23, 1917, the article “Gold in Russia” showed the presence of 1000 tons of metal. Obviously, the sent gold continued to be listed in the “On the way” section, where metal that had already left the country but had not yet arrived was taken into account.”

This is how the authors of the book “The Economy of a Sovereign Democracy” describe the “disappearance” of the last batch of “royal” gold sent to the Bank of England: “The gold in transit continued to be listed on Russia’s balance sheet until it was officially confirmed by the Bank of England. The agreed route ran through all of Russia to Vladivostok and further (on Japanese military ships) to Ottawa (Canada) (one of the overseas vaults of the Bank of England was located there - V.K.). The Bank of England double-checked the receipt of gold and gave confirmation to Russia. Only after this did the State Bank transfer the corresponding amount from the “gold in Russia” column to the “gold abroad” column. Gold sent from Vladivostok in November 1916 reached Ottawa in August 1917, but as early as October 8, 1917, gold worth 189.5 million rubles was listed on the balance sheet of the State Bank. It was never capitalized by the Bank of England...And this is just an episode of the usual thievery practice of international bankers.”

According to some reports, 5.5 tons of Nicholas II’s personal gold was also sent to Great Britain at the beginning of 1917 (to the Bering brothers’ bank).

The first shipment of gold to the UK was sent from Arkhangelsk to Liverpool on the Mantua transport. Subsequently, due to the risk of sinking transport by German submarines, gold for Great Britain began to be sent through the Far East (especially since Great Britain determined that the final destination of gold was not the British Isles, but Canada, where it had its own storage facilities). It should be noted that part of the gold intended for Great Britain was “intercepted” (more precisely, captured) by Japan in the Far East and never reached its destination.

Sending gold from Russia to the UK

Dispatch time	Batch volume (weight and cost indicators)	Notes
October 1914	58.8 t / 8 million f. Art./75 million 120 thousand gold rub.	Gold, in accordance with the secret British-Russian agreement (October 1914), was delivered on the British transport "Mantua" along the route Arkhangelsk - Liverpool to the Bank of England
Late December 1915	73.5 t / 10 million f. Art. / 93 million 897.5 thousand gold. rub.
Mid-June 1916	73.5 t / 10 million f. Art. / 93 million 897.5 thousand gold rub.	Gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antento-Russian financial agreement (December 1915) to the Bank of England*
Beginning of November 1916	147 t / 20 million f. Art. / 187 million 795 thousand tons of ash. rub.	Gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antento-Russian financial agreement (December 1915) to the Bank of England*
February 1917	147 t / 20 million f. Art. / 187 million 795 thousand gold. rub.	Gold was sent through the Far East in accordance with the secret Antento-Russian financial agreement (February 1917) to the Bank of England*. Didn't reach the destination because... was intercepted by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan)
February 1917	5.5 t / 8.0 million gold rub.	Personal gold of Nicholas II. Sent via the Far East to the English bank of the Baring brothers (London).* Did not reach its destination, because... was intercepted by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan).
	505.3 t / about 646 million gold. rub.	352.8 tons reached their destinations; Japan intercepted 152.5 tons

* The route for gold - the State Bank vault (European part of Russia), then by rail through Siberia to Vladivostok, then across the Pacific Ocean on chartered Japanese military ships to Vancouver (Canada) or San Francisco (USA), then to Ottawa (one from overseas vaults of the Bank of England) or across North America to the east coast, then to Liverpool or London (vaults of the Bank of England).

Sources :

V. Novitzky. The Russian Gold Reserve before and during the World and Civil Wars (1883-1921). In: “Russian Gold: a collection of articles and statistical data reporting the Russian Gold Reserve and shipments of Soviet Gold.” New York, Amtorg Trading Corporation, Information Department, 1928, p.12-15;

A.L. Sidorov. The financial situation of Russia during the First World War. M., 1960;

V.A. Sirotkin. Foreign gold of Russia. M.: "Olma-Press", 2000.

To get a more complete picture of the movement of the imperial gold reserves in the period from August 1914 to October 1917, we present a table that was presented by the Russian emigrant S.G. Petrov in his material prepared in the 90s of the last century and in which all indicators are expressed in monetary units - gold rubles and pounds sterling (Table 3). As can be seen from this table, the total value of gold exported abroad during the specified period amounted to 643.36 million gold rubles, which, based on the official gold parity of the Russian currency, is equivalent to 498 tons of pure gold.

Thus, the general estimates of gold exports given in Table 2 are slightly higher than the estimates in Table 3, but there are no fundamental differences in these estimates.

Indicator/operation	Million angry rub.
(A) Balance at the beginning of the First World War
(B) Exported abroad during the First World War 1) sold to Great Britain and sent in October 1914 in order to provide a loan to pay for military supplies of 8 million pounds sterling 2) Sent to the UK via Vladivostok and Canada on Japanese military ships as a loan December 1915 - 10 million pounds sterling June 1916 - £10 million November 1916 - £20 million Total - £40 million 3) Sent to the UK via Vladivostok and Canada on Japanese military ships under an agreement to provide an additional loan of 20 million pounds sterling 4) Sent to Sweden in October 1917 for the purchase of military supplies Total exported abroad	643,36
(B) Balance before adjustment: B= A - B	1.051,64
(D) Correction: Added to gold reserves during World War I from gold mines
(D) Balance sheet for November 1917: D = B + G	1.101,69

Source:

Petroff S. Where did Russian gold go? Report on the Russian gold reserves (1914-1929) // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11/30/1999.

Other foreign routes of Russian gold.

“Tsarist” gold as collateral, according to some sources, was also sent from Russia to USA . According to Prof. V. Sirotkina, from the end of 1915 Until the end of 1916, the tsarist government sent several shipments of gold to the United States as collateral for the purchase of weapons and smokeless gunpowder, which were never delivered to Russia (and DuPont Chemical planned to build a plant in Connecticut to supply gunpowder). The main shipment of gold for the United States, according to Sirotkin, was estimated at 40 million pounds. Art., which in terms of weight amounted to more than 500 tons of metal.

We have doubts about the fact of sending gold (especially such a large shipment) to the United States. For example, A.L. Sidorov, in his fundamental study of the financial situation of Russia during the First World War, does not mention at all the fact of sending the yellow metal to the USA. According to his version, collateral gold located in Great Britain was used to finance the purchase of gunpowder and weapons in the United States. According to most sources, the US was not the final recipient of the gold, but transit territory, through which gold from Russia was sent to Great Britain (Bank of England). It is possible that part of the gold addressed to Great Britain actually ended up in the accounts of American banks and companies (secondary redistribution of Russian gold). Thus, the information of Prof. V. Sirotkina requires additional verification and clarification.

Let us note once again that, starting from 1915, almost all gold was exported abroad through the Far East, where the Japanese controlled sea communications. According to a number of sources, gold, which was intended for the USA and Great Britain, was intercepted in March 1917 Japan .

“The last “golden train” to the USA and England... was completely captured by Japan and taken to the port of Maizuri (Japan) on the cruisers “Kashima” and “Katori” as a “trophy of war” (Russia and Japan did not fight in March 1917 ". It should be borne in mind that some of the “royal” gold that was sent abroad through the Far East, apparently, was not sent outside Russia before the revolution of 1917 and settled in the vaults of the State Bank of the Russian Empire in its branch in Vladivostok. However, in the end this gold went abroad. This happened already during the years of the civil war and intervention.

In addition, it must be borne in mind that even before the start of the war, Russia had in its bank accounts France a significant amount of currency in gold francs and other “gold” currencies (“gold abroad”). Moreover, literally a month before the start of the First World War, Russia managed to transfer its “foreign” gold from German banks to French ones (from the Russian point of view, the transfer of “foreign” gold to France was a reasonable action, since Paris was considered our main ally in the expected war). After the outbreak of the war, “allied” France introduced a so-called “moratorium” on the use of these currency values, fearing that Russia would not fulfill its obligations to repay and service French loans. In fact, this is exactly what happened: Russia’s “foreign” gold in French banks was used mainly not for the purchase of weapons and equipment so necessary for the Russian army, but for the payment of interest to French rentiers.

After the February revolution, the Provisional Government also managed to make its contribution to the export of gold abroad: literally on the eve of the October revolution, it sent a shipment of gold to Sweden for the purchase of weapons (in the amount of 4.85 million gold rubles, i.e. about 3.8 tons of metal).

Russia's gold reserves on the eve of the October Revolution of 1917.

A general idea of ​​what place gold exported abroad occupied in the total gold reserves of Russia is given in Table. 4. As can be seen from the table, the share of gold abroad in the total gold reserves of Russia during the war years until the October Revolution of 1917 steadily increased and reached more than 2/3.

Russian gold within the country and abroad during the First World War (million rubles)*

					8.10.1917
Gold within the country
Gold abroad
Total gold supply
Share of gold abroad in the total gold reserves, %

* As of January 1 of the corresponding year (except for the last column). The gold reserves include not only metallic gold, but also the currencies of gold standard countries. Such a sharp increase in the volume of “gold abroad” during the period under review is probably explained by the fact that it included the amount of loans received by Russia from the Entente countries in the form of currencies. The share of metallic gold in the total volume of “gold abroad” at the end of the period under review was, apparently, very small.

At first, the security officers and the NKVD unsuccessfully searched for him. Then the KGB, Federal
Security Service and other, more or less secret, services of Russia. Behind
For ninety years no one was able to snatch the secrets from the Siberian soil. During
the last scientific expedition of Russian researchers to Lake Baikal,
Bathyscaphes discovered a Civil War-era carriage at the bottom of the lake. Straightaway
rumors spread that this could be a trace of the missing gold

The treasure was part of the gold and silver reserves
Tsarist Russia, estimated at 1200 to 1600 tons. During the First
world war, on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, this is a huge wealth
Tsar Nicholas II ordered it to be taken to Kazan on the Volga. Collected in the city
more than 600 tons of gold bars and gold rubles and almost 500 tons
silver, including jewelry. Soon it began in Russia
civil war, and the royal treasure fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

in autumn
1918 Kazan was captured by pro-White Czechoslovakian soldiers
corps - formed during the First World War in the territory
Russia from prisoners and deserters from the Austro-Hungarian army. Under supervision
Czechs, the royal gold was transported to Omsk, where it was located
headquarters of Admiral Kolchak.

Alexander Kolchak

Leaning on
with money from the tsars' gold reserves, Admiral Alexander Kolchak captured
dictatorial power throughout Siberia, right up to the Urals. Piece of gold
immediately sent to banks in France, Great Britain and Japan as
payments for weapons, supplies and provisions and in the form of deposits,
probably transferred to private accounts. When in May 1919,
finally, Kolchak ordered an inventory of the treasure, it turned out
that there were about 500 tons.

How many of these funds does he
spent, still no one knows. It is assumed that he could
use about 180 tons, but there are no documents that would confirm
such quantity.

In the autumn of 1919, when the Red Army
began to dislodge white troops from successive provinces, and Kolchak himself
pushed everything further beyond the Urals, the admiral decided to send the treasure to
Vladivostok. Gold was to be transported east along the Trans-Siberian
railway. The valuable deposit was loaded into 29 wagons, and the golden train
went from Omsk to the east. The train also included carriages with platinum and
silver But the boxes with Kolchak's treasure never reached
Vladivostok.

Mystery Train

Route
The golden composition was controlled by soldiers of the Czechoslovak Corps. Exactly
they were obliged to guard Kolchak’s dispatch. It's hard to say why, but
The train with the treasure was moving mercilessly slowly. Only a journey to
Irkutsk, which in those circumstances could be overcome within
ten days, lasted more than two months. At that time in Siberia
the anti-Kolchak uprising spread, the admiral's army was
pushed further to the east, the Bolsheviks were strengthening, and the admiral himself was losing
support of the Entente. Finally, representatives of the coalition forced Kolchak
give power to General Denikin and transfer the train with gold under control
Chekhov. This happened on December 27 at Nizhneudinsk station.

When
the train reached Irkutsk, the Czech soldiers still handed it over to the Bolsheviks
both the admiral and the transported gold. In return they received
a guarantee of a safe route to Vladivostok and 30 wagons with coal for
steam locomotive

The Bolsheviks shot Kolchak, and the gold was again
transported to Kazan. However, what part of the treasure did they receive from the Czechs?
in fact, it is difficult to establish. Various sources give conflicting
or only approximate information. We are talking about approximately 409
millions of rubles in gold, or about 18 carriages that Czech soldiers
allegedly handed over to representatives of the Revolutionary Committee. When is gold
returned to Kazan, Soviet bankers estimated its quantity as
approximately 318 tons, and 190 tons were considered missing. Recognized
and also that 5 tons “evaporated” from the Bolsheviks themselves.

Accurate
the value of the treasure that fell into Kolchak's hands has never been
installed. Gold from the royal fund was counted into all sorts of units
measurements: from rubles, through boxes and pounds, to tons, or even wagons.
Such calculations were far from accurate, so it is not surprising that before
today it is difficult to determine how much gold was actually sent
Kolchak to Vladivostok, and how much was missing from the golden train. It could
be about a ton, or three. Or significantly more. According to one version, this
It was the Czechs who themselves removed 18 wagons from Irkutsk.

Preserved
also the testimony of eyewitnesses who claimed that on the way to Omsk,
boxes of gold disappeared from the train and were buried in the taiga.

hidden gold

It is known
that that part of the treasure that Kolchak managed to deposit in
Western banks, was sent in batches from Siberia by train to
Vladivostok. In total, the admiral carried out 7 such transportations. One of
parties, the last one, was captured in Transbaikalia by Ataman Semyonov.

There were about 30 tons of gold there.

Eat
also a third trace, simply called Siberian. According to this version,
part of Kolchak’s gold was hidden in the area of ​​Tomsk, Tobolsk and Tyumen.

Among
Some seekers of Kolchak's treasure believe that the prudent
The admiral kept hiding gold in parts in various places.

Treasure
usually buried in the ground. Skeptics point out that in 1919
winter began early and was very frosty, which practically made
it is impossible to bury gold. But the admiral was not a simple military man. He
He was also a polar explorer, explorer and sapper. He knew how to cope
difficult polar conditions. Possibly during the construction of hiding places
used explosives.

One theory says that some
the admiral's people tried to smuggle Kolchak's gold on a train through
Baikal, laying rails on the frozen ice of the lake. However, the ice is not
survived, and the treasure sank to the bottom. When last year one of
underwater vehicles The world found an old carriage from the times at the bottom of Lake Baikal
civil war, Kolchak’s gold was remembered again. Support for the action
Even deputies of the State Duma expressed their search.

However,
in the wreckage of the carriage, instead of treasure, only a box with
cartridges. It is more likely that the weakened remnants of Kolchak’s army,
fleeing the Red Army, they crossed Baikal on a sleigh, on
who were carrying part of the treasure saved from the new “owners”. frosts,
reaching 60 degrees, and the wind did its job. A nightmare ride
Few survived. Some of the gold, along with the sleigh, sank to the bottom during
spring melting of ice, part of it was hidden in the basements of surrounding churches.

Hidden
Russian services searched for Kolchak’s gold for several
decades. Only in the area of ​​Tobolsk, Tomsk and Tyumen did security officers dig
land for a whole decade, from 1922 to 1933. They managed to find part
royal jewels.

In 1941, the NKVD based
testimony of an eyewitness began the search for 26 chests of gold buried
near the village of Taiga. However, the witness, a former regimental
clerk in Kolchak’s army, could not accurately determine the location
hiding place with a treasure, claiming that after so many years he is not able
recognize the place. He was shot on charges of infiltration
delusion and deception of power. In the 50s they tried to find this gold
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1970, the KGB was looking for gold in the Khanty-Mansiysk region.
There is also information about a treasure hidden in the caves of Altai, and
a few years ago a Kazakh trace appeared.

Maybe,
to find Kolchak's gold, you have to... think in Polish. One of
the admiral's advisers at the time when this golden epic took place,
was a Pole. Writer, traveler, scientist, geographer, chemist and geologist,
Professor Ferdinand Anthony Ossendowski. Anti-communist, talented
intelligence officer and expert on Siberia, who returned to freedom in 1922
Poland. He reached the country through Manchuria and Mongolia, and how
some legends about Kolchak’s gold claim that part of it is hidden there
hidden treasures.

Tsar's gold captured by Admiral Kolchak,
has become so overgrown with myths that today it is difficult to separate
fiction from facts. The only thing that is certain is that the lost
people will talk about the treasure for a long time and look for it for just as long. U
Russians also have their own version of the legend of the Amber Room.

Joachim Vatsetis (Vatsietis) - left.

In 1918, 73% of Russia's gold reserves ended up in Kazan. Unexpectedly, the city was attacked by troops of the anti-Bolshevik coalition; Latvian riflemen under the command of Joachim Vatsetis (Vatsietis) came out against them. Kazan passed from hand to hand. As a result, the gold disappeared. Where did it go?

The disappearance of many tons of gold from the state reserves of the Russian Empire during the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 and the Civil War is still full of secrets. The search continues to this day, but they are mainly looking for part of the missing, the so-called “Kolchak gold”. However, the plunder of Russia's gold reserves began long before the empire's gold fund came into the possession of the admiral.

Marauders in Kazan

A surprise attack on August 6, 1918 by the troops of the Committee of Members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly (Komuch) and the Czechoslovak corps under the command of Colonel Vladimir Kappel took the Bolshevik authorities of Kazan by surprise. A detachment of Latvian riflemen under the command of Janis Berzin was transferred to the outskirts of the city, and the center of Kazan, where the bank building was located, was completely unguarded, which the enterprising townspeople took advantage of.

A crowd of townspeople, despite the resistance of the guards, broke into the Kazan branch of the People's Bank of Russia. They dragged everything they could get their hands on, moving haphazardly around the building and interfering with each other in every possible way. The lucky ones were already hurrying away, carrying buckets filled with gold coins along the narrow spiral staircase from the basement. Others, less fortunate and completely short-sighted, stuffed paper bills into their pockets and bags, which would soon turn into worthless pieces of paper. People fought for the possession of any valuables, and a real scrum of hunters for free wealth began at the safes with gold.

True, the large number of looters, commotion, confusion, as well as the competent actions of bank employees who managed to lock almost all the safes, significantly reduced the damage from spontaneous expropriation. The security, confused in the first minutes, managed to push the looters out of the bank, and on the morning of August 7, it was taken under guard by a Serbian detachment that participated in the city uprising against the Bolsheviks.

Ingots were brought from all over the country

When, during the First World War, the Russian army, under pressure from German troops, left a number of western provinces, the real danger of occupation loomed over Petrograd. To ensure the safety of the state gold reserves located in the capital, it was decided to evacuate them to the east of the country, to Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod.

Then in Kazan there were more than 600 tons of gold bars, coins, jewelry and almost 500 tons of silver.

After October 1917, gold was transported from Voronezh, Kursk, Mogilev, Samara, Tambov and other Russian provincial centers to this Volga region city, which had the newest banking building at that time with sophisticated security systems for storing valuables. By August 1918, the Kazan branch of the People's Bank stored 444 tons 509 kilograms 799 grams and 65 milligrams of gold in coins and bars worth 574 million gold rubles - more than 73% of Russia's total gold reserves.

Lenin corrected Vatsetis

The basis of Komuch's military forces rushing to Kazan were detachments of fighters with different political views, from monarchists to Republican Socialist Revolutionaries, united by the desire to overthrow the Bolsheviks. The successes of the anti-Bolshevik coalition were greatly facilitated by the support of the Czechoslovak corps, formed from prisoners and deserters of the Austro-Hungarian army. By agreement with the Entente, this corps was placed at the disposal of the allies and was to be relocated to France through Vladivostok.

Therefore, by the summer of 1918, the military echelons occupied by the formation stretched along the entire railway line from the Volga region to Eastern Siberia. It was these motley forces that united to capture Kazan, and they were opposed by the Latvian regiments of the Red Army under the command of Joachim Vatsetis, the local workers’ militia and units from the Tatars.
On July 22, Komuch’s troops took Simbirsk, and the threat of capturing Kazan became quite real. The manager of the Kazan branch of the People's Bank, Pyotr Maryin, demanded that Vatsetis begin evacuating the country's gold reserves. However, Vatsetis, confident in the garrison of Kazan, numbering about 12 thousand people, considered the threat insignificant. He was harshly corrected by Lenin himself, who on July 27 appointed a certain Illary Nakonechny as a special commissioner for evacuation. It was planned to transport the contents of the gold storage room to Nizhny Novgorod. However, a sudden attack by Kappel’s troops confused these plans, and only 100 boxes, that is, four and a half tons of gold worth six million rubles, were removed from Kazan.

Only bags of copper remained in the basements

The offensive of the troops of Komuch and the Czechoslovak corps towards Kazan was supported by the rebel “Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom” and Serbian soldiers. As a result, having received a blow in the back, the Bolsheviks left the city, and with it the country’s gold reserves. Leon Trotsky personally arrived on the Eastern Front, a significant military contingent, 40 airplanes, as well as ships of the Baltic Fleet were transferred here, which immediately changed the balance of forces in favor of the Bolsheviks. Therefore, Komuch’s leadership decided to evacuate the gold reserves to Samara as soon as possible. Already on August 12, the loading of boxes and bags of gold onto the Mars barge began. The last transport with the precious cargo, the steamship Field Marshal Suvorov, sailed for Samara on August 19.
After stubborn fighting, on September 10, the Bolsheviks broke into Kazan, where the chief commissioner of the People's Bank, Tikhon Popov, discovered only abandoned bags of copper coins in the basements. An investigation began into the circumstances of the export of gold reserves. According to the results of the audit, gold alone was exported to Samara in the amount of 645 million 533 thousand 893 rubles and 21 kopecks. At the same time, a shortage of 23 million 10 thousand rubles was discovered, which strangely coincided with the value of the valuables allegedly sent to Samara on August 14. Paragraph 4 of the act talks about sending gold coins of 5 and 10 rubles in 767 bags. In other words, almost 18 tons of gold worth 23 million 10 thousand rubles were lost somewhere along the way.

Operation Golden Fleece

In his book “Tsar’s Gold,” Valery Kurnosov claims that these 767 bags were stolen as a result of a scam planned by the leadership of the city and the bank, namely the leader of Komuch Boris Fortunatov and the manager Pyotr Maryin. Kurnosov is convinced that the gold was taken out on August 21 by foreign legionnaires who were specially selected for this purpose. Foreigners, on the one hand, had no contacts with the local population, which means they could not convey information about the treasure, and on the other, their participation in burying gold in a foreign country did not give them any opportunity to take possession of it. Even if they managed to survive the crucible of the Civil War and return to their homeland, they would hardly be able to use their knowledge to enrich themselves, being in their homeland, thousands of kilometers from the buried gold.

On August 22, 1918, partisan units under the command of the Latvian Vladimir Azin, who occupied the village of Vysoka Gora, were unexpectedly attacked by Komuch’s troops. The assault on the village, located 27 kilometers northeast of Kazan and having no strategic value, continued for three days. The answer to this riddle was found only in October 1929, when members of an international treasure-hunting expedition financed by the French bank R. De Luberzac and Co. arrived in Kazan.

A year earlier, this bank had started a lawsuit in New York against the USSR, demanding the return of 338 gold bars from the private Russian-Asian Bank, stored in Kazan. Soviet representatives refused to do this, citing the fact that all Kazan gold was exported to Samara.

And at that moment, representatives of the French bank were contacted by a certain Pole Vyacheslav Vetesko, who claimed that he knew about the burial place of part of the gold in the vicinity of Kazan, in which his brother Konstantin participated.

Returning after the operation, their detachment came across the Reds, and as a result of the battle, everyone died, except for Konstantin, who was seriously wounded. Konstantin died already in Poland, but before his death he managed to tell his brother about the hidden gold.

As a result, an agreement was signed according to which the USSR did not object to the French organizing an expedition to search for the missing gold. If successful, the French side would receive 20% of the value of the treasure. Well, the fact that the expedition began its search from a village located seven kilometers east of Vysokaya Gora explains the battle on August 22, 1918.
The beginning of the search was very encouraging. All the signs of the burial place given by Vetesko turned out to be correct, even conventional signs were found on the trees. However, when, following these signs, the expedition arrived at the place where the treasure could be buried, there turned out to be a small old house and several dozen beehives. A request was sent to Warsaw for clarification. The answer was discouraging: “There is no more data.” The search for gold was officially stopped.

Apparently, Vyacheslav Vetesko, having received confirmation of his brother’s story, gave the expedition false final guidelines, deciding to exclude the shareholders of the French bank from dividing the treasure.
Interestingly, in 1919, two Russian emigrants approached the Soviet representative office in Belgrade and offered to indicate the place near Kazan where the gold was hidden. They acted on behalf of the notorious Vyacheslav Vetesko and demanded 45% of the value of the treasure in foreign currency. True, they never received an answer. But the reaction followed - the NKVD authorities began searching for the Kazan treasure, and a special search case was called “Golden Fleece”. Until now it remains secret.

Member of the Public Council for Foreign and Defense Policy Mark Masarsky - about the possible outcome of the exciting detective story that began in 1918

SCHEME "VLADIVOSTOK - YOKOHAMA HURRY BANK"

- This story, Mark Veniaminovich, is more interesting to read than any detective story. Where do we start?

Because until 1917, Russia's gold reserves were determined by an astronomical figure - 1337 tons. No country in the world (except the USA) could even come close to it. When the Germans came almost close to Petrograd, the tsarist government wisely ordered the evacuation of the gold reserves away from the front, dividing it between Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan.

On the night of August 7, 1918, a small detachment of White Guard Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kappel captured all the “Kazan” gold - 507.1 tons worth 651.5 million rubles. And already in November it ends up in Omsk, with Kolchak. His army of almost one hundred thousand was in dire need of weapons, and they could only be purchased abroad. The gold of Tsarist Russia flowed there.

- How?

The scheme was simple and reliable. Kolchak’s “golden” trains were sent to Vladivostok (out of four, three reached the site, one was captured and plundered by Ataman Semenov), where their contents were reloaded into the basements of the local branch of the State Bank. And then, directly or through the Syndicate company, specially created from banks in the USA, England and Japan, an agreement was concluded with a foreign partner on a loan or supply of weapons. To secure the loan, so-called “collateral gold” was transferred to a foreign bank.

Kolchak transferred gold to many countries. But most of the money went to Japan, where the admiral’s main counterparty was Yokohama Hurry Bank, the only Japanese bank at that time that had official permission to operate in foreign currency.

But the Japanese never delivered weapons to Kolchak. And the gold was not returned.

TWO IMMORTAL AGREEMENTS

Back in 1996, from the rostrum of the Russian State Duma, one of its leaders directly said: “We have all the necessary documents to demand the return of our gold from Japan.” What documents were you talking about?

These are two Russian-Japanese financial agreements, signed in October 1919, providing a loan to the Kolchak government in Omsk secured by pure gold in two bills of lading, equivalent to 20 million and 30 million yen - about 60 tons of gold. We looked for these documents all over the world, but found them in Moscow, among the unsorted rubble of the Foreign Ministry archives. And the originals! The discoverers were graduate students and students of the Diplomatic Academy, students of Professor Vladlen Sirotkin, who sifted through thousands of unexplored documents.

The findings consisted of two loan agreements between a Japanese banking syndicate led by Yokohama Hurry Bank and the representative of the State Bank of Russia in Tokyo, I.G. Shchekin, speaking on behalf of the Omsk government. Let me emphasize so as not to return to this again: these were legal interstate agreements for the production of weapons by the Japanese military plant for Kolchak’s army.

We looked for these documents all over the world, but found them in Moscow, among the unsorted rubble of the Foreign Ministry archives

In October - November 1919, the Japanese received Russian gold, which was recorded in the preliminary “Information Message of the Bank of Japan” for 1919. Moreover, this information was leaked to the Japanese press. “Yesterday, Russian gold worth 10 million yen arrived in the city of Tsuruga as a loan to the Omsk government in the amount of 30 million yen,” the Toke Niti Niti newspaper notified readers on November 3, 1919.

The total cost of gold received by the Japanese side from the Kolchak administration as collateral for the promised arms supplies amounted to 54,529,880 gold rubles.

- This, as we remember, did not help Kolchak much...

Yes, literally a couple of weeks after the “golden” transfer, a series of defeats for Kolchak’s army followed; it retreated in panic from Omsk. What happened next is well known: the defeat at Irkutsk, the capture of Kolchak and his death. It was here that the Japanese side seized the excellent opportunity not to deliver what was promised “due to the absence of an addressee.” And it’s trivial to appropriate Russian gold. As a result, the loan was sold for only 300 thousand dollars, and the Japanese satellite Ataman Semenov received the weapons.

And this was only the beginning of the plunder of the royal treasury.

BULLONTS "ON YOUR WORD OF HONOR"

I guess that you mean the Japanese robbery of 25 pounds of gold from the Khabarovsk branch of the State Bank of Russia. This was stated in the telegram of the People's Commissariat of Finance of the RSFSR dated November 21, 1918.

Not only this. The biggest "golden jackpot" was hit by the Japanese thanks to the betrayal of Kolchak's general Sergei Rozanov. On the night of January 29-30, 1920, the Japanese cruiser Hizen moored directly opposite the building of the Vladivostok branch of the State Bank standing on a hill. The landing force that landed from it cordoned off the territory, and an assault group burst into the bank - it was led by Rozanov, dressed in the uniform of a Japanese officer. And the operation was commanded by Japanese intelligence colonel Rokuro Izome, the main specialist in Kolchak’s gold in the Far East.

Within two hours, about 55 tons of Russian gold, without any receipts or acts, were moved from bank vaults to the holds of a Japanese cruiser. Of course, the city authorities lodged an official protest with the Japanese government. Of course, a criminal case was opened against General Rozanov for theft on an especially large scale.

But Japan did not even bother to respond to the ultimatums.

There was another side to the medal. White generals carried tons of gold to the east in their convoys. But, pursued by the Bolsheviks and Chinese Honghuz bandits scurrying around Manchuria, they often found themselves faced with a fateful choice: either be captured and say goodbye to the gold, or...

Give it to the preservation of the only “real” power in Manchuria at that time - the Japanese. And escape the chase "lightly".

On November 22, 1920, the chief of logistics of Kolchak’s army, General Petrov, transferred 22 boxes of gold for temporary storage to the head of the occupation Japanese military administration in Transbaikalia and Manchuria, Japanese Colonel Rokuro Izome.

On February 13, 1920, the military foreman of the Ussuri Cossack army Klok transferred to the commander of the 30th Japanese infantry regiment, Colonel Servant, for safekeeping two boxes and five bags of gold from 38 pounds of gold confiscated by the White Guards in the Khabarovsk office of the State Bank.

Let us also remember about the 33 boxes of gold that were transferred to the Japanese side in March 1920 and placed in the Chosen Bank branch in Osaka. This is evidenced by the protocols of the Tokyo District Court dated March 9, 1925.

Let's add 143 boxes of gold, which General Semenov handed over to Japanese Colonel H. Kurosawa in March 1920 in Chita...

And General Istrov gave the Japanese 1 million 270 thousand gold rubles, General Podtyagin - one and a half million gold rubles, financial agent of the Ministry of Finance of the tsarist government Konstantin Miller - 10 million gold rubles...

- Was this gold given to the Japanese against receipt?

Not always. Who and on my word of honor...

SECRET FUND OF THE KWANTUN ARMY

Recently, the Kyodo Tsushin agency reported that representatives of the ruling circles of Japan took an active part in the illegal import of Russian capital...

Yes, the former president of the Japanese Credit Bank, Yoshio Tatai, managed to prove that at least four tons of Russian gold were stolen from Russia on the direct orders of the Japanese government. And Finance Minister Takahashi is personally involved in the secret transportation of 9.1 tons of Russian gold in 186 boxes into the country.

By the way, most of the gold embezzled by the Japanese, as shown by a parliamentary investigation conducted in Japan in March 1925, went to the “secret fund” of the Kwantung Army. This fund was managed by the future prime minister of the country, General Giichi Tanaka, concentrating by the end of 1922 many tons of Russian gold for a huge amount at that time - more than 60 million yen.

Several years will pass, and thanks to Russian gold, the Kwantung Army will turn into a real “state within a state” in the vastness of Northern China and Korea...

CHANCE TO CLOSE THE "GOLDEN" TOPIC

- Let me pose the question point blank: Has Russia retained the rights to the gold taken from it?

Undoubtedly. The Soviet Union was the legal successor of the Russian Empire and all regimes on its territory until the 1920s inclusive. Just as, according to the Paris Convention, the Russian Federation turned out to be the legal successor of the Russian Empire and all regimes on its territory. Let us remember how foreign counterparties have always treated us: “if you have to, you pay.” And we state that Article 8, fixed in the agreements of October 6 and 19, 1919, has not lost force: “The State Bank of Russia remains the manager of the gold deposit and, upon request, can return it from Osaka to Vladivostok, paying only six percent of the costs for the return transfer".

I repeat once again: Russia has the full and legal right to demand the return of the pledged gold.

- Are our Japanese partners aware?

In fact, they were never particularly secretive. And until 1925 they calmly waited to see if Soviet Russia would demand the return of gold deposits under the 1919 treaties. Wouldn't it require recognition of the legality of the signed agreements? Didn't demand it. And in June 1927, Yokohama Hurry Bank converted part of the collateral gold into government assets worth 62 million yen. And then every ten years the Japanese carried out this banking operation, the profit from which went straight to the treasury. Over 90 years, more than six billion US dollars have accumulated, at the lowest percentages.

Approximate cost of building two nuclear power plants.

Russia has the full and legal right to demand the return of pledged gold

- It is logical to demand the return of interest money and collateral gold to Russia...

Not so simple. When this topic was raised in the media in the 90s, the Japanese, in response to a request from the Russian Foreign Ministry, reported: there is no Russian gold in Japan. I will not go deeper into their argumentation - it does not stand up to criticism. The root of the problem is the Japanese mentality, which I have studied well over the years of living in the Far East. The Japanese, it seems to me, will never admit that they stole Russian gold. For them, preserving national honor and their face before the world is much more important than any economic interests.

Let us also pretend to be “politically correct” that Japan did not steal anything from us. And we will do as Indonesia did in its time. After the end of the Japanese occupation, the devastated country did not begin to extort debts from the former aggressor, but agreed with him on multi-billion dollar investments in the Indonesian economy. They not only revived Indonesia, but also brought considerable taxes into the state treasury...

- Instead of political litigation - a business plan?

Exactly. Do the Japanese need electricity? They are in need. Does Russia need to break the economic blockade that the United States (and its ally Japan) are actually putting on us in the Far East? Without any doubt.

Japan owes Russia, according to my calculations, six billion US dollars. Why not ask the Japanese government to act as a guarantor of energy investments and allow the Japanese Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank (successor to Yokohama Urgent Bank, today the largest in the world) to invest these six billion in the construction of two nuclear power plants in the Russian Far East? Their energy can be supplied to the island of Honshu via a sea cable (there is a corresponding project developed by a Russian institute.) Moreover, it can be supplied at a reduced cost until the Russian side reimburses investors for all the money invested in the construction of the stations. After this, Japanese investors withdraw from co-ownership of the nuclear power plant and two modern plants, built using safe, “post-Chernobyl” technology, remain in Russian ownership.

- You don’t believe in the direct return of “Kolchak’s gold”?

There is no real “Kolchak’s gold”. Bullions and Russian coins have long been melted down. But there is a geopolitical and economic reality where the ability to negotiate and compromise is more valuable than any money. In the investment option there will be no losers: Japan receives cheap electricity, Russia returns its gold reserves in the form of two nuclear power plants.

And it closes the topic of “Russian gold in Japan” forever.

- Does this project have a chance of implementation?

I think the time has come for this. The implementation of the “Indonesian option” of investment would be an asymmetric response to American plans for uncontested supplies of overseas shale LNG to the Far Eastern region. And for the Russian economy - the Far Eastern analogue of the South Gas Stream.

A bitter smile from history: “Yokohama Hurry Bank”, and then “Tokyo Ginko”, created on its basis, is the only one in Japan that until the mid-60s worked reliably with foreign currency. And the Land of the Rising Sun should thank its northern neighbor for this. It was Russian gold that took part in the formation of the Japanese “economic miracle”...

Historical gratitude is a perishable product. Russia has experienced this bitter truth more than once

At the beginning of the First World War, the Russian army was forced to retreat and leave some western provinces. The Germans approached Petrograd. The question arose about the safety of the state gold reserves, located in Petrograd in the storerooms of a number of provincial offices of the State Bank. It was decided to evacuate the gold to rear cities far from the front.

In 1915, the evacuation of state valuables from Petrograd to Kazan and Nizhny Novgorod began. After the revolution, gold was transported to Kazan from Voronezh, Tambov and Samara, Kursk, Mogilev, Penza, etc.

For a more comprehensive understanding of subsequent changes in the fate of Russia's gold reserves, it is necessary to briefly recall some of the main military-political events of the country in 1918-1920. Let's look at just three of them:

1. After the revolution of 1917, a constituent assembly was elected, designed to resolve the main issues of state life. The Social Revolutionaries (democratic party of social revolutionaries) received the majority of votes. The communists were in the minority. The Constituent Assembly refused to approve the decrees of Soviet power.

After the first meeting in January 1918, the communists closed the meeting. Deputies of the constituent assembly went to Samara and formed a bourgeois-democratic government - the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (KOMUCH), which led the fight against Soviet power.

• 2. In March 1918, the Soviet government concluded an enslaving peace treaty in Brest with Germany and its allies, according to which a significant part of the European part of the country departed from Russia, and Russia undertook to pay Germany an indemnity of 246 tons of gold. The Social Revolutionaries were categorically against such a peace treaty.
• 3. In the First World War, units of the Czechoslovak corps, numbering 45 thousand soldiers, fought on the side of Russia. They fought for the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the Austro-Hungarian occupation and did not agree with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The corps command agreed with the Soviet government that the corps would be relocated to France through Vladivostok and, together with other Entente troops, would continue to participate in the war with Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary for the freedom of their homeland. By the summer of 1918, Czechoslovakian military echelons stretched along the entire railway line between Syzran, Penza, Novosibirsk, Omsk and Irkutsk.

At the head of the corps was a democratically minded body - the Russian branch of the Czechoslovak National Council.

He was destined to play an important role in subsequent events related to Russian gold.

The Czechoslovak leaders, together with the future president T. Masaryk, at the insistence of the Entente countries, agreed to oppose Soviet Russia. On May 25, 1918, the commander of the Czechoslovak corps rebelled, as the Entente countries promised to support the creation of an independent Czechoslovak Republic.

The corps joined the troops of KOMUCH and captured a number of cities along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

On July 6, the Socialist Revolutionaries killed the German ambassador and started riots in many cities of the country. Commander of the Eastern Front, Socialist Revolutionary M.A. Muravyov refused to recognize the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany. M.A. Muravyov tried to create an independent Volga Republic and continue the war with Germany to the bitter end, but was soon shot. There was a threat of Kazan being captured by KOMUCH troops.

The Bolshevik government decided to evacuate the gold reserves from Kazan. Representatives of the Soviet government sent here managed to remove 4.6 tons of gold (100 boxes).

In a surprise attack on August 6, 1918, the troops of KOMUCH and the Czechoslovak corps under the command of Colonel V.A. Kappel captured the city and the gold reserves located here. Already on August 16, gold in the amount of 500 tons was sent to Samara on two ships under special security, which included officers from the General Staff Academy, for transfer to KOMUCH.

Soon the Red Army launched a successful offensive against the forces of KOMUCH and the Czechoslovaks, liberated a number of cities and approached Samara.

In connection with the threat of death that arose for them, all counter-revolutionary forces united and created a new government. It is known in history as the Ufa Directory. Admiral A.V. Kolchak was appointed Minister of War.

A White Guard government also functioned in Siberia, which sought to take power from the Ufa Directory.

At the end of September, KOMUCH began a hasty evacuation of gold from Samara to Ufa and then to Omsk. The headquarters and government of Admiral A.V. were already located here. Kolchak, whom all anti-communist groups and movements recognized as the supreme ruler of Russia and the leader of the white movement in Russia.

KOMUCH did not agree with this. He feared that the transfer of valuables to the leader of the white movement could lead to the squandering of Russian gold. Members of KOMUCH at their last on November 28, 1918. The meeting asked the Czechoslovak National Council to accept the gold reserves for safekeeping on behalf of the Czech people, and then transfer them to the newly convened Constituent Assembly or a popularly recognized government.

However, under the influence of the English mission, the command of the Czechoslovak corps decided to go over to the side of A.V. Kolchak and not. prevent the transfer of gold reserves to his disposal. It should be noted that as a statesman, the admiral was careful about the safety of the gold reserves, although he was unable to prevent some losses and even major thefts.

The gold reserve was accompanied by State Bank officials who sought to keep accurate records of the movement of gold. Researchers of this problem note that there was no looting of gold, because there was strict reporting. The archives of the Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of Russia contain relevant documents about this.

In November 1918, the trains arrived in Omsk, and the gold reserves were placed in the Omsk branch of the State Bank of Russia. The protection of the gold reserves was carried out by a special detachment subordinate to the Ministry of Finance of the white government. After the arrival of trains with Kazan gold, gold arrived in Omsk from branches of state and private banks in Siberia and the Urals.

In May 1919, a group of bank workers began counting the gold that was at the disposal of the government of A.V. Kolchak. The seals on all undamaged boxes were checked. About 400 damaged boxes and bags with gold coins were counted in special goals. According to registration data, each box contained two bags, each of which contained gold coins worth 30 thousand rubles.

After a recount, it was established that in total there were 505 tons of gold in Omsk in the form of Russian and foreign coins, circles, polos and bars. In addition, gold that was not included in the state reserve was stored here. For example, gold parts of instruments belonging to the Main Chamber of Weights and Measures, as well as gold nuggets and storage facilities of the Mining Institute.

As noted earlier, the tsarist government had 440 tons of gold in London, against which loans were opened to the tsarist government for the purchase of weapons and uniforms for the active army. It subsequently made it possible to well arm and provide everything necessary to the white army, which launched successful military operations, relying on the help of legionnaires of the Czechoslovak corps. With the help of this corps, the Whites captured the main cities of the Middle Volga, Urals and Siberia.

In the winter of 1919, the Red Army defeated the white armies. They lost a lot of military equipment and weapons. The Entente countries trained the troops of A.V. Kolchak to counterattack.

They began to intensively equip them with weapons and everything necessary for conducting active combat operations. The White Army also received:) Great Britain uniforms and equipment for 240 thousand soldiers, hundreds of thousands of rifles, machine guns and millions of cartridges for them. France delivered 400 artillery pieces, 1,700 machine guns with ammunition and 30 airplanes for the White Army. The USA alone supplied the armies of A.V. Kolchak about 400 thousand rifles, 1 thousand machine guns, 2 million pairs of shoes and other items. A lot of weapons came from Japan.

All this had to be paid for. The admiral's representatives tried to renew loans using the unused balance of royal gold previously deposited in London. Secured by this gold, the above-mentioned loans to the tsarist government were opened. After the October Revolution of 1917 they were closed.

It was not possible to renew the previous loans, as insoluble international legal problems arose, because the government of A.V. Kolchak was never recognized by the Entente, Japan and the USA. Everything was Russian, i.e. successor to the tsarist and provisional government A.F. Kerensky.

In this situation, Kolchak decided to sell part of the gold reserves to finance military supplies. From numerous sources published on the basis of archival data, it is clear that gold was seized from the storerooms of the Omsk branch of the State Bank in large quantities six times and sent to Vladivostok for subsequent shipment to Japan, France, the UK and the USA. The gold reserves also paid for the supply of weapons to the volunteer White Army, which, under the command of General A.I. Denikina fought against Soviet power in the European part of Russia.

In October 1919, a shipment of gold worth 43.6 million rubles, i.e. 33.7 tons, was sent from Omsk to Vladivostok.

At that time, General G.M. Semenov, with the assistance of Japan, created the Transbaikal Republic and took gold for the needs of his army, which was transported for loading on Japanese and American ships.

During August, using weapons received from overseas, the government of the white movement carried out several mobilizations and formed 15 new regiments, preparing them for combat operations against the Red Army. In total, the white army numbered up to 400 thousand people. The command of this army also relied on the help of intervention troops. In the summer of 1919, there were 120 thousand soldiers and officers from Japan, France, Great Britain and the USA in Siberia and the Far East. They provided the rear for the white armies preparing to attack.

In early September, Kolchak's armies and Czechoslovak units, having a significant superiority in numbers and equipment, went on the offensive and achieved success. The eastern front of the Red Army was broken through, and it began to retreat. Her stubborn resistance was supported by an expanding partisan movement behind the lines of the White armies.

On October 14, 1919, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. The White Guards were forced to retreat. On a number of sectors of the front, the retreat turned into a stampede. The commanders of the Czech units hastily withdrew their troops to the railway stations, captured the trains, and train after train left for the east. On November 4, the Red Army captured the city of Ishim in what is now the Tyumen region. At that time it was the most important railway junction on the way to Omsk.

In October 1919, due to the ongoing advance of the Red Army, the wide scope of the partisan movement and the beginning of the collapse of the army, the government of A.V. Kolchak decided to move the capital to Irkutsk. The relocation of the Ministry of Finance began on October 28, 1919.

On October 31, by order of the admiral, the gold reserves were taken out of the Omsk branch of the bank and loaded into wagons, which were prepared for departure under heavy guard of officers. The train with gold and the government moved towards Irkutsk on November 12, i.e. two days before Soviet power was established in Omsk.

Gold and security were placed in 40 carriages. At the same time, there were security and accompanying personnel in 12 carriages. The train with gold under the number “Liter D” was supposed to travel from Omsk to Vladivostok. The government was firmly convinced that gold could be exported abroad. Back on November 4, the Ministry of Railways of the White government gave an order to the Omsk, Tomsk, Transbaikal and Chinese-Eastern Railways about the unimpeded passage of the “Liter D” train to Vladivostok. State Bank employees accompanying the gold reserve were issued travel documents to Vladivostok.

Staff train A.V. Kolchak and the train with the gold reserves moved extremely slowly. Railway stations and stops were filled with trains with Czechoslovak troops and wagons with wounded. An armored train sent forward cleared the way for the Czechoslovaks, who kept the railway under control, allowing their own trains to pass first.

On December 27, the headquarters train and the train with gold arrived at Nizhneudansk station. It took a month and a half for the trains to move a distance that under normal conditions a train travels in less than one day. At this time, a workers' uprising broke out in Irkutsk, as a result of which power passed to the local government - the Political Center, uniting representatives of different political parties.

The headquarters train and the train with gold remained in Nizhneudansk until the situation was clarified. The commander of the Czechoslovak battalion received instructions from the Allies, from which it followed that:

• * the admiral's train and the train with gold are taken under the protection of the allied powers, i.e. Entente;
• * at the first opportunity, these trains under the flags of Great Britain, the USA, France, Japan and Czechoslovakia will be withdrawn from Nizhneudansk to the east;
• * Nizhneudansk station is declared a neutral zone. The Czechs must guard the trains and prevent local authorities and their armed forces from entering the station;
• * in the event of an armed clash between the admiral's convoy and armed local detachments, disarm both sides and give the admiral complete freedom of action. This could be understood to mean that the allies no longer considered the admiral as the supreme ruler of Russia.

The Czechs occupied and strengthened the station's defenses against a possible partisan attack. The security of the trains was carried out by soldiers of the admiral's convoy, which consisted of 500 privates and 60 officers.

At the same time, under the pressure of the advancing Red Army and Siberian partisans, Kolchak’s representatives lost power in settlements and cities located along the Trans-Siberian Railway from Irkutsk to Chita.

January 5, 1920 A.V. Kolchak signed an order to transfer the train with gold reserves to the protection of the Czechoslovak armed forces. On the same day, he signed an act of renunciation of the supreme rule in Russia in favor of General A.I. Denikin, who back in April 1919 united under his command the White Volunteer Army, Don and Kuban Cossack units. Relying on the help of the Entente, having an army of 150 thousand, he intended to overthrow Soviet power.

General A.I. Denikin demanded that the gold reserves be transferred to his disposal. He considered it necessary to take gold abroad and deposit it in approximately equal parts to secure loans in the UK, USA and Japan.

Government A.V. Kolchak, having already become convinced that it would not be possible to export the gold reserves on his own, decided to turn to the US government with a proposal to accept the gold for storage. The American government responded that it was ready to accept the gold, but the Czechs must ensure its delivery to Vladivostok. But this was unrealistic, since the workers of Irkutsk and the surrounding areas, relying on partisan detachments, presented the Czechoslovaks with an ultimatum: either they remove their guards from the train with gold, or the workers block the further advance of trains with Czechs towards Vladivostok. As a compromise, it was decided to allow small groups of partisans to guard the train with gold.

The allies offered the admiral, under the protection of the Czechs, to take him out in one carriage. They considered it impossible to remove all his guards and gold. The admiral's associates suggested that he change into a soldier's dress and, together with his adjutant, hide in one of the passing Czech trains. The Czechs freely accepted and transported white officers fleeing the Bolsheviks in their trains.

At first A.V. Kolchak refused these proposals, but then was forced to agree with the first. Essentially, the admiral and the gold reserve became hostages of the Czechs and, as subsequent events showed, were used by the Czechoslovaks in their own interests.

Considering that the admiral was not a real force in the fight against Soviet power, the Czechoslovaks, in accordance with the instructions of the command of the Entente troops, took upon themselves the protection of the trains with a guarantee on their own behalf and on behalf of the allied powers of the inviolability of both the admiral himself and Russian gold. In this regard, the flags of the Allied powers were mounted on A.V. Kolchak’s carriage: American, English, Japanese, Czech, etc. The admiral, confident in complete safety, disbanded his security detachment and relied entirely on foreign patrons.

A paradoxical situation has arisen. The Czechoslovakians became the main force determining the position of the white government. Kolchak's units fought with units of the Red Army and retreated in panic along the highway to the east. The Czechs and Slovaks, without participating in the battles, moved on trains under the protection of the retreating Kolchakites and dictated the conditions for the passage of trains.

On January 15, 1920, a train carrying the admiral and his entourage arrived in Irkutsk, followed by a trainload of gold.

With the consent of the other allies, the Czechoslovaks used A.V. Kolchak and a train with gold in a political game with the Irkutsk Political Center.

They stated that they would extradite the admiral and his associates on the condition that they and other allied troops would be provided with locomotives and carriages to Vladivostok, where ships were already waiting for them for further movement to Europe. They guaranteed to hand over the train with gold immediately as soon as the last Czech train left Irkutsk.

On the day of his arrival in Irkutsk, the admiral was handed over to local authorities and placed in prison. On January 21, 1920, the Political Center of Irkutsk transferred power to the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) of the Irkutsk province. The committee was headed by the Bolsheviks. At this time, a large group of White Guard troops under the command of General V.A. was fighting towards Irkutsk. Kappel, the one who at one time commanded a united detachment of Russian-Czechoslovak and Serbian troops that suddenly captured Kazan and Russia’s gold reserves. The task of this group was to capture Irkutsk and free A.V. Kolchak.

On February 6, an order from the Irkutsk Military Revolutionary Committee was transmitted along the railway line. It noted: “To all revolutionary committees, executive committees, all revolutionary organizations, troops, partisans, the entire population along the Trans-Baikal Railway. Under no circumstances should traffic be allowed along the Trans-Baikal railway line. trains with Russia's gold reserves east of Irkutsk, no matter who accompanied it. Damage the route, blow up bridges, tunnels, destroy vehicles, wrest these valuables from the hands of a gang of robbers, no matter who they are, in open battle.”*

The Red Army units and partisans managed to repel the Kappel attack, but in the current situation, the Military Revolutionary Committee sentenced Admiral A.V. without trial. Kolchak to be shot. On February 7, the sentence was carried out, and the remains of the admiral were lowered under the ice of the Angara River.

History repeated itself. Two years earlier, in connection with the approach of Kolchak and Czechoslovak troops to Yekaterinburg, Russian Tsar Nicholas II and his family were shot without trial by the verdict of the Military Revolutionary Committee.

• On February 7, an armistice agreement was signed between the commanders of the Fifth Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak Corps. The Soviet command took upon itself the obligation to facilitate the evacuation of Czechoslovak troops, and the Czechoslovak command - to hand over a train with gold to the Irkutsk Revolutionary Committee when the last Czechoslovak echelon departed from Irkutsk.
• On March 22, 1920, the train with gold was sent west, back to Kazan. On May 7, 1920, its cargo was again stowed in the storerooms of the Kazan office of the People's Bank of the RSFSR.

From a certificate compiled in June 1921 by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the RSFSR, it is clear that during the reign of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, Russia’s gold reserves decreased by 235.6 million rubles, or 182 tons, including 191 million rubles worth of gold delivered to Vladivostok, as follows from other publications.

Let us now consider the fate of gold, which, as noted earlier, Ataman G.M. Semenov was seized in Chita from a train en route from Omsk to Vladivostok. Of the seized amount of gold, at least 5.8 tons ended up in the hands of the Japanese.

In January 1920, having made a difficult march to Chita, he arrived from near Irkutsk, after a failed attempt to take the city and liberate A.V. Kolchak, detachment of General V.A. Kappel. The general himself died during the campaign. This detachment, numbering 15 thousand war-hardened fighters, mostly officers, united with the Cossack units of Ataman G.M. Semenov, as a result the Far Eastern Army (FEA) was formed. For the maintenance of this army G.M. Semenov identified 39 boxes with gold coins and bars.

In September 1920, the Red Army approached Chita. On the eve of leaving Chita G.M. Semenov sent a shipment of gold to the Russian military attaché in Tokyo, General Podtyagin, supposedly for the purchase of weapons, although it was already clear that the DVA would not need weapons, because it had left Russian territory. This gold was deposited in the Japanese bank Yokohama Hurry Bank.

TWO, ​​under the pressure of the Red Army, moved to China. The command, after crossing the Russian-Chinese border, decided to divide what it received from G.M. Semenov 39 boxes of gold.

This decision was made on November 19, 1920 at the Manchuria station of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The military council was attended by the chief of logistics of the DVA, General P.P. Petrov. His son is in our time in the 80s. handed over to the professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs V.G. Sirotkin documents from the family archive. As can be seen from these documents, the military council of the DVA decided to divide 39 boxes into two parts: 17 of them contained gold coins worth 1050 thousand rubles. transfer to the commanders of the four corps for unforeseen expenses associated with the maintenance of the evacuated troops; 22 boxes containing gold coins and bars totaling 1,270 thousand rubles, in view of the real threat of their capture by the Red Army or Chinese robbers, it was decided to transfer against receipt to the head of the Japanese military mission at the Manchuria station. General P.P. was assigned to carry out this operation. Petrov. On November 22, the head of the mission, Colonel of the Japanese Army R. Izome, issued a receipt:

“RECEIPT.

This receipt was given by the Japanese military mission at the station. Manchuria to the chief of supply of the Far Eastern Army of the General Staff, Major General Pavel Petrovich Petrov, that the Japanese Military Mission at the station. Manchuria accepted twenty (20) boxes of gold coins and two boxes of gold bullion for cutting. (Box numbers are listed below.) All boxes are sealed with a wax seal and have a seal. The above-mentioned boxes with gold coins and gold bars are the property of the Far Eastern Army and are not subject to any alienation based on anyone’s statements. I undertake, at the first request of the General Staff, Major General P.P. Petrov or by his power of attorney, release everything accepted for safekeeping. We attest to this with our signatures and seal.

November “22” day, 1920.

Manzhouli station. Signature of Colonel Izome."

The first attempts to return this gold were made immediately in December due to the need to pay for military supplies. Not only were the valuables not returned, but R. Izome left Manchuria without informing his Russian partners about the fate of the gold transferred to him for safekeeping.

In February 1920, when the Ussuri Cossack army was leaving Khabarovsk, Colonel Savitsky and military foreman Klok withdrew 38 poods from the local branch of the bank, i.e. more than 600 kg of gold and handed it over against receipt to the commander of the Japanese infantry regiment, Colonel Sugi. The latter issued a receipt for the gold.

Before the evacuation of the Japanese from Khabarovsk, the gold was under the control of General Yamadi, who then transferred it for safekeeping to the Japanese Chosen Bank. In October 1922, when the Japanese evacuated from Russia, the gold was transported to the Japanese city of Shimonoseki.

Generals Semenov, Petrov and Podtyagin in the 20-30s. tried to return through the court the gold transferred to the Japanese. The decision to sue for the return of gold came not without the help of liberal elements in Japan's leadership circles. There were certain influential groups here that supported the white generals behind the scenes. Liberal MPs accused former war minister and then prime minister Ugaki of using Russian gold to finance his conservative party. In these circles, a complex political game was being played against the generals of the Kwantung Army.

A possible trial could become a platform for accusing the generals of this army of violating the laws and customs of Japan during the intervention in Russia in 1920-1922. Subsequently, one of the Japanese researchers discovered in the parliamentary library in Tokyo a court case on the issues of Semenov’s gold, as it was clear from this case, 1200 pages. The Japanese court recognized the presence of Russian gold assets in the country's banks, but refused to satisfy the generals' claim, citing the fact that they no longer have official authority to manage state gold. Thus, even in those years, Japan recognized the presence of Russian gold in the country and even demonstrated its readiness to return it to the “official” authorities. There is evidence that Russian gold was used in interbank transactions involving the Japanese government. This is evidenced by the fact that Yokohama Hurry Bank transferred a large amount of interest in connection with transactions with Russian gold to the Japanese state budget.

In 1945, the American military administration liquidated the Yokohama Hurry Bank and Chosen Bank as accomplices of Japanese militarism, but their successor was the Bank of Tokyo, created by the American occupation administration, which, merging with Mitsuba Bank, entered the top ten largest banks in the world.

Documents collected by the closed joint-stock company "Russian Gold" indicate that it was the predecessors of this bank who used Russian gold, and the bank should be responsible for the return of the precious metal to the Russian Federation.

Back in 1922, at the world Genoa conference, when the Bolsheviks sought diplomatic recognition from the West, they used the available data on gold appropriated by the Entente states from reserves that were previously stored in Kazan. At the conference the question was raised about the recognition by Soviet Russia of pre-war tsarist debts. This issue, at the insistence of Russia, should be considered together with the return and offset against the debt of the tsarist gold found abroad. According to the Russian delegation, this gold was estimated at 215 million gold coins, not counting the 60 million that the government of Admiral A.V. Kolchak was transferred to the Syndicate company and other private banks as gold to obtain a loan for the purchase of weapons. As a result of the counterclaims presented, it was decided to postpone the discussion of the issue of mutual obligations that arose during the First World War and the Civil War.

The fate of Russian gold and other valuables that ended up abroad after the defeat of the White movement and the departure of the interventionists was of interest to many former statesmen and historians. One of the attempts to determine their value was made by the former Finance Manager of the Far Eastern Republic A.I. Pogrebetsky. This democratic republic was formed in April 1920 in Eastern Siberia in the Far East after the defeat of the white movement. In November 1922, the republic became part of the RSFSR.

Based on data from A.I. Pogrebetsky and his own research, former Minister of Finance of the White government V.I. Moravsky prepared a certificate about the presence of Russian gold abroad. This certificate was discovered in the archives of the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace in California. Using these documents and the results of his own research, Russian scientist N.K. Ablazhei and American scientist N.V. Moravsky (the son of a former minister) compiled and published information in 1996, from which it is clear that the government of A.V. Kolchak deposited 81.5 million rubles in October 1919. gold, the bulk of which was used to pay for weapons. The balance of the unused amount fluctuated, according to the emigrant press, within the range of 12-14 million rubles. gold.

In the Chinese city of Qingqihar, the governor general detained 350 thousand rubles in 1920. gold, and the customs of the Chinese city of Harbin detained 316 thousand gold rubles on March 6, 1920.

Until now, we have been talking about that part of Russia’s gold reserves that was stored in Kazan. The other part of the reserve was stored in Nizhny Novgorod, and its fate is connected with the peace treaty that Russia concluded with Germany in March 1918. This agreement went down in history under the name “Brest-Litovsk Peace”. A secret agreement was drawn up to it, according to which Russia, which lost Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic states and part of Poland under the agreement, had to pay an indemnity in the amount of 245 tons 564 kg of gold.

In September 1918, 93 tons 536 kg were delivered to the Imperial Bank of Germany. The shipment of the rest of the gold from Nizhny Novgorod to Berlin was suspended due to the revolution in Germany. Soon the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the agreement to it were denounced by Russia.

After Germany's defeat in the First World War, Russian gold was at the disposal of the French army. The command of the occupation forces decided that this was a trophy for France, but the other victorious countries of Germany did not agree with this. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to deposit 93.5 tons of gold in a French bank under the control of Great Britain, France and the United States. Subsequently, Great Britain and the United States ceased to show interest in this gold. When the treaty between the victorious countries in the First World War and Germany was concluded in June 1919, Article 259 was included in its text, which stated that gold in the amount of 93.5 tons belonged to the Russian state and was placed in safekeeping in France. The value of this gold at modern prices would be more than $1 billion.

In 1963, the status of this gold was legally and actually confirmed by an agreement at the level of the governments of the USSR and France. Of this gold, the Russian side agreed to give 45 tons, and the French side agreed to accept it to pay off old Russian debts in favor of France. This agreement once again confirmed that the remaining 48.5 tons belong to Russia.

An expert council has recently been created, which, together with the Russian Gold joint-stock company, is conducting a study of documents related to royal gold located abroad and the possibility of returning its value to Russia.

A message has already appeared in the press that the provisional bourgeois Russian government, which led the country in February-October 1917, sent 3.7 tons of gold to Sweden for the purchase of military equipment, which at modern prices costs about 45 million dollars. Back in 1928 Confirmation was received that the gold was in the vault of a Swedish bank. Russia did not receive a single rifle or cartridge from Sweden in exchange for this gold.

Considering that at the moment Russia has begun to recognize the tsar’s debts, it has the right to claim the return of the tsar’s gold that ended up abroad. Part of the gold reserves of Tsarist Russia was spent on financing foreign communist and workers' parties to intensify their activities to force the world revolution. This money was transferred through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR. In total, this Commissariat spent abroad during 1920-1921. 12 million gold rubles, i.e. 9.2 tons of gold.

Of course, there was also money for the maintenance of diplomatic missions, but this amount could have been many times less. An additional argument for this conclusion is the official statement of the issuance of gold coins, discovered in the archives of the State Bank of the USSR. It notes that in the period from October 1, 1920 to May 15, 1921, 2,984 thousand rubles were allocated for the needs of the Communist International. gold.

Sending gold abroad continued in subsequent years. Therefore, the waste of gold returned from Siberia to Kazan, and gold stored in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow, is directly related to the desire of the Bolshevik leadership to establish the Soviet form of government in other countries of the world.