Countries of the world where Shiites are widespread. Who are Sunnis, Shiites and Alawites?

November 24, 2017 Views: 1596

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Shiites (from the Arabic "shi'a" - "adherents, party, faction") are the second largest branch of Islam in terms of the number of adherents, although compared to Sunnis they constitute a clear minority. Like all Muslims, Shiites believe in the messenger mission of the Prophet Muhammad. A distinctive feature of the Shiites is the belief that the leadership of the Muslim community should belong to Imams - God-appointed elected officials from among the descendants of the Prophet, to whom they include 'Ali ibn Abi-Talib and his descendants from Muhammad's daughter Fatima, and not elected officials - caliphs. Shiites are critical of the caliphate of the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman, because Abu Bakr was elected by a small number of companions, 'Umar was appointed by Abu Bakr. ‘Uthman was elected from seven candidates appointed by ‘Umar under such conditions that the election of anyone other than ‘Uthman was not possible. According to Shiites, the election of the leader - the Imam - of the Muslim community is similar to the election of prophets and is the prerogative of God. Currently, followers of various Shiite communities exist in almost all Muslim, European and American countries. The Shia faith is adhered to by the overwhelming majority of the population of Iran and Azerbaijan, about two-thirds of the population of Bahrain, a third of the population of Iraq, a significant part of the population of Lebanon and Yemen, in Afghanistan - the Farsi in the west of the country and the Hazaras. The majority of the inhabitants of the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan - the Pamir peoples - belong to the Ismaili branch of Shiism.

The number of Shiites in Russia is insignificant. The Tats living in the Dagestan Republic, the Lezgins of the village of Miskindzha, as well as the Azerbaijani communities of Derbent, who speak the local dialect of the Azerbaijani language, belong to this direction of Islam. In addition, Shiites are most of Azerbaijanis living in Russia (in Azerbaijan itself, Shiites make up, according to various estimates, up to 65 percent of the population). Shiism is dominated by Twelver Shiites or Imamis. Currently, relations between the Twelvers (as well as the Zaydis) and other Shia movements sometimes take on tense forms. Despite the similarities in doctrine, in fact these are different communities. Shiites are traditionally divided into two large groups: moderate (Twelver Shiites, Zaydis) and extreme (Ismailis, Alawites, Nusayris, etc.). At the same time, since the 70s of the 20th century, a reverse gradual process of rapprochement between moderate Shiites and Alawites and Ismailis began. Shi'ism, one of the two main branches of Islam, is recognized as a rather formal clerical hierarchy, in contrast to Sunni Islam, which emphasizes the authority of certain textual traditions and schools of thought. Many different Shia groups can be found in Europe, including the Khoei community (Sayyid Abu-al-Qasim al-Khoei Organization or al-Khoei Foundation) from South Asia (came through Africa), the Yemeni Ismailis, and the Indian Bohras. But the majority of Shiites belong to the dominant branch of the Twelvers (Isna'ashariyya), which is located in Iran, Lebanon, the Arab Gulf countries and Pakistan.

Unique to Shiism is the position of the marja' al-taqlid (“source of imitation”), a figure regarded by Shiites as a living example of the embodiment of the principles of Islam. One of the most famous and widely revered marjahs of recent times is Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, the Grand Ayatollah of the Iraqi holy city of Najaf, who died in 1992. He founded the al-Khoei Foundation, which serves the interests of the growing Shia diaspora living across the border. outside the Middle East. Based in London with an office in New York, the foundation covers a wide range of activities, including running schools and Shia mosques in Europe, especially the UK, translating Islamic texts into English, providing guidance on Islamic practices in the West, and providing cleric services to prisoners -Shias, assistance to fellow community members in matters of marriage, divorce and funerals. Politically, this foundation is opposed to the theocratic rule of Iran and acts in some sense as a counterweight to the Tehran regime's attempts to influence Shiites in Europe. After the death of al-Khoei, the foundation as a whole was under the leadership of another influential marja' - the Supreme Ayatollah 'Ali Sistani, who lives in Iran. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States and the London bombings, the foundation also worked in the field of propaganda and dialogue to improve the image of Islam in the West. The Foundation has also advised several parts of the British government, including the Foreign Office and the Department of Commons and Local government on Shiism issues. The Trust's management has also worked closely with the National Advisory Council on Mosques and Imams, a recently created British Government advisory body aimed at promoting good administrative practice in the country's mosques and preventing them from being used as centers of Islamic extremism. Shiites actively preach their version of Islam in modern world and are the initiators of the project to bring Islamic madhhabs closer together.

MODERATE SHIITES

Moderate Shiites include Twelver Shiites and Zaydis. Twelver Shiites (Imamits). They are the predominant direction within Shiite Islam, predominantly widespread in Iran, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq and Lebanon, and are also represented in other countries. The twelve Imams of the Prophet's family who are recognized by the Shiites are listed below. ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib (d. 661), also called “Murtada” by the Shiites, the fourth righteous caliph, cousin of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him). He was killed in Kufa by the Kharijite ‘Abdurrahman ibn Muljim.

1) Hasan ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib, or Abu Muhammad, called “Mujtaba” (d. 669).

2) Husayn ibn ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib, or Abu-‘Abdallah, called “Shahid,” which he actually is (d. 680).

3) ‘Ali ibn Husayn ibn Abi-Talib, or Abu Muhammad, called “Sajjad” or “Zayn al-‘Abidin” (d. 713).

4) Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Husayn, or Abu Ja'far, called "Bakir" (d. 733).

5) Ja'far ibn Muhammad ibn 'Ali or Abu-'Abdallah, called "As-Sadiq" (d. 765) (he is also the founder of the Jafarite school of Islamic law - the Jafari madhab).

6) Musa ibn Ja'far al-Sadiq or Abu Ibrahim, called "Kazim" (d. 799).

7) 'Ali ibn Musa ibn Ja'far al-Sadiq or Abu Hasan (also Imam Reza), called "Rida" (d. 818).

8) Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Musa or Abu Ja'far, called "Taqi" or "Jawad" (d. 835).

9) ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali or Abu Hasan, called “Naqi” or “Hadi” (d. 865).

10) Hasan ibn ‘Ali ibn Muhammad or Abu Muhammad, called “Zaki” or “‘Askari” (d. 873). 11) Muhammad ibn Hasan al-‘Askari or Abu Qasim, called “Mahdi” or “Hujjatul-Qaim Al-Muntazir”.

According to the Shiites, he was born in 256 AH, and in 260 he was first ascended to heaven, after which, already in 329, he entered an underground passage in his father’s house and has not yet appeared. The Mahdi in Islam is the Messiah who went into hiding at the age of five. This cover-up, according to the Imami Shiites, continues to this day. But before the Day of Judgment he will return and fill the world with justice. The Imamis ask for the speedy coming of the Mahdi. Sunnis also believe in the coming of the Mahdi, but do not consider him the 12th Imam, and expect him from among the descendants of the Prophet's family. The Shia creed is based on the following five main pillars (usul al-din). 1) Belief in One God (Tawhid). 2) Faith in the Justice of God (‘Adl) 3) Faith in Prophets and Prophecies (Nubuvwat). 4) Faith in the Imamate (belief in the spiritual and political leadership of the 12 imams). 5) The afterlife (Ma'ad). Moderate Imami theologians argue that the first, third and fifth pillars are common to all Muslims. The second and especially the fourth pillar are signs of the Shiite madhhab. Most Shiites follow the madhhab of Imam Ja'far in fiqh. The Ja'farite madhhab is one of the madhhabs in Islam, the founder of which is the sixth Imam of the Twelver Shiites and Ismailis, Ja'far al-Sadiq ibn Muhammad al-Baqir. Their sources of law are Holy Quran and Akhbar, ijma‘ and ‘aql (mind). Akhbar is the same as the Sunnah, but Shiites use other texts - this is a collection of hadiths from al-Kulayni, also Bihar al-Anwar, Nahj al-Balyaga, etc. The madhhab has several basic principles that distinguish it from all other madhhabs. This is the open gate of ijtihad and permitted temporary marriage. Very trained ‘ulama, who are called “maraji’” (plural from the singular “marja’”), can use the gates of ijtihad and issue fatwas. The madhhab is divided into two groups - Usuli (usuliyya) and Akhbari (akhbariyya). The Usuls follow the Maraji' in ijtihad, while the Akhbaris proceed to ijtihad in a more limited manner and the Maraji' do not. The Akhbars are mainly inhabitants of extreme southern Iraq and Bahrain, and the rest are Twelver Shiites in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc. are usuli. The Usulites are much more moderate than the Akhbarites, who practice a literalist approach. The madhhab is recognized as one of the legitimate (canonical) legal interpretations of Islam by other madhhabs. This was once again confirmed by a fatwa on July 6, 1959 by scholar Mahmoud Shaltut, President of the Al-Azhar Islamic Academy in Egypt. Zaydis (zaydiyya/zaydiyya). The founder of the sect was the grandson of Imam Husayn, Zayd ibn ‘Ali. The Zaydis spread widely in Iran, Iraq and the Hejaz, forming Zaydi states: Idrisid in North Africa in 789 (lasted until 926), in Tabaristan in 863 (lasted until 928), Yemen in 901. A branch of the Zaydis - the Nuktavits - are widespread in Iran. The Zaydis established power in part of Yemen, where their imams ruled until the revolution on September 26, 1962. They make up a significant part of the Yemeni population. In theology, the Zaydis follow the Mu'tazilites. Zaydis, in contrast to other Shiites, do not recognize the doctrine of a “hidden” imam, the “prudent concealment” of one’s faith (taqiyya), and reject anthropomorphism and the doctrine of unconditional predestination. Their number at the end of the 20th century. - 7 million people. The current leader of the Zaydis is Sheikh Husayn al-Houthi. The separation of Zaydism from the general mainstream of the Shiite movement occurred in the 30s of the 8th century, when some of the Shiites supported the desire of Zayd - the son of 'Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad - to prove with the sword his right to the Imamate. In matters of dogma, the Zaydis took a position most loyal to Sunni Islam. Thus, recognizing that the imam (head of the community) must be from the clan of ‘Ali, they denied the divine nature of the imamate and believed that any Alid who openly came out with arms in his hands could be an imam. They also allowed for the simultaneous existence of several imams in different Muslim countries. They also, in order to suppress the unrest, allowed the rule of the caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Umar, although they believed that 'Ali was a more worthy contender.

The Zaydis have their own special madhhab of fiqh. Zaydis are widespread in southern Yemen, where they have long coexisted with Sunnis, mainly representatives of the Shafi'i madhhab. The Yemeni theologian and imam al-Shaukani, the author of important works on theology, was a Zaydi by origin.

EXTREME SHIITES

Extreme Shiites include: Ismailis, Alawites and Kaysanites.

Ismailis are adherents of the Shiite Muslim sect that arose in the Caliphate in the middle of the 8th century and was named after the eldest son of the Shiite imam Ja'far al-Sadiq - Ismail.

In the 9th century, the Ismailis split into the Fatimid Ismailis, who recognized hidden imams, and the Qarmatians, who believed that there should be seven imams. In the 11th century, the Fatimid Ismailis were divided into Nizaris and Musta'lites, and already at the end of the 11th - beginning of the 12th centuries, the Qarmatians ceased to exist. The most famous of the Nizari sects were the Hashshashins, better known as the Assassins. In the 18th century, the Shah of Persia officially recognized Ismailism as a movement of Shiism.

Ismailism (Arabic: “al-Ismā‘īliyya”, Persian: “Esmâ‘īliyân”) - a set of religious movements in the Shiite branch of Islam dating back to the end of the 8th century. Each movement has its own hierarchy of imams. The title of the imam of the Nizari, the largest and most famous Ismaili community - Aga Khan - is inherited. Currently, the imam of this branch of the Ismailis is Aga Khan IV. There are now more than 15 million Ismailis of all directions. The emergence of the Ismailis is associated with a split in the Shiite movement that occurred in 765. In 760, Ja'far al-Sadiq, the sixth Shia imam, deprived his eldest son Ismail of the right to legitimate succession to the imamate. A number of experts believe that the real reason why the right to inherit the Imamate was transferred to the youngest son was that Ismail took an extremely aggressive position towards the Sunni caliphs, which could upset the existing balance between the two directions of Islam, beneficial to both the Shiites and and Sunnis. In addition, the anti-feudal movement began to rally around Ismail, which unfolded against the backdrop of a sharp deterioration in the situation of ordinary Shiites. The lower and middle strata of the population pinned hopes for significant changes in the socio-political life of Shiite communities with Ismail’s coming to power. The number of Ismail's followers increased, which caused alarm among both the Shiite feudal nobility and Ja'far al-Sadiq himself. Soon Ismail died. There was reason to believe that Ismail’s death was the result of a conspiracy organized against him by the ruling circles of the Shiites. Ja'far al-Sadiq widely publicized the fact of his son's death and allegedly even ordered that Ismail's corpse be put on display in one of the mosques. However, the death of Ismail did not stop the unfolding movement of his followers. Initially, they claimed that Ismail was not killed, but was hiding from enemies, and after a certain period they declared Isma'il the seventh “hidden imam”, who at the right moment would appear as the Messiah-Mahdi and, in fact, after him one should not expect the appearance new imams. The Ismailis, as the adherents of the new teaching began to be called, argued that Ismail, by the will of Allah, passed into an invisible state, hidden from mere mortals, of “gaib” (“gaib”) - “absence.” Some adherents of Ismail believed that Ismail actually died, so his son Muhammad should be declared the seventh imam. It is noteworthy that over time, the majority of the Ismailis began to believe in the seventh imam Muhammad, the son of Ismail. For this reason, the sect began to bear the name “Septenary”. Over time, the Ismaili movement strengthened and grew so much that it began to show signs of an independent religious movement. The Ismailis deployed in the territories of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Persia, North Africa and Central Asia a well-secret, extensive network of preachers of the new teaching. At this initial stage of development, the Ismaili movement met all the requirements of a powerful medieval organization, which had a clear hierarchical model of internal structure, its own very complex philosophical and theological dogma with elements reminiscent of the Gnostic teachings of Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity and small cults common in the territories of medieval Islam. -Christian world. Gradually the Ismailis gained strength and influence. In the 10th century, they founded the Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa. It was during the Fatimid period that Ismaili influence spread to the lands of North Africa, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Yemen and the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina. However, in the rest of the Islamic world, including the orthodox Shiites, the Ismailis were considered extreme sectarians and were often brutally persecuted. At the end of the 11th century, the Ismailis were divided into Nizari, who believed that the “hidden imam” was the eldest son of Caliph al-Mustansir Nizar, and Musta'lits who recognized Musta'li, the youngest son of the caliph. The Ismaili organization changed several times during its development. At its most famous stage, it had nine degrees of initiation, each of which gave the initiate specific access to information and its understanding. The transition to the next degree of initiation was accompanied by mystical rituals. Advancement up the Ismaili hierarchical ladder was primarily related to the degree of initiation. With the next period of initiation, new “truths” were revealed to the Ismaili, which with each step were more and more distant from the original dogmas of the Koran. In particular, at the 5th stage it was explained to the initiate that the text of the Koran should be understood not in a literal, but in an allegorical sense. The next stage of initiation revealed the ritual essence of the Islamic religion, which also boiled down to a rather allegorical understanding of rituals. At the last degree of initiation, all Islamic dogmas were actually rejected, even the doctrine of the divine advent, etc. was touched upon. Good organization and strict hierarchical discipline allowed the leaders of the Ismaili sect to manage a huge organization at that time. One of the philosophical and theological dogmas that the Ismailis adhered to stated that Allah from time to time infused his divine essence into the flesh of the “natyq” prophets he sent down (lit. “preacher” or “utterer”): Adam, Abraham, Noah , Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. The Ismailis claimed that Allah sent down to our world the seventh natyk prophet - Muhammad, the son of Ismail. Each of the sent down natyq prophets was always accompanied by the so-called “samit” (lit. “silent man”). Samit never speaks on his own, his essence boils down to the interpretation of the sermon of the natyk prophet. Under Moses it was Aaron, under Jesus it was Peter, under Muhammad it was ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib. With each appearance of the natyk prophet, Allah reveals to people the secrets of the universal mind and divine truth. According to the teachings of the Ismailis, seven natyq prophets should come into the world. Between their appearances, the world is ruled successively by seven imams, through whom Allah explains the teachings of the prophets. The return of the last, seventh prophet-natyk - Muhammad, son of Ismail, will reveal the last divine incarnation, after which divine reason should reign in the world, bringing universal justice and prosperity to devout Muslims. The religious doctrine of the Ismailis, apparently, is characterized by the concept of unlimited free will, the rejection of determinism and the recognition of the independent existence of the attributes of God, characteristic of the dominant trends in Islam.

List of famous Ismailis:

‘Abd Allah ibn Maymun al-Qaddah, Nasir Khosrow, Firdousi, ‘Ubaydullah, Hassan ibn Sabbah, al-Hakim bi-Amrillah, Rudaki. Alawites (‘Alawiyya, Alawites) got their name from the name of Imam ‘Ali. They are also called Nusayris - after Ibn Nusayra, considered the founder of the sect. Distributed in Turkey and Syria. They were the main population of the Alawite State. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad1 is of Alawite origin. Turkish Alawites are different from Syrian Arabs (Nusayris). 1. However, Bashar al-Assad, like his father, are Sunnis, at least outwardly. My father officially abandoned Shiism, not just Nusayism, in favor of Sunniism. The late Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buty read the funeral prayer for Hafiz Assad. Sunnis do not recite the jinazah prayer to the Alawites. Bashar prays in Sunni mosques according to Sunni rites. External signs are sufficient for Muslims to consider him a Sunni. The knowledge that he is a true Sunni or not belongs to Allah. Muslims make judgments based on external signs.

A Lavites are extreme Shiites (gulyat ashshi'a), like the Ismailis. Sunnis do not recognize them as Muslims due to serious deviations in the field of ‘aqida. The main claim is the deification of ‘Ali. There is an opinion that the Syrian Alawites at their 1938 congress abandoned their extreme views in favor of moderate Shiism, the teachings of the Ja'farite Imami.

Kaysanites- a vanished branch of the extreme Shiites. Formed at the end of the 7th century. They proclaimed ‘Ali’s son, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyi, as the imam, but since he was not the son of the Prophet’s daughter, most Shiites rejected this choice. According to one version, they got their name from the nickname of al-Mukhtar ibn Abi-‘Ubaid al-Sakafi - Kaysan, who led the uprising in Kufa under the slogan of defending the rights of Ibn al-Hanafiyya and avenging the blood of Imam Husayn. According to another version - on behalf of the head of the guard al-Mukhtar Abu-'Amr Kaisan. The Kaysanites split into a number of sects: Mukhtarites, Hashemites, Bayanites and Rizamites. The Kaysanite communities ceased to exist in the middle of the 9th century.

Sunni criticism of Shiism

There are several provisions that, according to Sunni theologians, demonstrate the falsity and inconsistency of Shiite beliefs regarding the companions (may Allah be pleased with all of them). As Sheikh Sa'id Fuda, a Jordanian specialist in the field of Sunni kalam, says, the following most important provisions on this issue can be identified. The Shiites themselves cite messages in their books telling that the Sunni authority Caliph ‘Umar ibn Khattab was married to the daughter of Imam ‘Ali, who was not the daughter of his wife Fatima, may Allah Almighty be pleased with both of them. This clearly indicates that Imam ‘Ali, contrary to what the Shiites say, did not tolerate takfir for ‘Umar or Abu Bakr, but, on the contrary, helped them and was their faithful brother. Only a fool can claim that Imam ‘Ali was afraid or was forced to do so, because the courage of Imam ‘Ali is recorded and confirmed by the mutawatir hadiths, the authenticity of which is beyond doubt. How can one say that ‘Ali was afraid of the power and authority of ‘Umar if there is no evidence that he was afraid of anything at all?! If we assume that he was silent and did not express his opinion openly due to some circumstances unknown to us, then why are the Shiites themselves not silent about this? If you believe that imams are sinless and never make mistakes, then how can you explain the fact that Imam Hasan renounced the right to khilaf (caliphate) in favor of Mu'awiyah ibn Abi-Sufyan? One of the greatest Shiite scholars of his time, al-Majlisi, tried to comment on this in his book “Bihar al-Anwar”. Over the course of several volumes, he finds fault with everything and scolds in a way that a reasonable person should not. He is not able to convince even himself that all the actions of Imam Hassan in that situation were correct, let alone convince others! Can it be said that Imam Hassan was wrong? If you give an affirmative answer, then this means that your madhhab (according to which all imams are sinless and never make mistakes) is erroneous. If you claim that Hassan was right, you will again be wrong. But we can say that Hassan is a great companion from the descendants of the noble Messenger, however, despite this, he is a man and, like any person, he could make a mistake and could be right, without being sinless (ma'sum) and without having knowledge of the sacred. You can also say that he did all this for purely political reasons, but then you have to admit that this misleads subsequent generations of Muslims and hides the truth, while the ma'sum is obliged to reveal it, and not to hide it. Allah Almighty said: “Obey what you are commanded and distance yourself from the ignorant. Verily, We have delivered you from the mockers.”

And Allah Almighty said: “Allah protects you from people.” It is not appropriate here to talk in detail about what happened between the companions in that fitna (trouble), however, it should be noted that, according to the 'aqida of Ahl-s-sunnah wal jama'a, Imam 'Ali, karramallahu wajhahu, was right, and Mu 'Awiya ibn Abi-Sufyan was mistaken. Then the sheikhs of Ahl-s-Sunna disagreed regarding Mu'awiya. There are many commentaries and expositions that can be consulted. The opinion of the Shiites regarding the Noble Qur'an clearly shows us that they, the Shiites, have clearly deviated from the path of truth and are deeply mistaken from the point of view of the Sunnis. The vast majority of their scholars (jumhur) believe that the Holy Quran is distorted, since some surahs and verses have been removed (rather than added). Only some (few) Shiites deny that the Koran was distorted both by deleting and by adding surahs and verses. These words refer specifically to the opinion of the overwhelming majority (jumhur), for example, al-Kulaini, al-Majlisi (the author of the book “Bihar al-Anwar”, consisting of more than a hundred volumes), Ni’matullah al-Jazairi and other Shiite scholars who openly declare that the mandatory provisions of their madhhab include the belief that the Koran was distorted by removing suras and verses. Some of them even pointed out examples of distortion, as did al-Bihrani, citing examples of distortion of the Holy Qur'an in his tafsir Al-Burhan. I repeat once again that my words now apply only to these people. There is no doubt that, because of their statements about the distortion of the Quran, they left the Islamic religion (millat al-Islam), one of the greatest signs of which is the Holy Quran, which Allah Almighty Himself protects from distortion. This is stated in the following words of the Almighty: “Verily, We have sent down a reminder, and We are its guardians.” The Almighty also said: “A lie will not approach it (the Quran) either from the front or from the back. He is sent down from the Wise, the Glorious." Thus, anyone who believes that the Koran has been distorted by removing or adding surahs and verses is a kaafir, according to the unanimous opinion of all Muslim groups and movements, except for the Shiites, who never cease to defend their imams who speak of the distortion of the Book. Some Shiites now declare that they personally do not believe that the Qur'an has been distorted, that there is supposedly disagreement on this issue and that the most correct thing is to deny the distortion (tahrif). However, such an excuse, according to Sa'id Fuda, is even more vile than the sin itself, since there is no disagreement among Muslims on this issue and one cannot assume it. It is necessary to reject the ideas of those who discredit Islam with such statements. It cannot be said that the Shiites did not say this. Those Shiites whose names were mentioned above openly declared that the Holy Quran had been corrupted. Their books have been published and are quite well known. At one time, Musa Bigiev also pointed out this in his work “al-Washi’a fi naqd ‘akaid ashshi’a” (“The Promotion Shuttle in the Criticism of Shiite Dogmas”), having studied well-known Shiite sources.

On the other side Sa'id Fuda draws the attention of Muslims to the following: “It is known that some adherents of the true ‘aqida of Ahlu-s-Sunnah are trying to refute the Shiites, attributing to them words that they did not say. They accuse them of beliefs for which the Shiites themselves endure takfir. We are talking, for example, about the opinion that the angel Jibril, alayhi al-salaam, made a mistake in transmitting the Revelation, about the opinion that Imam 'Ali is on the clouds and that the peals of thunder are his voice, and about other opinions expressed by isma 'Ilits, Druze, an-Nusayriyya, who, according to Muslim ijma, are kafirs. It is wrong to attribute to the Shiites something that is not in their books. We should refute only those opinions of the Shiites that they express, so as not to fall into lies and slander.” The above opinion is expressed by many representatives of Sunni Islam. Recently, however, Shia scholars have emerged who reject some of the Sunni accusations (especially regarding the Qur'an), linking them to Akhbarites and weak traditions within Shia sources. The Shiites themselves, the Imamis, thus have different points of view, and among them there are moderates who go to resolve conflicts between the two groups, prohibiting scolding the companions of the Prophet and his wives. Just as there are extreme Imamites, who even call themselves Rafidis, who declare openly on satellite channels about the unbelief of the first three caliphs, the two wives of the Prophet ‘Aisha and Hafsa and other companions.

Sunnis are the largest sect in Islam, and Shiites are the second largest sect of Islam. Let’s figure out where they agree and where they differ.

Of all Muslims, 85-87% of people are Sunni and 10% of people are Shia. Sunnis number more than 1 billion 550 million people

Sunnis place special emphasis on following the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (his actions and statements), on loyalty to tradition, on the participation of the community in choosing its head - the caliph.

The main signs of belonging to Sunnism are:

• Recognition of the authenticity of the six largest collections of hadith (compiled by Al-Bukhari, Muslim, at-Tirmidhi, Abu Dawood, an-Nasai and Ibn Majah);
• Recognition of four legal schools: Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanafi and Hanbali madhhabs;
• Recognition of the schools of aqidah: Asarite, Ash'arite and Maturidi.
• Recognition of the legitimacy of the rule of the Rightly Guided Caliphs - Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Ali (Shiites recognize only Ali).

Shiites Unlike the Sunnis, they believe that the leadership of the Muslim community should belong not to elected officials - caliphs, but to Imams - appointed by God, chosen individuals from among the descendants of the prophet, to whom they include Ali ibn Talib.

The Shia faith is based on five main pillars:

• Belief in One God (Tawhid).
• Belief in the Justice of God (Adl)
• Belief in Prophets and Prophecies (Nabuwwat).
• Faith in the Imamate (belief in the spiritual and political leadership of the 12 imams).
• The Underworld (Maad)

Shiite-Sunni split

The divergence of currents in Islam began under the Umayyads and continued during the Abbasids, when scholars began to translate into Arabic the works of ancient Greek and Iranian scientists, analyze and interpret these works from an Islamic point of view.

Despite the fact that Islam united people on the basis of a common religion, ethno-confessional contradictions in Muslim countries have not disappeared. This circumstance is reflected in different currents of the Muslim religion. All differences between currents in Islam (Sunnism and Shiism) actually come down to issues of law enforcement, and not dogmatics. Islam is considered the unified religion of all Muslims, but there are a number of disagreements between representatives of Islamic movements. There are also significant discrepancies in the principles of legal decisions, the nature of holidays, and attitudes towards people of other faiths.

Sunnis and Shiites in Russia

In Russia, mostly Sunni Muslims, only in the south of Dagestan are Shiite Muslims.

In general, the number of Shiites in Russia is insignificant. The Tats living in the Republic of Dagestan, the Lezgins of the village of Miskindzha, as well as the Azerbaijani communities of Derbent, who speak the local dialect of the Azerbaijani language, belong to this direction of Islam. In addition, the majority of Azerbaijanis living in Russia are Shiites (in Azerbaijan itself, Shiites make up up to 85% of the population).

Killing Shiites in Iraq

Of the ten charges brought against Saddam Hussein, only one was chosen: the murder of 148 Shiites. It was carried out in response to the assassination attempt on Saddam himself, a Sunni. The execution itself was carried out during the days of the Hajj - the Muslim pilgrimage to holy places. In addition, the sentence was carried out several hours before the start of the main Muslim holiday - Eid al-Adha, although the law allowed this to be done until January 26th.

The choice of a criminal case for execution, a special time for hanging Hussein, indicates that the behind-the-scenes authors of the script for this massacre planned to provoke Muslims to protest all over the world, to new feuds between Sunnis and Shiites. And, indeed, the contradictions between the two directions of Islam in Iraq have worsened. In this regard, a story about the roots of the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, about the reasons for this tragic split that occurred 14 centuries ago.

History of the Shia-Sunni split

This tragic and stupid division is not based on any serious or deep differences. It is rather traditional. In the summer of 632, the Prophet Mohammed was dying, and behind a curtain of palm fibers a dispute had already begun about who would replace him - Abu Bekr, Mohammed's father-in-law, or Ali, the prophet's son-in-law and cousin. The struggle for power was the root cause of the split. Shiites believe that the first three caliphs - Abu Bekr, Osman and Omar - non-blood relatives of the prophet - illegally usurped power, and only Ali - a blood relative - acquired it legally.

At one time there was even a Koran consisting of 115 suras, while the traditional Koran contains 114. The 115th, inscribed by the Shiites, called “Two Luminaries,” was intended to raise Ali’s authority to the level of the Prophet Mohammed.

The power struggle eventually led to Ali's assassination in 661. His sons Hasan and Hussein were also killed, and the death of Hussein in 680 near the city of Karbala (modern Iraq) is still perceived by Shiites as a tragedy of historical proportions. Nowadays, on the so-called day of Ashura (according to the Muslim calendar, on the 10th day of the month of Maharram), in many countries Shiites hold funeral processions, accompanied by a violent manifestation of emotions, people stab themselves with chains and sabers. Sunnis also honor Hussein, but consider such mourning unnecessary.

During the Hajj - the pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca - differences are forgotten, Sunnis and Shiites worship together at the Kaaba in the Forbidden Mosque. But many Shiites make a pilgrimage to Karbala - where the prophet's grandson was killed.

The Shiites have shed a lot of blood of the Sunnis, and the Sunnis have shed a lot of the blood of the Shiites. The longest and most serious conflict facing the Muslim world is not so much the conflict between Arabs and Israel, or between Muslim countries and the West, but the conflict within Islam itself over the schism between Shiites and Sunnis.

“Now that the dust has settled from the war in Iraq, it has become clear that the unexpected victors were the Shiites,” wrote Mai Yamani, a fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. “The West has realized that the location of major oil reserves coincides with those areas where Shiites are in the majority - Iran, the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Southern Iraq." This is why the American government is flirting with the Shiites. Even the murder of Saddam Hussein is a kind of sop to the Shiites. At the same time, this is evidence that the scriptwriters of Iraqi “justice” wanted to create an even greater split between Shiites and Sunnis.

Now there is no Muslim caliphate, because of the power in which the division of Muslims into Shiites and Sunnis began. This means there is no longer a subject of dispute. And theological differences are so far-fetched that they can be leveled out for the sake of Muslim unity. There is no greater stupidity than for Sunnis and Shiites to forever cling to these differences.

The Prophet Mohammed, shortly before his death, said to the Muslims gathered in the mosque: “See that after me you do not become lost, cutting off each other’s heads! Let the one present inform the one who is absent about this.” Mohammed then looked around at the people and asked twice: “Have I brought this to your attention?” Everyone heard it. But immediately after the death of the prophet, Muslims began to “cut off each other’s heads” by disobeying him. And they still don’t want to hear the great Mohammed.

Isn't it time to stop?

, Iraq and Bahrain. According to various estimates, from 27% to 35% of the Lebanese population adhere to the Shia faith; up to 30% in Kuwait.

Shiism is professed by the Balti people living in Northern India and Pakistan, as well as Burishi (Ismailis) and some Pashtun tribes: Turi (English), most bangash (English) and some Orakzais (English). The majority of the inhabitants of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan - the Pamir peoples (except for some of the Yazgulem people) belong to the Ismaili current of Shiism.

The number of Shiites in Russia is insignificant. The Tats living in the Republic of Dagestan, the Lezgins of the village of Miskindzha, as well as the Azerbaijani communities of Dagestan belong to this direction of Islam. In addition, the majority of Azerbaijanis living in Russia are Shiites (in Azerbaijan itself, Shiites make up about 85% of the Muslim population).

Islam arose in the 7th century and already in the first century of its existence, the single Muslim community (ummah) split into three directions - Sunnism, Shiism and Kharijism. The main criterion that became the impetus for the split in the Islamic religion initially lay in the question of the nature and nature of the supreme power in a Muslim state. Some Muslims formulated the concept according to which power is transferred by decision of the community (ummah) to the most respected Muslim from the Quraish tribe, to which the Prophet Muhammad belonged. Another part of Muslims recognized the family and direct descendants of the prophet (Ahl al-Bayt) as his only legitimate heirs and spiritual successors.

During the intense struggle for power that unfolded in the caliphate at the beginning of the second half of the 7th century between the cousin, son-in-law and sahab of the prophet Muhammad - Ali and his opponents in the person of the Umayyads, a religious-political group was formed ( ash-shia) supporters of the rights of Ali and his children. This group became the core of a movement that would later lead to the split of the Muslim community into two main parts - Sunnis and Shiites. The schism went beyond dynastic rivalries within the caliphate, having a profound impact on the fate of the Muslim world. According to legend, the prophet Muhammad reported about the split in the Islamic community. According to one hadith, the prophet said: “The Jews split into 71 sects. And the people of Nazareth were split asunder(that is, Christians - approx.) for 72 sects. And my ummah will split(that is, the community of believers - approx.) for 73 sects". There are different versions of this hadith, but they all report the split of the Muslim community into 73 sects.

There is no generally accepted opinion about the emergence of the Shiite movement. Some believe that it arose during the time of the prophet, others - after his death, others attribute the origin of Shiism to the reign of Ali, others - to the period after his assassination. As S. M. Prozorov notes,. I.P. Petrushevsky believes that Shiism developed into a religious movement in the period of time from the death of Hussein in 680 until the establishment of the Abbasid dynasty in 749/750, and during the same period, splits began in it. During the lifetime of the prophet himself, the first to be called "shiya"(i.e. "Shiite"), were Salman al-Farisi and Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, al-Miqdad ibn al-Aswad and Ammar ibn Yasir.

“these discrepancies are due to the fact that the authors, calling the followers of “Ali” Shiites, do not give a clear definition of this term and do not take into account the change in its content”

Returning from his last pilgrimage, the Prophet Muhammad, in the town of Ghadir Khumm, located between Mecca and Medina, made a statement addressed to Ali. Muhammad declared that Ali was his heir and brother, and those who accepted the prophet as mawla should accept Ali as his mawla. Shia Muslims believe that in this way the Prophet Muhammad declared Ali as his successor. The Sunni tradition recognizes this fact, but does not give it great importance, while the Shiites solemnly celebrate this day as a holiday. In addition, according to the hadith, the prophet said: “I leave among you two valuable things, if you stick to them, you will never get lost: the Koran and my family; they will never separate until the day of judgment". As proof of the imamate of Ali, the Shiites cite another hadith about how Muhammad, calling on his closest relatives and fellow tribesmen, pointed to Ali, who was then still a boy, saying: .

“This is my brother, my successor (wasi) and my deputy (califa) after me. Listen to him and obey him!

Prophet Muhammad died on June 8, 632 at his home in Medina. Almost immediately after his death, a group of Ansars gathered in one of the city's quarters to resolve the issue of a successor. They were later joined by the prophet's companions Abu Bakr and Umar. At the meeting, several people (sahaba Abu Dharr al-Gifari, al-Miqdad ibn al-Aswad and Persian Salman al-Farisi) spoke out as supporters of Ali’s rights to the caliphate, but they were not listened to. Ali himself and Muhammad's family were at this time busy preparing the funeral of the prophet. The result of the meeting was the election of Abu Bakr as “deputy messenger of Allah” - Caliph Rasuli-l-lahi, or simply caliph. Upon his death, Abu Bakr recommended Umar as his successor, and the community unanimously swore allegiance to him. Dying, Umar named the six most respected veterans of Islam (Ali, Uthman ibn Affan, Saad ibn Abu Waqqas, Abd ar-Rahman ibn Auf, Talha and az-Zubayr) and ordered them to choose a new caliph from among them. Uthman was elected the new caliph.

Shiites consider the first three caliphs to be usurpers who deprived of power the only legitimate owner - Ali, and the Kharijites, on the contrary, consider only Abu Bakr and Umar to be righteous caliphs. When the Abbasid dynasty, descended from the uncle of the prophet al-Abbas, came to power in the caliphate in the middle of the 8th century, its representatives began to make claims to legitimate power in the Muslim community, thus becoming competitors to the descendants of Ali. The Abbasid caliph al-Mahdi officially called all four caliphs usurpers and declared that the caliphate and imamate after the death of the Prophet Muhammad belonged to his uncle al-Abbas and his descendants. Sometimes they tried to present the first caliphs, starting with Abu Bakr, as “presidents” elected democratically. The English researcher B. Lewis noticed that not only the second, but already.

“The first caliph... Abu Bakr was elected in a way that, according to our point of view, can be called a coup d'etat (that is, a coup d'etat - approx.). The second, Umar, simply assumed power de facto, probably on the instructions of his predecessor."

In June 656, Muslims dissatisfied with Uthman's policies besieged his house, and forty days later they burst inside and killed the caliph. Three days after the assassination of Uthman, Ali was elected the new caliph. However, the governor of Syria and Uthman's second cousin, Muawiyah from the Umayyad family, refused to swear allegiance to the new caliph, as a person (as he believed) who had stained himself with connections with the murderers of Caliph Uthman. In addition to him, the closest companions of the prophet, brother-in-law Talha ibn Ubaydullah and cousin al-Zubayr, as well as the prophet’s wife Aisha, also opposed Ali. The rivalry between Ali and his opponents that arose in the caliphate caused the first civil war (fitnah). Talha, al-Zubayr and Aisha were defeated by Ali in the "Battle of the Camel".

The apogee of the confrontation with Muawiya was the Battle of Siffin. The battle was not going well for Muawiyah, and Ali was favored to win. The situation was saved by the governor of Egypt, Amr al-As, who proposed pinning scrolls of the Koran on spears. The battle was stopped. During these clashes, Ali lost 25 thousand, and Muawiya 45 thousand people. Among those who fought on Ali's side and died in the Battle of Siffin was one of the most famous companions of the Prophet Muhammad, Ammar ibn Yasir. Ali agreed to arbitration, but it ended in vain. Dissatisfied with his indecisiveness, part of Ali's supporters moved away from him and formed a third Muslim movement - the Kharijites, who opposed both Ali and Mu'awiya. J. Wellhausen called the Shiite and Kharijite parties “religious and political parties of opposition” to the Umayyads.

In 660, Muawiyah was proclaimed caliph in Jerusalem. In January 661, Ali was killed by a Kharijite in the mosque of Kufa. In the years following his assassination, Mu'awiya's successors cursed Ali's memory in mosques and ceremonial gatherings, and Ali's followers retaliated against the first three caliphs as usurpers and the "dog of Mu'awiya."

Truly, what prompted me to write this letter to you was my innocence before Allah, the Great and Glorious, in my dealings with you. And you should do a great deed, in which it would be good for Muslims: give up your stubbornness in a false cause and enter into what people have entered, and swear allegiance to me. After all, you know that I have more rights to this matter than you, in the eyes of Allah and all the repentant, the preserved and those who turn their hearts to Allah. Fear Allah and leave the outrage, stop shedding the blood of Muslims, because, I swear by Allah, it is no good for you if you appear before Allah with this abundantly shed of their blood. Enter into peace and humility and do not dispute the matter with the people to whom it belongs, and with the one who has more rights to it than you, and may Allah extinguish the anger with this, and unite the speeches, and settle civil strife. And if in your delusion you want nothing more than humiliation, then I will come to you with the Muslims and will sue you until Allah judges us - and he is the best judge...You mention the disputes of Muslims over this matter after him (Muhammad) and bring charges against Abu Bakr the Truthful, and Umar the Discerning, and Abu Ubaydah the Reliable, and Talha and az-Zubayr, and the blameless Muhajirs, whose decision is unpleasant to you, Abu Muhammad. But when the community argued about this matter after its prophet Muhammad - may Allah bless him and grant him peace - it knew that the Quraish had more rights in this regard, because its prophet was one of them. Then the Quraish and the Ansars, and the worthy Muslims, and the believers decided to entrust this matter to the most knowledgeable of Allah and the most God-fearing of them, the very first of them in Islam, and chose Abu Bakr the Most Truthful, although they knew the position of a person who is more worthy than Abu Bakr, who took it place and protecting the heritage of Islam, but they refused him this.Now the situation between you and me is the same as it was with him. If I knew that you are firmer in the affairs of your subjects, and more caring towards this community, and better at governing, and more cunning with the enemy, and stronger in all matters, then I would hand over this matter to you after your father, because I know that you claim the same thing that your father claimed. You know that your father came out against us and fought with us, and then things turned out in such a way that he chose a man and we chose a man, so that the two of them would make a decision that would settle the matter of this community, and with his help, friendliness would return and unity. And we obliged both judges to follow the covenants of Allah and loyalty to him in this matter, and they obliged us to do the same so that we would agree with what they decide. Then they agreed on your father’s abdication and abdicated him. And since you call me to this matter, seeking the right of your father, and your father has lost it, then take care, O Abu Muhammad, of yourself and your religion. And peace.

The confrontation between the house of Ali and the Umayyads broke out again. Hassan was forced to sign an agreement with Muawiya, according to the terms of which, after the death of Muawiya, power over the Muslim community was to pass back to Hassan.

The motive for the death of Usman was one of the reasons why Hassan was not buried next to his grandfather, the Prophet Muhammad. Hassan wanted to be buried next to the grave of his grandfather, but the governor of Medina, Marwan bin al-Hakam, stood in the way of the funeral procession, and forbade him to be buried next to the prophet as punishment for the undignified funeral of Uthman, to which Hassan himself had nothing to do. In the resulting skirmish, which threatened to develop into bloodshed, Muhammad bin Ali persuaded Ali's youngest son, Hussein, to bury his brother next to his mother in the al-Baki cemetery.

The agreement between Hasan and Mu'awiyah was decisively rejected by Hussein. He refused to swear allegiance to Muawiyah, but he, on the advice of Hasan, did not force him. After Muawiyah's death, power passed to his son Yazid I, to whom Hussein also refused to swear allegiance. The Kufis immediately swore an oath of allegiance to Hussein and called him to them. Surrounded by his relatives and closest people, Hussein moved from Mecca to Kufa. On the way, he received news that the action in Iraq had been suppressed, but nevertheless Hussein continued on his way. In the town of Ninewa, Hussein’s detachment of 72 people clashed with the 40,000-strong army of the caliph. In a stubborn battle they were killed (many of those killed were members of the family of the Prophet Muhammad), including Hussein himself, the rest were taken prisoner. Among the dead, more than twenty people were Hussein’s closest relatives and, accordingly, members of the prophet’s family, of whom two were Hussein’s sons (Ali al-Akbar (English) and Ali al-Askar (English)), six paternal brothers of Hussein, three sons of Imam Hasan and three sons of Abdullah ibn Jafar (English)(nephew and son-in-law of Ali), and three sons and three grandsons of Aqil ibn Abu Talib (English)(Ali's brother, cousin and sahab of the prophet). The head of the prophet's grandson was sent to Caliph Yazid I in Damascus.

The death of Hussein contributed to the religious and political unification of adherents of the Ali clan, and he himself became not only a symbol of the Shiite movement, but also a significant figure in the entire Muslim world. Among Shiites, Hussein is considered the third imam. The day of his death is celebrated with the deepest mourning (shahsey-vahsey). It is noteworthy that commemoration on the day of Ashura occurs not only among Shiites, but in some places also among Sunnis. For example, in Central Asia, in particular in Fergana and Samarkand, among Sunnis, especially women, muridoks of local ishans, special rituals took place with the reading of religious poems about the death of Hussein, which were called Ashuri. The cult of Hassan and Husayn also exists among Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school, particularly in the Deccan (India) and Indonesia. Among Indonesian Muslims.

“The holiday is called the “Feast of Hasan-Hussein” because in Indonesia the predominant form of Islam (Shafiites) dates back to the influence of the Deccan. And in the southern part of India, Hussein’s brother Hassan is considered a saint.”

In the middle of the 8th century, a revolt against the Umayyads broke out in Khorasan, leading to their overthrow and the establishment of the Abbasid dynasty, descended from the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad. At first, the Abbasids did not take a firm position regarding the descendants of Ali and Fatima (Alids), but soon not only a political, but also a religious and ideological struggle for power developed between these groups. The first of the Abbasids to systematically exterminate the Alids was Caliph al-Mansur. After his death, many corpses of executed Alids were discovered in the caliph’s secret cellars. Labels were tied to their ears, indicating the identity of the executed person. According to the information of Muhammad al-Mughniyya, during the period of his reign, al-Mansur destroyed over a thousand descendants of Ali and Fatima.

In a number of individual regions, which under the Abbasids began to gradually fall away from the caliphate, the Alids came to power. Thus, in 788, the great-grandson of Imam Hassan, Idris, who took part in the Alid uprising against the Abbasids in 786, created the Idrisid state in the north of Morocco. The Idrisids became the first dynasty formed by adherents of the Zaydi sect of Shiism. However, it was not the only North African state with a Shiite twist. Elements of Shiism were also present in the religious beliefs of the Berber tribal confederation of Bharghawat (English) .

Caliph Al-Mamun, who came to power in 813, began a policy of rapprochement with the Alids. By his order, in 816, the eighth Shia imam, Ali ibn Musa, was brought from Medina to Khorasan. Upon the latter's arrival, al-Ma'mun gave him laqab ar-Riza and on March 24, 817, proclaimed him his heir (vali'ahd). The caliph married his daughter Umm Habib to Imam Reza and sealed the union between Reza's son, Muhammad, who was then six years old, and his other daughter, Umm al-Fazl. Moreover, al-Mamun ordered the official black color of the Abbasids to be replaced with green, the color of the Shiites, and also ordered the name of Ali ar-Riza to be minted on coins after him: “ar-Riza, Imam of the Muslims.” Al-Mamun made attempts to achieve ideological unanimity among Muslims - for the first time to formulate an official dogma of faith that would satisfy both Sunnis and Shiites. In 827, the Shia slogan "Ali is the best of men" was officially adopted - with the qualification "after Muhammad", and Mu'awiyah I was censured. The policies pursued by Caliph al-Ma'mun met with opposition among members of the Abbasid dynasty. They proclaimed his uncle, Ibrahim ibn al-Mahdi, caliph in Baghdad.

At the beginning of the 9th century, the name probably appears Imamites(al-imamiya), another name for which isna'asharites(al-isna'ashariyya). The first to be called Imami were the Shia theologians Ali ibn Ismail al-Tammar and Muhammad ibn Khalil al-Saqqaq. By that time, the Shiite teaching had noticeably spread throughout Arab Iraq and its neighboring regions. At the end of the 10th century, al-Khwarizmi cites Babylonia as a classic example of a Shia region. Already in the 10th century, the inhabitants of Qom were Shiites. In the same period, Basra became Shiite, about which even in the 9th century they could say: “Basra - for Osman, Kufa - for Ali.”

The territory of the Fatimid Caliphate against the backdrop of the modern borders of Asia and Africa.

At the beginning of the 10th century, an uprising of Ismailis (“extreme Shiites”) broke out on the territory of Ifriqiya (modern Tunisia), led by Ubeydallah, who declared himself a descendant of Ali and Fatima. In January 910, in Raqqada (near Kairouan), Ubeydallah was proclaimed caliph and mahdi. A few years later in 929, the Emir of Cordoba, Abd ar-Rahman III, also assumed the title of Caliph and “Head of the Faithful.” Thus, as L.A. Semyonova rightly notes. The Fatimids not only established their power along the entire African coast, also subjugating the Idrisids, but also extended it to Sicily. During the Fatimid reign, the al-Azhar mosque was built in Cairo and the university of the same name was founded, which later became the largest theological school in Egypt.

“The formation of a Shiite state in North Africa meant the split of the Muslim world into three caliphates hostile to each other: the Fatimids, the Abbasids and the Umayyads of Cordoba”

In the middle of the 11th century, the power of the Ismaili Sulayhid dynasty was established in Yemen. In the 11th-12th centuries, Ismailism established itself in Gorno-Badakhshan, and from the very beginning its followers were persecuted by representatives of the orthodox Sunni clergy.

In the 10th century, the Daylemite dynasty of the Buyids (Buwaikhids) rose in Western Asia, making the Abbasids dependent on them. The Buyids belonged to the Isna'Shari (Twelver) direction of Shiism. In their era, a certain systematization and intellectualization of Shiite theology took place. At the same time, the Buyids showed hostility towards the political opponents of the Abbasids - the Ismaili Fatimids. The Kara Koyunlu state, which existed in the XIV-XV centuries in Western Asia, belonged to the Shiites.

“so that in the squares [people] would loosen their tongues to mock and curse Abu Bakr, Umar and Usman, and cut off the head of anyone who would resist”

In 1943, Lebanon's Muslim and Christian communities entered into an oral agreement known as the National Pact, laying the foundation for Lebanon as a multi-religious state. In accordance with the National Pact, a Shiite Muslim is assigned one of the three main posts in the state - the chairman of parliament, while the Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim are assigned the positions of president and head of government, respectively. In 1949, the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon was founded, with Druze as its core.

In the second half of the 20th century, a new political alignment on a religious basis emerged in the Islamic world. In the 1970s The Alawite minority came to power in Syria. In 1979, during the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Shah's regime was overthrown and a new form of government was established. The constitution adopted after the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran declared that (Article 12). The establishment of a Shiite Islamic regime in Iran, equally distant from both the USA and the USSR and the secular and Sunni regimes in the region, became a completely new factor in the political situation in that period. The revolution in Iran became one of the key events of the 20th century and had a huge historical meaning for the whole world.

The Iranian revolution was greeted with enthusiasm among Bahraini Shiites. Some Shiite politicians formed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (English), came up with the idea of ​​declaring an “Islamic republic” in the country, while others demanded that the monarch agree to form a new, “Islamic” government. Some even began to raise the issue of Bahrain joining Iran. The response to these sentiments was the government’s campaign against opposition forces, which was anti-Shiite in nature. Many Shia activists were imprisoned. On December 14, 1981, the foiled coup attempt was announced. (English), in the organization of which the authorities accused Bahraini Shiites from among the members of the Islamic Liberation Front, as well as “Khomeinists” from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman.

The Islamic revolution caused no less uprising of the Shiite masses in neighboring Iraq. Back in 1968, the underground political movement “ad-Daawa al-Islamiyya” (“Islamic call”) was founded in Iraq, which expanded in the 1970s. armed struggle against the Baathist regime. The leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, openly called on the Iraqi Shiites to throw off ruling regime. The Iraqi authorities launched brutal repressions against the Dawa party. Even membership in this party was punishable by death. Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Amina al-Sadr were arrested and then executed. In 1991, after Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, a Shiite uprising broke out in the south of the country. (English)(“Shaabani intifada”), brutally suppressed by parts of the Iraqi army.

The Lebanese Shia Amal militia was active in the resistance during the 1982 Israeli invasion. During the Civil War in Lebanon, another paramilitary group arose among the Lebanese Shiites - Hezbollah, which advocated the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon modeled on Iran.

“the possibility of broad and comprehensive development in areas inhabited by professing Hazaras, be it in Hazarajat, Kabul or other cities”

In 2002, in Yemen, Zaydis from the Al-Houthi group launched an armed struggle against the central government in the country's northwestern province of Saada. The government accused the rebels of intending to overthrow the ruling government and establish their own power led by the Imam. The rebels, in turn, argued that they were only protecting their community from discrimination by the authorities.

To strengthen mutual understanding and formalize dialogue between followers of the two branches of Islam (Shiism and Sunniism), the Sunni-Shiite Theological Council was established in May 2011 in Jakarta with the support of the Indonesian government.

The predominant trend in Shiism is the Imami, among whom a split occurred into Twelver Shiites (Isna'Sharites) and Ismailis. Al-Shahrastani names the following sects of the Imami: Bakirites, Navusites, Aftahites, Shumayris, Ismailis-Waqifites, Musawites and Isnaasharis, while other heresiographers (al-Ashari, Naubakhti) identify three main sects: Qatites (later becoming Isnaasharites), Shukkarites and vaqifites.

Currently, relations between the Twelvers (as well as the Zaydis) and other Shiite movements sometimes take on tense forms. Despite the similarities in doctrine, in fact these are different communities. Shiites are traditionally divided into two large groups: moderate (

The main Shia shrines are located in Iraq's Karbala. Photo by Larry Jones

In the one and a half billion world of Islam, over 85% of Muslims are Sunnis, while Shiites are about 130 million. The bulk of them live in Iran (more than 75 million, over 80% of the total population, while Sunnis in Iran are 18%), Iraq (more than 20 million) , Azerbaijan (about 10 million). In these three countries, Shiites dominate numerically, culturally and politically.

In a number of Arab countries (Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc.) there are numerous Shiite minorities. Shiites inhabit the central, mountainous part of Afghanistan (Hazaras and others - about 4 million) and some areas of Pakistan. There are Shiite communities in India, although there are many more Sunnis here. In the south of India, “black Shiites” live among Hindus.

In the Pamir Mountains (in the Tajik and Afghan parts of the historical region of Badakhshan, in the Sarykol region in the far west of China), several small nations profess Ismailism-Nizarism, a type of Shiism. There are quite a few Nizari Ismailis in Yemen (here, as well as in India, there is another type of Ismailism - Mustalism). The center of Ismaili-Nizarism is located in Mumbai, India, in the Red Palace of their spiritual leader Aga Khan.

Another variety of Ismailism is common in Syria. The most important ethno-confessional group of Shiites in Syria are the Alawites, the peasantry of the mountainous northwestern region. The Shiites also include the Druze, a very distinctive ethno-confessional group inhabiting the Shuf region in Mount Lebanon, the Hauran highlands on the border of Syria and Israel, the mountainous region of Jebel Druz in southeastern Syria and groups of villages along the routes connecting these three regions.

In Turkey, in addition to the majority of Sunni Turks and Sunni Kurds, there are Shiite Turks (a very unique ethnographic community) and Shiite Kurds (some tribes), as well as Alawite Arabs.

In Russia, almost all Shiites are Azerbaijanis and Tats; Of these, only the residents of Derbent in the south of Dagestan and some surrounding villages (including one large Lezgin aul) are the indigenous population.

In the Arab Mashreq (in the East), apart from Iraq, Shiites form a majority only in the small island state of Bahrain, but Sunnis are in power here. In North Yemen, Zaydi Shiites are much more numerous than Sunnis.

Are Shiites the oppressed?

The culture of the Shia part of the ummah is in many ways different from the Sunni one. Its central elements are the especially strict mourning of Ashura on the day of remembrance of Imam Hussein, who died a martyr in 680, a number of other holidays (birthdays and deaths of the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, imams - spiritual leaders and descendants of Caliph Ali), pilgrimages in a row holy cities, a curse on the widow of the prophet Aisha and the caliphs who ruled after Ali.

Shiites (except for the clergy) must observe the rule of taqiyya - hiding, if necessary, their faith among people of other faiths, especially Sunnis. Only the Zaydis, a Shia sect in Yemen (including the Houthis), do not recognize taqiyya.

Everywhere except Iran and Azerbaijan, Shiites have been poorer and more humiliated than their Sunni neighbors for centuries. The only exception is the urban Nizari Ismailis - subjects of the Aga Khan, one of richest people in the world. But the Nizari Ismailis of villages and small towns in Syria, Oman, the Pamir mountains, as well as the Mustalit Ismailis of Yemen, Gujarat and Mumbai (in India, where they live next to the rich Nizari Ismailis) are poor.

In Iraq, the Shiites were poorer than the Sunnis; in Lebanon, the Shiite peasants of the Bekaa Valley were the poorest and most numerous in the country in the middle of the 20th century; in Syria, the Alawites were very poor mountaineer peasants until the second half of the 20th century; in Yemen, the Zaidi mountaineers were much poorer Sunnis, in Afghanistan the Shia Hazaras (Mongols who had lost their language) were poorer than all their neighbors, and in the south of India the “black Shiites” were poorer than all the Muslims in the region.

In recent decades, in various countries (Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, etc.), Shiites are seeking – including with arms in their hands – power and wealth, which they enjoy (or enjoyed in the recent past ) Sunnis (and in Lebanon – Christians).

In all the countries mentioned above, except Iran (where the Shiites are a single multi-ethnic group) and Azerbaijan, the Shiites constitute ethno-confessional groups with the same clear cultural and political self-identification as in Europe - national identification. This phenomenon is historical, rooted in ancient times and consolidated in the mass consciousness by the orders of the Ottoman and other Muslim empires.

The main cult centers of Shiism are located in the Arab world - in addition to Mecca and Medina, common to all Muslims - in Iraq; The main ritual language of Shiites, like all Muslims, is Arabic, not Farsi. But for the Iranian and non-Iranian peoples of the vast region within the Islamic civilization, including Iran, Kurdistan, Tajikistan, part of Uzbekistan (with the cities of Bukhara, Samarkand, etc.), Afghanistan, part of Pakistan (west of the Indus Valley), Farsi is the language of the highly developed Persian culture.

The Shiite Arabs who inhabit the Khuzistan region of Iran and some others are more strongly influenced by Persian culture than other Arabs. All this facilitates the spread of many of its elements, including those related to the sphere of cult, among fellow Shiites in Arab countries. Moreover, this process affects not only the Imamis, but also the Ismailis, Alawites, Zaydis, Shia Kurds to the west of the borders of Iran. In recent years, among the Zaidi Houthis of Yemen, as eyewitnesses say, a pan-Shiite (as in Iraq and Iran) version of Ashura mourning, previously unknown here, has been spreading.

Perhaps this is one of the signs of cultural and political integration of various Shiite communities in Arab countries?

Knots of contradictions

In Iraq, the confrontation between the Sunnis of the North and the more numerous Shiites of the South is the main dominant feature of political life. The situation is similar in Bahrain. The indigenous Baharina Arabs, the Imamites (the main branch of Shiism), make up the majority. Arab Sunni minorities, descendants of settlers from the mainland, from Saudi Arabia: Wahhabis are the ruling minority and Sunnis of the Shafi'i and Maliki madhhabs are the other two minorities, with all Sunni Arabs belonging to certain tribes.

In Kuwait, the indigenous Arab Shiite minority, once unprivileged, now, like the Sunni majority, enjoys many advantages over the numerous foreigners. In Syria there are four Shia ethno-confessional groups of Arabs (ruling Alawites, Imami Mutawali, Ismaili Nizari and Druze), two each in Lebanon (Mutawali and Druze), Yemen (Zaydis and Ismaili Mustalis), Saudi Arabia (Imamits and Zaydis, and also foreigners).

In Lebanon, the ratio of the size and influence of ethno-confessional groups changed significantly after it was enshrined in the constitutional acts of first the autonomy in the 1930s and 1940s, and since 1946 - the independent republic. The small state of Greater Lebanon was created by France after the First World War as part of a mandate territory. Greater Lebanon was formed from several regions of the Ottoman Empire with different ethno-religious compositions.

The core of the state was Mount Lebanon, which consisted of the Land of the Maronites (historically, a vassal emirate, headed by the noble Arab family of al-Sheibani, who was secretly baptized, but was officially considered Sunni). The Maronite Church once entered into a union with the Roman Church. Adjacent to the Maronite land is the Chouf region, where the Maronites live together with the Druze - a very unique syncretic community, headed for centuries by the feudal Jumblatt family. From here the Druze migrated to the rain-watered mountain oases of southern Syria: Hauran, Jebel Druz, etc. The Maronites and Druze were mountain warrior-farmers, whose independence all rulers of the region had to reckon with.

To Mount Lebanon, where Christians made up the overwhelming majority of the population, French politicians annexed the adjacent coastal lowlands, river valleys and foothills. Here, in towns and villages, Sunni Muslims (the relative majority), Christians of different Churches (primarily Orthodox and Uniate Catholics), Druze in the South, and Alawites in the North lived in stripes or in separate neighborhoods. The Shia Mutawali lived compactly in the southeast. They were the poorest of all, their level of education was lower than other ethno-confessional groups, and their rural housing was especially archaic. In the 20-40s of the twentieth century, Sunnis showed all-Syrian patriotism, and Maronites and partly other Christians, as well as Druze (not all) were supporters of an independent Lebanon.

In 1926, Greater Lebanon was renamed the Lebanese Republic, whose political structure formally copied the French Republic. But in reality it was based on an agreement between influential clans that headed the main ethno-confessional groups. The first president of the Lebanese Republic was a Christian, Charles Debbas (Orthodox), but since 1934 all presidents have been elected from among the Maronites. Since 1937, prime ministers have been appointed only from Sunni Muslims. Other ethno-confessional groups were represented in parliament and other government bodies in proportion to their numbers and influence. They created their own political and other organizations (for example, the Druze became social democrats) under the leadership of traditional hereditary leaders.

This system has evolved under the influence of internal and external factors. In the first decades of the existence of the Lebanese Republic, there were slightly more Christians than Muslims, and the Druze were incomparably more influential than the Mutawali Shiites. Over time, the relative numbers and political and economic influence of the Maronites, other Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Armenians, and Druze declined. But the Mutawali Shiites, who in the early 1930s made up 17–18% of the Lebanese population and almost did not live in cities, sharply increased in strength. Poverty and a low level of education were combined among the Mutawali with large families, as a result their numbers grew faster than other groups, and they populated the cities.

Like other groups, the Lebanese Mutawali emigrated to South America, to West Africa, where they engaged in trade, grew rich, and supported their relatives in Lebanon. The emigration of Christian groups began much earlier, heading to different countries and regions of the world (France, USA, Latin America, etc.) and had similar consequences. But Christians, Druze and Sunnis, who had long lived in cities, owned estates and received better education, large families were replaced by small families.

Maronites and other Christian groups were losing their influence, while Muslim groups were gaining strength. Accordingly, the Maronite president gradually ceded his first role to the Sunni prime minister. As the number and political role of Christians decreased, their confrontation with Muslims receded into the background compared to the contradictions between Muslims - Sunnis and Shiites.

Not only Christians and Druze, who had long cast their lot in with the West, but also the Mutawali and Alawites armed themselves - with the help of their coreligionist Iran. Like the Druze, they created their own political and other organizations; The radical Shiite organization Hezbollah (Party of Allah), armed and supported by Iran, was especially active. Like some other Arab militant organizations, it used terrorist actions against its opponents - Sunnis, Christians and Israel.

After the creation of the State of Israel (1947) and the Arab-Israeli wars (1947–1973), Palestinian refugees, mostly Sunnis, poured into Lebanon, becoming a numerically significant and politically influential part of the population. Syria, Iran, Israel and the great powers (including the USSR, France and the USA) had a variety of influences on Lebanon, including the invasion of troops, the arming of local and Palestinian militias (the Christian Army of South Lebanon, etc., the Shiite Hezbollah, etc. .) As a result, Lebanon was rocked by civil war from 1975 to 1990, with Hezbollah fighting Christian and Sunni militias.

Sunnis remained a relative majority, but among them, all-Syrian patriotism and political orientation towards Syria gave way to distancing from the Syrian authorities, whom they considered the patrons of Shiites and Christians. Today, Sunnis are the dominant group in Lebanon. The end of the civil war gradually weakened the confrontation between ethno-confessional groups and transferred them to the socio-political sphere, but the events of recent years in Syria and Iraq have once again intensified the rivalry between them. The Mutawali Shiites continue to grow in numbers and establish themselves in different areas life and challenge the power of the Sunnis.

After the First World War, France, establishing a mandate territory regime in Syria, encountered patriotic resistance from some Sunnis. In contrast, the French tried to rely on Christian and Shiite ethno-confessional groups.

Some of the Alawites who inhabited the mountainous region between Lebanon and the lower reaches of the Nahr al-Kalb River received territorial autonomy (Alawite State, L’Etat des Alaouyes); The French granted the same autonomy to the easternmost of the mountainous regions where the Druze lived - Jebel Druze. In addition, they returned to Turkey the northwestern border region of Hatay (as the Turks called it) with the ancient cities of Antioch and Alexandretta, although all together the Arab communities (including Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, etc.) were more numerous here than the Turks and others ( Kurds, Yezidis, etc.) combined. At the same time, part of the Mutawali Shiites moved to Iraq.

It is paradoxical that the creation political parties formally modern type gave a new impetus to the delimitation of ethno-confessional groups. This can be seen in the evolution of the Baath Party in Syria and Iraq.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the youngest of the Arab countries. About a century ago, there was a conglomerate of alliances of Bedouin tribes and principalities (emirates) of the Pirate Coast - a buffer zone between Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and the Ibadi (Kharijite) Imamate of Oman (and the Muscat Sultanate). Having established a protectorate over the Muscat Sultanate and Qatar, the British also made a group of principalities, which they called Treaty Oman, their protectorate. The vast majority of the local population were Sunni Arabs; Only on the border with mountainous Oman did some branches of local tribes profess Ibadism, and on the seashores Shia Baharina lived in separate fishing villages. Now those Baharina who have UAE citizenship enjoy all the benefits of citizens, receive education, enter public service etc. But many Baharina are foreigners.

In the Bahrain archipelago itself, the Shiite majority is fighting for equal rights. It is associated with the Baharina in other Gulf countries and with Iran, as well as with the Shiite majority Arabs of Iraq. In eastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Shia minority (mainland Baharina) are in opposition to the dominant Sunnis. Other Shiite Arabs in the UAE are Iraqis. But the majority of Shiites here are Iranians, some Indians and Pakistanis. In cities they form communities, have their own schools (with education in Farsi, Gujarati and other languages), even branches of universities in their homeland.

In Yemen, Shiism in its Zaydi form throughout the 10th–11th centuries was distinguished by relative religious tolerance, but intransigence towards foreign domination. In 1538 and subsequent years, the Turks tried to conquer Yemen, but the areas inhabited by the Zaydis did not submit to them. Zaydis and Sunnis united in the fight against the invaders, and after a century of domination, Turkish troops left Yemen. Following this, the Zaydi imam al-Mutawakkil Ali Ismail extended his power to Aden and a number of Sunni sultanates, and in 1658 to Hadhramaut. Even at the beginning of the 17th century, the Sultan of Hadhramaut was a follower of Zaydism. But at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 17th centuries, Yemen was again divided into a predominantly Zaydi North and a union of Sunni possessions of South Yemen.

In the 19th century, the entire Arabian Peninsula was divided into spheres of domination by the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain. The first went to Northern Yemen, the second to Southern Yemen, as well as the emirates of Eastern Arabia: Kuwait, Muscat, the emirates of Treaty Oman.

The First World War led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and gave rise to a new political situation on the Arab Island, which was finally established only in the 1920s and early 1930s. The states of Northern and Central Arabia united into the vast Wahhabi Saudi Kingdom. It also occupied part of the Shiite region on the shores of the Persian Gulf and a small Zaydi region in the north of what was then Yemen. At the same time, the Zaydi Imam Yahya was also proclaimed king and tried to unite all of Yemen, including the sultanates of the South, which were under British protectorate. But Yahya was not successful in this and, according to the 1934 treaty, he recognized the division of Yemen into North - an independent kingdom and South - the British colony of Aden and protectorates. Subsequently, the growth of the city of Aden attracted people from the Zaydi North. The unification of both Yemen into one state took place only in 1990.

Thus, over the vast territory from the Balkans to the Hindustan, ethno-confessional groups are no less important than nations. The Shia community of Muslim peoples is not a union of (ethnic) nations, but a spiritual and political community of ethno-confessional groups of Shiites within the Islamic world. It serves as an important factor in cultural and political life.

Praise be to Allah, Lord of the worlds. Peace and blessings be upon our master Muhammad, sent as a mercy to the worlds, as well as on his family, companions and those who followed him sincerely until the Day of Judgment.

The Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, said: “Muslims in mutual love, showing mercy and forbearance are like a single body. If one part of it hurts, the whole body responds to this pain with insomnia and fever” (Muslim).

The situation of Sunnis in Iran

More than 20 million Sunni citizens live in Iran. Most of them live in the outer provinces of Iran - Khorasan, Kurdistan, Baluchestan, Hormazkan, Bushehr, Turkmensakhra, in the Tawalish and Anbaran regions, in the Ceylan sector, etc. The central part of Iran is overwhelmingly populated by Shiites.

Even before the Iranian revolution, Sunnis did not have the position that Shiites had in politics, economics and culture.

Sunnis supported Khomeini's revolution. However, immediately after the establishment of the Ayatollah’s power, literally a few months later, trials began for our brothers in Iran. Numerous scientists were killed at the hands of the new state. The dirty policy of Shiiteization in Sunni regions also began to be applied.

The infringement of Sunnis in Iran is expressed in the following:

1) Shiites are free to spread their madhhab and creed and in their other affairs. Sunnis have none of this. Moreover, the state is trying to replace Sunnism with Shiism, because they understand that the spread of the Sunni creed would mean the infidelity of the Shia creed for those who believe the opposite.

2) From the moment of its inception until today, the state - both within the country and abroad - has declared the freedom of Sunnis to explain their beliefs, equality and equal status, and the absence of division between Sunnis and Shiites. All this is nothing more than treachery. Behind this veil they carry out their policy of neutralizing Sunnism.

3) Sunnis do not have the right to explain Friday sermons their creed, while the Shiites have complete freedom, including the right to denigrate Sunnis in their sermons.

4) Shia scholars and members of the security services attend Sunni Friday prayers to monitor what the imam says in the khutbah, to ensure that nothing contrary to the country's official policy is passed through.

5) Sunnis have the right to speak about Islam in sermons only in general terms, and to give instructions that are not related to the Sunni faith. If the imam goes beyond these boundaries, he is immediately accused of Wahhabism, called a person who spreads Wahhabism. A huge number of scientists were imprisoned on such charges.

6) All the media are “foaming at the mouth” and are busy spreading the Shiite madhhab and their creed. Their scientists use every possible means within their power. The Sunnis have none of this.

7) Sunni scholars missing in Iran:

Sheikh Abdunasir Sabhaniy,

Sheikh Abduhakk (Qudratullah) Jafari,

Sheikh AbdulWahhab Siddiqui,

Sheikh Dr. Ali Muzafarian,

Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Mirin Sayad Balushi,

Sheikh Allama Ahmad Muftiyzadeh,

Sheikh Yar Muhammad Kahruziy,

Sheikh Farooq Farsad,

Sheikh Kariy Muhammad Rabiy,

Sheikh Ali Dahrawi,

Sheikh Abdusattar Kardanzadeh,

Sheikh Muhammad Salih Diyayy,

Sheikh Abdulmalik Mullazadeh,

Sheikh Abdunasir Jamshidzakh,

Sheikh Dr. Abdul Aziz Kazimi,

Sheikh Sharif Saidyani,

Sheikh Jalaludin Raisi,

Sheikh Mujahid Qadi Bahman Shukuri,

Sheikh Musa Karmyur,

Sheikh Muhammad Umar Sarbazi,

Sheikh Nimatullah Tawhidi,

Sheikh Abdul Hakim Hasan Abadi,

Sheikh Nuruddin Gharibi,

Sheikh Murtada Radamhari,

Sheikh Salih Hasrawi,

Sheikh Abdul Azizi Allah Yara,

Sheikh Abdulatif Haidari,

Sheikh Said Ahmad Said Husaini,

Sheikh Habibullah Hussein Ber,

Sheikh Ibrahim Daminiy,

Sheikh Qadi Dadurakhman Kasarkandiy,

Sheikh Abdulkudus Malazakhy,

Sheikh Muhammad Yusuf Sahrabi, Shamsuddin Kayami,

- as well as many other members of the organizations “Sunni Islamic Movement in Iran”, “Organization of the Central Council of Sunnis”, “Koran”, “Muhammadiyya”. Sunni scholars and students are in constant danger. Sunnis suffer every day at the hands of the regime.

Many scientists and youth are sitting in Khomeini's prisons, while their only crime was that they are Sunnis who defend their faith and distance themselves from all the innovations and “miracles” spread in the country.

9) It is a well-known fact that Sunnis are prohibited from building their mosques and educational establishments in those regions where there is a numerical majority of Shiites. For example, in the capital of the country - Tehran, in Isfahan, Yazid, Shiraz and other big cities. And this despite the fact that about a million Sunnis live in Tehran alone. They do not have a single mosque in the capital where they could pray. They don’t have a single center there where they could gather. At the same time, in Tehran there are numerous Christian churches, Jewish synagogues, Zoroastrian fire temples, etc. All of them are building their own places of worship and educational institutions.

Hussein's ziyarat are being brazenly built even in villages where there is not a single Shiite except the bureaucracy. Today, the Iranian state officially banned the construction of Sunni mosques in Tehran, Mashhad and Shiraz.

10) Destroyed and closed Sunni mosques and educational institutions:

Mosque-madrasah named after. Sheikh Qadir Bakhash Biluji in Baluchistan,

Sunni mosque in Khishtbir in the province of Ardabil,

Kanarik Mosque in Jabhar Balochistan,

mosque in Mashhad located on Shahriyur street 17,

Husnin Mosque in Shiraz,

mosque in Serdeshd,

Nabi Mosque in Bijnurid,

madrasah named after Imam Abu Hanifa in Zabeel,

Juma Mosque named after them was destroyed. Sheikh Fayd, located on Khosravi Street in the city of Mashhab near Khorosan. The mosque grounds were turned into a garden for the children of the Safavid dynasty, as well as a parking lot. During the destruction of this mosque, more than 20 people were killed who stood up to defend the house of Allah, which was built 300 years ago. The pretext for its destruction was various accusations: that it was an “evil” mosque (masjidu dirar); that it was built without state permission; under the pretext that the imam and teachers in the madrasah are Wahhabis, and also under the pretext of the need to expand the street.

All these were just pretexts to hide the intentions of the Shiites and weaken the Sunnis, suppress their activity, and bend them to the Shiite faith. But only help comes from Allah!

11) Sunnis are prohibited from having cultural, social, and political rights. For example, it is prohibited to print and publish Sunni books, magazines, and newspapers. It is forbidden to participate in the administrative apparatus, except for those few persons who are pleasing to the regime. There is a ban on the distribution of Sunni books on faith, such as “The Way of the Sunnis”, “The Book of Monotheism”, books by Ibn Tayimiya, Ibn al-Qaim, Ibn Abdul Wahhab.

There is censorship on published religious books of any author. They must undergo a Rafidhi check by a special ministry. Woe to the preacher who mentions that it is forbidden to turn to graves for help, speaks out against paganism, or speaks well of the righteous caliphs - Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman (may Allah be pleased with them), the mother of the faithful Aisha, or touches on other issues of doctrine , contrary to Shiism.

12) There is a policy of Shiite settlement in areas populated predominantly by Sunnis in order to change the ratio of the population living in the region. To do this, they specifically buy land from Sunnis. This is exactly what the Jews in Palestine did in their time.

Outlining the overall picture, we can say the following: the state is trying in every possible way to suppress any manifestation of Sunnism in the country. We need to know that the brutal Shiite government does not shun murders and assassinations, and then tries to hide its crimes by showing crocodile tears. They did this to many scientists, after which they expressed regret over their death. Know: concealment (tukiya) and hypocrisy (nifaq) are one of the most important foundations of their madhhab. This has been the case since the emergence of Shiism. Allah is their judge.

Along with what we have mentioned - about persecution, political, cultural, religious prohibitions for Sunnis - despite all this, Sunnis are growing stronger in their commitment to their path and worship. This process is only growing every day. Allah Almighty said: “And those who do injustice will soon find out where they will return.”(Surah “Poets”, verse 227).

Translator's note: “Due to the specifics of proper names and geographical names, names may be slightly distorted during translation. The facts themselves are important here (I hope the reader will understand us). Don’t forget to make dua for Muslims all over the world!”