The role of Finland in the Second World War. Finland's exit from World War II
In the fall of 2012, I was sitting on the Allegro train on the way to St. Petersburg. In the same carriage with me sat two Finns, apparently historians and scientists, who did not hesitate to express their opinions to all other passengers. One of the men repeated several times his opinion that “Russians do not know how to study history.”
I thought why should I listen to such statements again in 2012, on a train between Helsinki and St. Petersburg, in the famous Allegro, which symbolizes the high level of Russian-Finnish relations.
One of the most interesting national historiographies is that of Finland on the Second World War. The masterly nature of factual distortions, falsification of historical events and contextual falsification, as well as constant false legal speculation around almost all facts and events - all this is like pseudoscientific historiography of Finland has extremely interesting psychological functions, the function of mass psychology, and significance for the study of political psychology.
The primary purpose of distorting the history of World War II in Finland is to reassure the people, to prevent people from drawing incorrect conclusions about why and at what cost Finland lost the war as an ally of Nazi Germany. The main goal of the distortions: to make the Finnish people believe that Russia and the Russians are the eternal enemies of Finland, who always tried to “occupy” and destroy Finland, that Finland had no relations with Nazi Germany during the war (the Germans only “helped” a little), that there was no nationalism, fascist movements or organizations in Finland. This distorted mythology is still in effect, including in Finnish school history textbooks. The history departments of Finnish universities are, of course, masters in teaching the technologies of these distortions.
The goal is also to simultaneously, and rather cleverly, hide the fact that large-scale anti-fascist opposition movement. This means that if there is no fascism in Finland, if the Finns are not allies of the Nazis, if the Russians are only dangerous “occupiers” - then, of course, no resistance movement is needed. The entire Finnish people are supposedly united against “Russ” (the so-called offensive word for Russians in Finnish nationalist and fascist propaganda).
In practice, we are talking about preventing the denazification of Finland. This is one of the main functions of falsifying the history of the Second World War in Finland. It is important to distort history by deceiving that there are no Nazi or fascist movements in Finland, Finland was not an ally of Nazi Germany - therefore, in Finland no denazification needed.
It is characteristic of Finnish falsification that each fact is falsified according to one scheme: Stalin or the Russians planned to “occupy” Finland and destroy the nation, Finland was always alone, the Finns made only the right decisions, the Russians were always wrong, immoral, etc. For these purposes, the famous Finnish pseudo-historian Ohto Manninen even published a book, a “research”, entitled “How to Occupy Finland: Operational Plans of the Red Army 1939-1944” (2008), supposedly as proof of Stalin’s “plans” for the destruction of the Finnish people and nation.
Thus, the falsification of the history of the Second World War in Finland can, first of all, be defined as information and psychological warfare against one’s own people. As a result, the entire Finnish people almost always live in a state of war psychosis. This paranoia is easy to notice in the Finnish media, which regularly broadcast extremely distorted materials about Finnish military history, Finnish-Russian relations and the internal situation in Russia.
The Myth of Occupation
The main myth of Finnish historiography of the Second World War is myth of occupation, that Stalin’s original goal was supposedly to conquer all of Finland, “occupy” the country, and destroy the entire Finnish people. Such a myth provides many opportunities for Finnish pseudo-historians to justify the decisions and actions of the Finnish authorities during the war years.
The myth of occupation, of course, has a lot to do with the former Baltic states, which were in fact supposedly “occupied” in the summer of 1940. Therefore, in Finland they often say that it was right to fight (even with Hitler) against the USSR, since otherwise Finland would have faced the fate of the Baltic states. Also connected with this is the crude falsehood of pseudo-historian Kimmo Rentol that Stalin planned to shoot 30,000 Finns in the Katyn Forest (despite the fact that not a single document supports such nonsense). Although in the propaganda about the occupation, the most important thing is, of course, the version that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact allegedly determined the entire European history. Therefore, the Baltic states and Finland supposedly faced one common fate: Soviet occupation!
For example, if we have to admit the fact of Finland’s alliance with Nazi Germany, Finnish pseudo-historians always emphasize that this was, at least, a personal decision of President Ryti in the summer of 1944, and the main event of this alliance was the support of the German Air Force in the summer of 1944 against the mass offensive of Soviet troops (an attempt to “occupy” the country) on the Karelian Isthmus. The large-scale cooperation of the German and Finnish navies, infantry, reconnaissance, aviation, and the presence of dozens of German air force airfields on Finnish territory for operations against Leningrad and Karelia are often kept silent because these facts do not support the myth of occupation.
Finnish historiography regularly talks about the “mass offensive in the summer of 1944” in order to prove to the Finns that the Soviet Union, which attacked Finland, is to blame for the war. But in Finnish historiography, of course, they are silent about the fact that Finland from the 1920s to the 1940s was an extremely aggressive neighbor, which itself staged attacks on the territory of Soviet Russia and Karelia several times.
One typical and recent example. The extremely Russophobic main newspaper of Finland, Helsingin Sanomat, asked its readers in September 2012: “When did Finland have the most independence?” One of the answers published in the newspaper is extremely interesting. A certain Matti Pystynen from the city of Espoo answered briefly: “Historically, we were most independent, and alone, during the war years 1939-1944.” Matti Pystynen's opinion is, of course, a gross falsification of the facts - Finland was not actually “alone” during the Second World War, on the contrary - it was perhaps the most important ally of Nazi Germany - and not only Germany, but also Italy - also perhaps the most loyal ally of the Nazis and fascists. The goals in the war were common: the destruction of Leningrad and the USSR, the mass extermination of “lower races” - Russians, Jews.
One illustrative example: the famous Finnish pseudo-historian Kimmo Rentola (professor at the University of Turku, also a member of the Finnish Security Police) published material in 2003 about the reasons why Polish officers were shot in the Katyn Forest. Rentola’s explanation is extremely surprising: Beria and Stalin allegedly had the intention to shoot not the Poles in Katyn, but 30,000 Finnish officers, for whom it was necessary to “make room” by killing the corresponding number of Polish officers. But when the Finns unexpectedly “won” in the winter war (as the pseudo-historian Rentola writes), it turned out that it was no longer necessary to kill the Polish officers. Although, Rentola writes, Stalin was so angry about the Finnish victory that he decided to kill the Poles anyway. Thus, according to Rentol’s interpretation, the cause of the Katyn tragedy is the victory of the Finns in the winter war! It should be added that Rentola did not provide any evidence for his claims regarding plans to kill 30,000 Finns in Katyn, or about Stalin’s intentions. But still, he is engaged not only in a pathological distortion of history, but also in a gross mockery of the feelings of Polish families who lost their relatives in this tragedy. By the way, it was Rentola who became an employee of the Finnish Security Police in projects to falsify Finnish history in the interests of the intelligence services. Of course, we do not know whether the gross falsification of the Katyn tragedy is being used in the interests of Finnish law enforcement agencies.
In many ways, Finnish historiography of the Second World War is a repetition of the speech of the defense of President Risto Ryti at the trial against Finnish war criminals in Helsinki in 1945-1946. It was then that Ryti persistently repeated the clichés that Finland was alone, that Stalin intended to occupy Finland, that the alliance with Hitler was forced as the only way out for the Finns, etc.
The peculiarity of the historical falsification of Finland is that history is already falsified in the course of events. So, 25.-26. In June 1941, the Finns falsified a large-scale operation of Soviet aviation against German airfields and other military installations on Finnish territory as an unexpected and unjustified attack against civilians, women and children. This is exactly what President Risto Ryti said in a famous radio speech, knowing full well that Finland was in alliance with Hitler. In the same radio speech, Ryti called Hitler a “leader of genius.”
In many ways, the historiography of the Second World War in Finland is just a repetition of wartime propaganda. Finland, of course, even then tried to emphasize the “independent” role of its campaign next to Hitler, of course, primarily so that the Finnish front-line soldiers would not understand that they fought for Hitler and shed blood for the interests of Germany (those were the words he used to assess the situation former President Ryti himself after the war).
"Shots of Maynil"
There are other examples of how the Finns falsified history already in the course of historical events: the famous “Mainila shots” (“Mainilan laukaukset”), which were reported by Radio Moscow on November 26, 1939. According to Soviet radio broadcasts, Soviet border guards noticed seven shots from the Finns that hit USSR territory. The Finnish authorities immediately decided to fabricate a case against the Soviet leadership that Soviet artillery near the border with Finland allegedly fired at its own border guards in order to have a pretext for attacking Finland. For these purposes, the Finnish General Staff at night collected “testimony” from Finnish border guards, who stated that they allegedly “saw” from the territory of Finland how Soviet artillery fired at their own on the territory of the USSR. The evidence is contradictory. Although in fact, there were no “Maynil shots”. But until now, the invented story of the “Maynil shots” is the main event of the invented and falsified history of the so-called. "Winter War"
But that's not all. The famous Finnish pseudo-historian Ohto Manninen stated in the early 1990s that he allegedly “found” evidence of the “Mainila shots” in Russian archives. The results of these “research” were published in 1994. According to Manninen’s materials, there are records of the winter war where the word “execution” is written. This, according to Manninen, is proof of the “plans” of the Soviet leadership regarding the “Mainil shots”. The famous Finnish professor Manninen (so far) has not found any other evidence other than the word “execution” in one document.
On the issue of the “Winter War,” it is also popular among Finnish pseudo-historians to spread the opinion that the League of Nations allegedly legally deprived the USSR of membership in this organization after the USSR’s attack on Finland in November 1939. For Finnish pseudo-historians, this version is supposedly proof that Finland is not to blame for anything. Although in fact, as is known, the decision of the League of Nations to exclude the USSR was made unlawfully and did not have legal force.
Also in Finland, it is popular among pseudo-historians to say that the so-called. Teriyo government, i.e. The Finnish people's government on the Karelian Isthmus during the "Winter War" was proof that the USSR intended to occupy Finland. In fact, here again Finnish pseudo-historians want to hide the fact that the Finns themselves planned already during the “winter war” to create a Russian people’s government in Reboly, under the leadership of Trotsky or Kerensky, and even planned to create a Russian people’s army there (like the predecessor of the Vlasov army).
Thus, any choice of subject matter by Finnish pseudo-historians should always be assessed as an attempt to falsify history, to hide especially important facts and wartime events.
"Yatkosota"
Of course, in falsifying history through conceptual manipulation, the Finns are simply great masters. There is, for example, the concept of “continuation war” (in Finnish “yatkosota”) - the period 1941-1944, i.e. Finland's participation in Operation Barbarossa as an ally of Nazi Germany. After all, for the Finns this is just a “continuation” of something, although “Barbarossa” is a unique event in military history. Although it is not entirely clear what this war could be a “continuation” of: some Finnish pseudo-historians believe that “Barbarossa” is a continuation of the “Winter War” of 1939-1940, a bilateral military conflict that lasted, by the way, only 105 days.
The use of the term “yatkosota” (continuation war) is, of course, the best evidence that the author is falsifying history. Unfortunately, according to the national bibliography of Finland, 2,143 works about “yatkosota” were published in the country, and only 1,761 works about “talvisota” (i.e. about the winter war).
It must be said that the use of the term “Yatkosota”, unfortunately, also indicates that the author supports Nazism - after all, the term “Yatkosota” itself exists in order to justify and support Operation Barbarossa. Thus, the reader should be careful, since all works using this term (“yatkosota”) reflect an extremely hostile Russophobic ideology, neo-Nazism and extremism. The word “yatkosota” is an information weapon, a military threat against Russia.
But “yatkosota” is not everything. The Finns have other false terms to confuse the causes and essence of this war. There is the term “separate war” (in Finnish “erillissota”), also the period 1941-1944, in order to tell people that Finland supposedly had nothing to do with the Germans, but fought “alone”. The meaning of the terms “Yatkosota” and “Erillissota” is, of course, a justification for the military aggression of Finland together with Germany against the USSR, as well as a justification for the Barbarossa plan itself. Thus, these terms can still be classified as a kind of military threat against Russia.
A notorious example is the speech of Finnish President Tarja Halonen at the Institute of Foreign Policy in Paris in 2005. Halonen said that for Finns, the second World War was a “separate war” against the USSR, and after the war Finland supposedly “retained” independence and democracy. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded clearly and decisively, recalling the Paris Peace Treaty, which clearly defined Finland’s criminal alliance with Nazi Germany, as well as Finland’s role in the war.
The Finns are, in principle, ready to admit the fact that Finland, together with Germany, really attacked the USSR in the summer of 1941. But for this situation, they have a special false conceptual manipulation, dividing “Yatkosot” into three parts. Therefore, they talk about the “offensive phase” in the summer of 1941, but then very soon the supposedly defensive “phase of positional war” appeared, and in the summer of 1944, the “retreat phase”, which allegedly already testifies to Stalin’s aggression, the intention to “occupy” » Finland (according to Manninen), etc. By the way, in the notorious Finnish “novel” about the war, “The Unknown Soldier,” these three phases are supposedly very well reflected. Therefore, the book is even recommended to schoolchildren.
Typical for studies of the “winter war” of 1939-1940. that its research is practically prohibited. The main thing is that the reasons and background of this war are classified information for the Finns. The main person involved in this case is, naturally, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland in 1938-1939. Elias Erkko, whose archives are closed. (It’s interesting that Finns always protest about closed Moscow archives, but never about Erkko’s archives, although in fact, talking about closed Moscow archives is very beneficial for lazy Finnish pseudo-historians.) There is an opinion that in negotiations between our countries before winter war, Erkko’s personal position and behavior greatly influenced the situation. He, for example, refused all constructive proposals from the Soviet leadership (for him, all this was supposedly just an attempt to “occupy” Finland, of course). It is logical that after the winter war, the Erkko archives were always closed, and no one received permission to study them. However, a very interesting term for the winter war appeared in everyday life, “Erkko’s war” (in Finnish “Erkon sota”), as if he was somehow personally the initiator of this war. It is no secret that Erkko and his son Aatos were also the main shareholders of the Russophobic newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, which aggressively disseminates anti-Russian propaganda, including gross falsification of history, especially regarding the “Erkko war”. Some kind of research still needed to be done about the life of Elias Erkko, in the style of a biography, and for this the archives were partially opened. Although it is extremely characteristic of Finnish historiography of the Second World War, the fact that Erkko could work with the archives of Elyas, receiving funding naturally from Erkko himself, was none other than the same Ohto Manninen, whom we, unfortunately, have repeatedly mentioned. A work appeared about Erkko's life, where, of course, it is written that the winter war was a necessity because the Russians were trying to occupy Finland, etc.
Fog Curtain
The main goal of the Finnish falsification of military history is the denial of the alliance with Hitler, and thus the denial of Finland's responsibility in the war, which is recorded in the Paris Peace Treaty. In a rather interesting way, for example, the situation was characterized by the so-called. a research project by Minister of Justice Tuija Brax in 2010 regarding the issue of rehabilitation of Finnish war criminals convicted in the Helsinki trials of 1945-1946. Minister Brax's working group, in principle, recognized Finland's alliance with Hitler, but added that “Finland was a de facto ally of Germany,” which means “de jure” Finland was not an ally. This means that the Finnish Ministry of Justice believes that Finland does not bear any responsibility in the war, because there is no evidence. Therefore, it is also legitimate, according to the Finnish Ministry of Justice, to declare that there was no alliance.
It is important to note that all this false legal speculation around Finland’s alliance with Nazi Germany is a foggy curtain covering real legal problems and crimes of the Finnish leadership during the Second World War, for example: provocations and refusal of constructive negotiations on the eve of the “Erkko War”, mass deportations of Jews, prisoners of war and Finnish political prisoners to concentration camps (including Auschwitz), genocide of civilians in Finnish concentration camps on the territory of Soviet Karelia, mass extermination Soviet prisoners of war, participation in the siege of Leningrad, political persecution of democratic and anti-fascist resistance movements, exploitation of concentration camp prisoners (including Poles during the construction of roads in Lapland), etc. How this relates to the words of Finnish President Halonen that Finland supposedly “defended democracy when the USSR tried to occupy it twice” is worth thinking about.
Master of Jokisipila
There is another interesting version of the falsification of the history of Finland’s alliance with Nazi Germany - this is the version that Finland allegedly “refused” its alliance with the Nazis. Those. Germany allegedly offered the Finns to join an alliance, but the Finns (“democrats”) refused. The master of these distortions is the relatively young historian Markku Jokisipilä from the University of Turku. Jokisipilä published an article in the 1990s entitled “Finland's Opposition to the German Alliance Treaty Proposals in 1943.” This means that the idea is to prove that Finland not only fought a separate, “independent” war, but even resisted the Germans’ attempts to conclude an alliance. This means that Finland fought simultaneously against the USSR and Nazi Germany! Jokisipil published a doctoral dissertation in 2004 with a very typical Finnish title, “Brothers in Arms or Allies?” Those. back in 2004, this young “scientist” questioned the status of Finland’s alliance with Nazi Germany.
Also, Jokisipil, and many other Finnish pseudo-historians, often have a false version that Finland’s alliance with Germany, if it existed at all, is the “personal matter” of President Ryti, who sent a letter to Hitler in the summer of 1944 regarding support for the German Air Force against the USSR on the Karelian Isthmus. This letter is supposedly the only “agreement” of alliance. Thus, Finnish pseudo-historians are ready to betray even their president, a famous Hitler fan, occultist Risto Ryti, who quite openly expressed his obsequious attitude towards Hitler in a radio speech at the end of June 1941.
Very problematic for Finnish pseudo-historians is, of course, a radio speech by Hitler himself on June 22, 1941, where he said that Finnish troops were advancing next to Hitler’s and in alliance with Nazi Germany. Finnish pseudo-historians believe that this was extremely “problematic”, and the Finns even tried to hide Hitler’s words from the people. Although it is very interesting that Hitler’s radio speech was published in the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper, already on the same day in a Finnish translation. This means that he was transferred in advance. But it is quite surprising that the Finns even deny the words of Hitler, which they themselves published.
The ideological prejudices of the pseudo-historian Jokisipil are extremely interesting and reflect the thinking of the younger generation. Jokisipilä believes that “talvisota” and “yatkosota” are just “reasonable defensive military actions against USSR aggression.” For Jokisipilä, “talvisota” is a “patriotic holy war,” and, despite the fact that its continuation was an attack on the USSR, only the USSR itself is to blame for this, Jokisipilä believes. He also writes that although Finland lost both wars, it was a "political winner" because the country "was not occupied." For Jokisipil, the massive Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944 is, of course, evidence of an attempt to occupy Finland. According to Jokisipila, Finland could conquer the city of Leningrad and help Hitler win, including in the confrontation with Great Britain, writes the Finnish historian Jokisipila, a great expert in the history of the Third Reich (apparently, he already lives in his dreams). It is already clear to everyone that the Finnish historian Jokisipila is a National Socialist by political conviction, like many other Finnish pseudo-historians.
For Finnish pseudo-historians, any fact can serve as evidence of the opposite. Thus, the relatively lenient convictions of Finnish war criminals in the Helsinki trial for Markku Jokisipilä are proof that Moscow recognized the independent (“separate”) nature of the Finnish war.
"War Children"
There is another extremely tragic story that is connected with Finnish children. During the war, Finnish authorities deported about 80,000 Finnish children from Finland, without parents, mainly to Sweden. The topic is still poorly understood, but there is reason to believe that the children were deported in order to save resources - to make it easier to provide and feed 200,000 German soldiers in Finland.
It was assumed that the deportation of children would be temporary - after all, the “blitzkrieg” was supposed to end in the summer, and the children were supposed to return to “Great Finland.” But the potential “Great Finnish” children remained there. Some of them returned briefly but were deported again. There were many tragic cases when Finnish women abandoned their children if the mothers, for example, had a Fritz groom. To this day, the issue of “war children” (in Finnish “sotalapset”) is a little studied, extremely tragic episode of Finnish history. Many children were seriously injured. Finnish pseudo-historians naturally believe that Stalin is to blame for the suffering of children. After all, because of him, German troops were unable to create a “Great Finnish” future for Finnish children.
Plans for "Greater Finland"
The most influential socio-political organization in Finland before the war was, of course, the Academic Karelian Society (AKS), whose goal was the creation of a “Greater Finland” through war, the destruction of the city of Leningrad, mass deportations and the extermination of Russians. Members of this organization included many representatives of the Finnish cultural, military, political and academic elite. AKC members signed their letters with the slogan “your brother in hatred of Russians.” Despite the openly fascist nature of this organization, Finnish pseudo-historians characterize it only as nationalist, partly marginal. Those. They do their best to justify the activities of this organization.
Literally in 2011, a large publication was published about the history of the AKC, a collection of several Finnish authors who do not write anything critical or negative about this organization. On the contrary, in the collection, the famous Finnish pseudo-historian, journalist and publisher Jarkko Vesikansa (Vesikansa Jr.) writes about an organization called “Spiritual Warfare - a continuation of the AKC - the influence of society on anti-communist activities in Finland during the cold war". This means that the propaganda term “yatkosota” (continuation war) has again appeared, which here has already received a new meaning: the war against the USSR after the Second World War through active work former members fascist organization AKS.
Of particular importance for Finnish pseudo-historians is the falsification of plans for the creation of “Greater Finland”. Here Finnish pseudo-historians act extremely cunningly. They acknowledge the fact that Finland occupied “Eastern Karelia”, although they try to justify this occupation as necessary. This means that for the Finnish false historiography, there was nothing in the “Greater Finland” except Finland itself with the occupied “East Karelia”. For these purposes, the Finns even published works criticizing the occupation of “East Karelia.” But here again there is falsification: Finnish pseudo-historians only recognize the fact of “Finnish occupation” in Eastern Karelia, they specifically hide the fact that the occupation was German-Finnish. This is again proof of the cunning of Finnish pseudo-historiography of the Second World War. At one time, the widely known, first “critical” work on the occupation of Eastern Karelia was called, respectively, “Finland as an occupier” - in order to again preserve the mythology that Finland fought without Nazi Germany.
The plans of “Greater Finland,” of course, were different: to unite the vast territories of the USSR, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia into one “Great Finnish” state. On the territory of the USSR, the goal was to occupy the Kola Peninsula, Karelia, the city of Leningrad (with its subsequent destruction), the Estonian SSR, part of the Latvian SSR, etc. In the AKS magazine in 1923, a map of “Greater Finland” was published, which extends to Yekaterinburg and the Urals. And only with the help of Nazi Germany did the Finns consider the implementation of these plans possible. Of course, against the backdrop of all this, talking only about the “Finnish occupation of Karelia” is extremely ridiculous.
"Savior of Leningrad"
Complete denial of Finland's participation in the siege of Leningrad is the main theme of distortions of the history of the Second World War in Finland. The main motivation here, of course, is to accuse the Soviet leadership of unreasonable demands in connection with the statement that Finland threatens the security of Leningrad. Finnish pseudo-historians, despite Finland’s participation in the siege of Leningrad together with Nazi Germany, are confident that during the war years Finland did not pose any threat to Leningrad. Even the fact that a radio speech was prepared in Finland in honor of the capture of the city of Leningrad (in both Finnish and Swedish) does not affect the position of Finnish pseudo-historians.
Recently, in the 2000s, there appeared a new version that Finland allegedly “protected” Leningrad or even “saved” it. Here they especially want to draw attention to the new role of Marshal of Finland Mannerheim as the “savior of Leningrad” when he allegedly refused to attack Leningrad. The authors of these gross falsifications and false statements are pseudo-historians Ohto Manninen, Timo Vikhavainen, as well as revanchist organizations “ProKarelia” and others, who began to demand some kind of compensation from Russia for the fact that Finland “saved” the city of Leningrad. We also remind you of the opinion of pseudo-historian Marku Jokisipilä, who writes that only Finland could lead Germany to complete victory, including the occupation of Leningrad, but Finland allegedly refused. Although it is known that Finland was ready to send about 30,000 military police to occupied Leningrad to organize cleansing in the city.
The publication in Finland of the first book about Finland’s participation in the siege of Leningrad from the famous author and historian Nikolai Baryshnikov in 2003 led to loud scandals, sharp attacks and insults from Finnish pseudo-historians. The main newspaper Helsingin Sanomat even falsified Baryshnikov's written response, which led to a penalty from the Finnish Publicity Council.
Anti-fascist resistance movement in Finland
The existence of an anti-fascist resistance movement in Finland is a fact that Finnish pseudo-historians find extremely difficult to admit, because they claim that in Finland there was never any fascism, Nazism, or any alliance with Hitler (often pseudo-historians try to distort the facts, explaining that the Finns allegedly treated the Germans with contempt or suspicion during the war). If there is no fascism, no anti-fascist resistance movement, of course, can take place, especially when supposedly the entire Finnish people “united” in the war against the USSR already during the winter campaign (the so-called myth of “unity in the winter war”, one of main myths of pseudohistorians). It is logical that if there was “unity” in the winter war, then naturally there was also unity in the “continuation war.”
In the distorted historiography of the Second World War in Finland, there is a tendency to deny the very existence of the resistance movement, also the denial of all specific actions of this movement, the denial of the heroism of the Finnish liberation fighters, and finally, the denial of the existence of political repression and terror against the democratic resistance movement in Finland. In fact, despite the fact that democratic movements were already repressed in the 1920s and 1930s, the anti-fascist resistance movement was quite widespread in Finland. It is known that in the 1930s there were about 400,000 people in the files of the Finnish State Police. Tens of thousands of deserters lived in the forests, anti-fascist propaganda was distributed throughout the country, including regulations on the creation of partisan and sabotage brigades, and acts of sabotage and propaganda dissemination were carried out everywhere. Finnish pseudo-historians are trying to explain the situation by saying that the “cowardly deserters” just hid in the forests - because of this, the humiliating name “cone guard” (“käpükaarti”), “forest guard” (“metsäkaarti”). Many Finnish resistance fighters fought bravely, and were persecuted mercilessly by fascist troops, police and army, killing them on the spot.
Probably one of the most famous Finnish heroes of the anti-fascist resistance, Veikko Paõsti, in December 1942 in Helsinki, fought alone with the police until the last shell, did not give up, and was killed. Dozens of police fired thousands of times during the siege, which lasted all day. Despite this, Peysti managed to kill two police officers and mortally wound several. One of the martyrs of the Finnish anti-fascist resistance movement is Finnish woman Martta Koskinen, who was shot by the Nazis in Helsinki in October 1943 (just one year and 2 days before the signing of the armistice between Finland and the USSR). Martta selflessly carried out correspondence for the underground resistance movement in Helsinki, for which she was sentenced to death. Her last words before the execution: “Down with Ryti and Tanner!” A couple of years later, the same Ryti and Tanner were convicted and were in the same prison where Martta Koskinen was imprisoned.
Quite a lot was written about the Finnish anti-fascist and democratic resistance movement in the 1970s. For example, in 1973, a collection of poems from the Finnish resistance movement was published. But then Finnish pseudo-historians in recent decades began to distort the history of the movement.
The myth of the Soviet partisans
Associated with the denial of the existence of a resistance movement, this is aggressive propaganda by Finnish pseudo-historians against the Soviet partisan movement. Over the past two decades, Finnish pseudo-historians and the Finnish press have been very aggressively spreading the version that the official goal of the Soviet partisan movement was the alleged mass extermination of Finnish women and children, and allegedly on the orders of Stalin. Such delusional falsification, unfortunately, has become the official truth for the Finnish media and some publications in the field of Finnish pseudohistory. The main promoter in this area is the Finnish journalist Veikko Erkkilä, who has already managed to publish 2 books on this topic.
It is clear that the trend of distortions, outright lies, are again associated with the general trend of falsification and denial of Finland’s alliance with Nazi Germany. If Finland really fought “alone”, if it was the victim of Stalin’s attack and the threat of “occupation”, if there was “unity of the people” against the USSR, then the fighting and intelligence operations of the German garrisons and other military installations near the border are easier to falsify using the version of intentional attacks on civilians. Although here again, what the pseudo-historian Erkkilä writes, for example, is very similar to Nazi propaganda of the war period. It was the Nazis who created the mythology that the goal of the Soviet partisans was the mass destruction of civilians, women and children. Although in these cases, which the pseudo-historian Erkkilä studies 60 years later, it is no longer possible to prove who killed whom and why.
"Return Karelia"
There is also an interesting tendency in Finnish revanchism of the 1990s and 2000s to falsify the history of the Second World War. The main slogan of the Finnish revanchists “Return Karelia” (in Finnish “Karjala takaisin”) has no real relation to reality - after all, Karelia was never part of Finland. Parts of it were occupied by German and Finnish occupiers, but this, of course, does not give any right to its “return”. If you look at the official propaganda of the ProKarelia organization, then against the background of the slogan “return Karelia” they actually demand from Russia the regions from the Barents Sea to the islands of the Gulf of Finland, in accordance with the Yuryev Peace Treaty of 1920, which has nothing to do with Karelia. Thus, the slogan “return Karelia” for Finnish revanchists is just a foggy curtain of demands for the creation of a “greater Finland” with various territorial claims.
It is interesting that the slogan “Pro-Karelia” is the battle cry of the Finnish fascists of the AKC movement in the 1920s, when they also demanded the creation of a “Greater Finland” under this slogan. After the liquidation of this fascist organization (AKS) after the war on the basis of the Paris Peace Treaty, it continued to operate until the 1980s under the name “Club 22” (“Kerho 22”), then in the early 1990s a new successor organization to the AKS was created , "Pro Carelia", and in the early 2000s "ProKarelia". In the 2000s, an event was even organized where Pro Carelia activist members joined ProKarelia and handed over all the archives to them. Thus, the revanchist organization “ProKarelia” is the main heir to the fascist AKC movement in Finland.
It is also very problematic that the activist members of the AKC, as well as the authors and architects of the “Greater Finland”, were never punished - on the contrary, they continued their work, occupying key positions in Finnish society. It is characteristic that the children of prominent figures of the AKC, for example, the children of the famous fascist Martti Haavio, never made any apologies for the Russian genocide in German-Finnish concentration camps in the occupied territory of Soviet Karelia.
During recent years The heated debate between Finnish historians revolved around the mass executions of Finnish soldiers in the summer of 1944 on the Karelian Isthmus. Several books have been published on this topic, for and against, which either acknowledge the existence of mass secret executions of Finnish deserters in the summer of 1944, or deny the existence of such executions.
There are also interesting demands here: to cancel the criminal record of Finnish political leaders and the conviction handed down to them by the post-war tribunal of 1945-1946, when eight Finnish political leaders were convicted precisely of planning military aggression together with the Germans. It is often customary to respond to such demands that criminal records are allegedly unconstitutional and do not express the opinion of the people, so they do not need to be overturned.
Results
As a result, we can say that Finnish historiography of the Second World War is practically absent. There are myths, legends, military propaganda, psychological agitation. The most important thing is the anti-Soviet propaganda that Stalin’s main intention was supposedly initially to “occupy” Finland, to destroy its people, and therefore the Finnish attack with Hitler was “fair”. In many ways, Finnish historiography of the Second World War resembles the pro-fascist revanchism of the German historian Ernst Nolte, the main figure in the so-called. historianstrait in the 1980s. Changes in the Finnish so-called There was practically no historiography - it remained the same as it was during the war. The main point of Finnish military propaganda is attempts to hide the real nature of German-Finnish relations. There are also elements of Nazi propaganda in Finnish national historiography. Many facts and events were already distorted in their time (“Mainil’s shots”, Soviet aviation bombings of Finland on June 25-26, 1941, the activities of Soviet partisans in Finland). Finnish historiography of the Second World War is extremely Russophobic in nature. The purpose of using terms such as “yatkosota” (continuation war) is, ultimately, to justify the policies of the Third Reich and Hitler’s attack on the USSR, and to recognize Operation Barbarossa as legitimate. Thus, the term “Yatkosota” is a Nazi, extremely dangerous information weapon. Those people who use the term “Yatkosota” justify Nazism and its crimes, recognize Operation Barbarossa as legitimate and are ready to repeat the crimes. Finnish historiography of the Second World War is extremely anti-democratic. There was no real denazification in Finland, so Finnish pseudo-historians can calmly repeat the fascist slogans of “Greater Finland.” Finnish historiography of the Second World War must be written from the point of view of the anti-fascist resistance movement. This point of view already existed during the war in leaflets and underground newspapers. The heroes of the Finnish anti-fascist resistance movement and their exploits are immortal. The time will come when their point of view will be legitimate. Only then can the Finnish people live a full spiritual life.
Johan Beckman, Doctor of Social and Political Sciences, Associate Professor at the University of Helsinki, Chairman of the Anti-Fascist Committee of Finland
Manninen Ohto. Miten Suomi valloitetaan. Puna-armeijan operaatiosuunnitelmat 1939-1944. Edita. Helsinki. 2008.
Lukijat vastaavat kysymykseen: Milloin Suomi on ollut kaikkein itssenäisin? Helsingin Sanomat. 23.9.2012.
Kimmo Rentola. Katyn: pieni suomalainen jälkikirjoitus. // Ajankohta. Poliittisen historian vuosikirja. 2003. Toim. Klaus Lindgren. Poliittinen historia. Helsingin yliopisto ja Turun yliopisto. 2003.
Baryšnikov Vladimir. Ammuttiinko Mainilassa ollenkaan? Ulkopolitiikka Vol. 1.No. 1. 2004; Helsingin Sanomat 14.2.2004: “Venäläistutkija epäilee: Mainilan laukauksia ei koskaan ammuttu.”
Manninen Ohto. Molotovin cocktail - Hitlerin sateenvarjo. Toisen maailmansodan historian uudelleenkirjoitusta. Painatuskeskus. Helsinki. 1994.
Fennica (Suomen kansallisbibliografia).
Venäjä arvostelee Halosta. Yleisradio. 4.3.2005.
Manninen Ohto & Raimo Salokangas. Eljas Erkko: vaikenematon valtiomahti. WSOY. Helsinki. 2009.
Sotasyyllisyysoikeudenkäynti. Selvityksiä ja ohjeita. 22/2010. Helsinki. Oikeusministeriö. 2010.
Jokisipilä Markku. Saksan liittosopimusvaatimusten torjuminen vuonna 1943. // Leena Pylvänäinen ja Timo Soikkanen. Toim. Ajankohta. Poliittisen historian vuosikirja 1996. Poliittinen historia. Helsingin ja Turun yliopistot. Tutkijakoulu. Historia ja politiikka uudessa maailmassa (HISPO). Julkaisuja 2. Helsinki. 1996.
Jokisipilä Markku. Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia? Suomi, Saksan liittosopimusvaatimukset ja Rytin-Ribbentropin sopimus. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura. Helsinki. 2004.
Hitlerin julistus Saksan kansalle. Helsingin Sanomat. Ylimääräinen numero. Helsingissä, sunnuntaina kesäk. 22. pn 1941.
Jokisipilä Markku. Suur-Suomesta sosialistiseksi neuvostotasavallaksi 1939--1944. // Niemi Mari K. & Ville Pernaa. Toim. Entäs jos... Vaihtoehtoinen Suomen historia. Ajatus Kirjat. Helsinki. 2005.
Ibidem. P. 140.
See for example: Kaven Pertti. Sotalapset: toiveet ja todellisuus. Minerva. Helsinki. 2011.
Uola Mikko. Toim. AKS:n tie. Akateeminen Karjala-Seura isänmaan ja heimoaatteen asialla. Minerva. Helsinki. 2011.
Kulomaa Jukka & Jarmo Nieminen. Toim. Teloittettu totuus: kesä 1944. Ajatus. Helsinki. 2008; Arponen Antti O. Teloitetut: viimeinen jatkosodan kesä 1944: kadonneet rintamakarkurit: Huhtiniemen mysteeri. Revontuli. Tampere. 2006; Jaakkonen Pasi. Huhtiniemi: 400 kadonneen miehen mysteeri. Minerva. Helsinki. 2007; Ylikangas Heikki. Romahtaako rintama? Suomi puna-armeijan puristuksessa kesällä 1944. Otava. Helsinki. 2007.
Psychology of war in the twentieth century. Historical experience of Russia [Full version with applications and illustrations] Senyavskaya Elena Spartakovna
Finns in World War II
Finns in World War II
The Soviet-Finnish military confrontation is very fertile material for studying the formation of the image of the enemy. There are several reasons for this. First of all, any phenomenon is best known by comparison. Opportunities for comparison in this case are opened by the very development of the Soviet-Finnish conflict, its historical division into two unequal parts.
First - the so-called “winter” war (1939–1940) - a clash between a huge power and a small one neighboring country in order to solve their geopolitical problems. The course and outcome of this war is known. With disproportionately large sacrifices, the USSR managed to force Finland to give up part of its strategically and economically important territories. The international resonance of this conflict is also known: started in the context of the unfolding World War II, it evoked associations with the German invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland and led to the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations as an aggressor. All this should have affected the mutual perception of direct participants in the hostilities on both sides. For the Finns, this was, of course, a just war, and they fought with great patriotism, fiercely and skillfully, especially since the battles took place on their territory. The command still had to justify to the Soviet soldiers why the “big one” should offend the “little one.” This is what the rationale looked like.
In his radio speech on November 29, 1939, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov said: “The hostile policy of the current Finnish government towards our country forces us to take immediate measures to ensure external state security... Confused in its anti-Soviet ties with the imperialists, [it] does not want to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union ... and take into account the demands of the non-aggression pact concluded between our countries, wanting to keep our glorious Leningrad under military threat. From such a government and its reckless military, one can now only expect new brazen provocations. Therefore, the Soviet government was forced to declare yesterday that from now on it considers itself free from the obligations assumed by virtue of the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland and which is being irresponsibly violated by the Finnish government.”
At the same time, the Finnish side ideologically justified its participation in this war, which was reflected in the order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Finland, G. Mannerheim, on the start of military operations against the USSR: “Valiant soldiers of Finland!.. Our centuries-old enemy has again attacked our country... This war is nothing more than a continuation of the liberation war and its final action. We are fighting for our home, for our faith and for our Fatherland.”
Of course, ordinary combatants on both sides did not think in terms of government directives and command orders, but the latter, of course, left an imprint on the everyday perception of the enemy. Although ideological layers are present in both quoted documents, the formula of Mannerheim’s order that the Finns are fighting for their home and for their Fatherland was still closer to the truth and understanding of the Finnish soldier than the strained formulations about the threat to the huge USSR from a small neighbor.
Second phase The Soviet-Finnish conflict is fundamentally different. Having taken the side of German fascism, which attacked the USSR, Finland itself turned into an aggressor. Of course, she is again trying to present her participation in this war as fair, as an attempt to return the taken lands. The order of the same Mannerheim in June 1941 accuses the USSR as an aggressor, questions the sincerity and constancy of the peace concluded after the “winter” war, which “was only a truce,” and calls on the Finns to go “on a crusade against the enemy to ensure Finland has a secure future." However, the same order contains a hint of this future - to Greater Finland right up to the Ural Mountains, although here so far only Karelia appears as the object of claims. “Follow me one last time,” Mannerheim calls, “now that the people of Karelia are rising again and a new dawn is dawning for Finland.” And in the July order, he already directly states: “Free Karelia and Great Finland flicker before us in a huge whirlpool of world-historical events.”
Therefore, the statement of Professor Jukka Nevakivi of the University of Helsinki that “if not for the “winter” war, in which we lost a tenth of our territory, Finland, perhaps, would not have become Hitler’s ally in 1941, preferring the neutrality of the “Swedish”, does not sound entirely sincere. option." The Finnish army moved that summer only to take away what had been taken.”
Although there is some truth in his assessment: having unleashed military actions against a sovereign neighbor on November 30, 1939 and defeating him pyrrhic victory at the cost of huge losses, the Stalinist leadership thereby predetermined its position in the coming big war, turning a probable or even unlikely enemy into an inevitable one. No insult to the national pride of another people can go unpunished. And Finland rushed at the recent offender, not too caring about what dubious company it found itself in.
However, the matter was not limited to the “return of what was taken away.” Having reached the old Soviet-Finnish border, the Finnish army, without hesitation, moved on, occupying territories that did not previously belong to it. Finnish propaganda claimed that Jaanislinna (Petrozavodsk), and then Pietari (Leningrad) would belong to Finland, that Greater Finland would stretch east to the Urals, “throughout its entire historical territory.” Although - there is such evidence - the Finns really were more willing to fight on those lands that they lost in 1940.
The official guidelines of the Finnish leadership about the fairness of their participation in the war were completely consistent with the public atmosphere. This is how former Finnish officer I. Virolainen recalls the mood of the Finnish public in connection with the start of the war against the USSR: “A certain great national upsurge arose and a belief arose that the time had come to correct the injustice done to us... Then the successes of Germany blinded us so much that all Finns edge to edge lost their minds... Rarely did anyone even want to listen to any arguments: Hitler started the war and that was already right. Now the neighbor will feel the same thing that we felt in the fall of 1939 and the winter of 1940... In June 1941, the mood in the country was so inspired and stormy that whatever the government was, it would be very difficult for it to keep the country from war.” .
However, now the Soviet people felt themselves to be victims of aggression, including from Finland, which had entered into a coalition with Nazi Germany. Great and Patriotic War The years 1941–1945 were for Soviet soldiers no matter on what front and against what specific enemy they fought. It could have been Germans, Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Finns - the essence of the war did not change: the Soviet soldier fought for his native land.
Finnish troops took part in this war on the front, which the Soviet side called Karelian. It ran along the entire Soviet-Finnish border, that is, the battlefields largely coincided with the theater of operations of the “winter” war, the experience of which was used by both sides in new conditions. But on the same front, German units also fought alongside the Finns, and, according to many testimonies, the combat effectiveness of the Finnish units, as a rule, was much higher. This is explained both by the already mentioned psychological factors (assessment of the war as just, patriotic enthusiasm, inspiration, desire for revenge, etc.), and by the fact that most of personnel of the Finnish army had combat experience, tolerated the northern climate well, knew specific features terrain. It is characteristic that Soviet soldiers on the Karelian Front rated the Finns as an enemy much higher than the Germans and treated them “more respectfully.” Thus, cases of capture of Germans were not uncommon, while the capture of a Finn was considered a whole event. One can also note some features of Finnish tactics with the widespread use of snipers, deep raids in Soviet rear ski sabotage groups, etc. On the Soviet side, the experience of the Winter War could have been used less, since its participants were mainly among the personnel of the command staff, as well as local natives drafted into the army.
This is the general historical, eventual and socio-psychological background of the mutual perception of opponents in two interconnected wars, which, although considered independent, in reality represent episodes of a single World War II in the North European theater of military operations.
Fighting continued in the North between Soviet and Finnish troops for three years - until September 1944, when Finland withdrew from the war, concluding a truce with the USSR and Great Britain and declaring war on its former ally, Germany. This event was preceded by major successes of Soviet troops along the entire Soviet-German front, including an offensive on the Karelian Front in June-August 1944, as a result of which they reached the state border, and the Finnish government turned to the Soviet Union with a proposal to begin negotiations.
It is to this period, associated with the offensive of the Soviet troops and Finland’s exit from the war, that the documents we discovered from the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense date back to.
The first of them provides Soviet intelligence data on the mood in the Finnish army in July 1944, as well as excerpts from the testimony of prisoner of war captain Eikki Laitinen. The second tells about the circumstances of his capture and interrogation, but not in the dry style of a military report, but in the vivid language of a newspaper essay, authored by Soviet captain Zinovy Burd. These documents provide us with a unique opportunity to look at the same event through the eyes of two opponents who fought on the same sector of the front in the same military rank and met face to face in battle.
The first document is characterized by both aspects that interest us: the self-assessment of the Finnish side, and the conclusions of the Soviet command made on this basis about the moral and psychological state of the Finnish troops shortly before Finland’s withdrawal from the war (June-July 1944). By this time, the mood of the Finns had clearly changed, as evidenced by the soldiers' letters. The turning point in the war, the retreats, including on the Soviet-Finnish sectors of the front, clearly influenced the mood in the troops. However, a Soviet colonel who analyzed the documents concludes that “the morale of the Finnish troops has not yet been broken, many continue to believe in the victory of Finland. The preservation of combat readiness is also facilitated by the fear that the Russians are supposedly barbarians who seek the physical destruction of the Finnish people and their enslavement.”
These fears are evidenced by an excerpt from a letter from one unknown Finnish soldier: “... Most of all I am afraid of falling into the hands of the Russians. It would be the same as death. After all, they first mock their victims, who then face certain death.” It is interesting that among Soviet soldiers there was also a widespread opinion about the special cruelty of the Finns, so being captured by them was considered even worse than by the Germans. In particular, the facts of the destruction of Soviet military hospitals by Finnish sabotage groups along with the wounded and medical personnel were well known.
The Finns were also characterized by a differentiated attitude towards the civilian population of the territories they occupied along ethnic lines: cases of cruel treatment of Russians and a very loyal attitude towards Karelians were common. According to the regulations of the Finnish occupation military administration of Eastern Karelia on concentration camps dated May 31, 1942, they were supposed to contain primarily persons “belonging to the non-national population and living in those areas where their stay during hostilities is undesirable,” and then all those who are politically unreliable. Thus, in Petrozavodsk, according to the recollections of former juvenile prisoner M. Kalinkin, “there were six camps for the Russian civilian population, brought here from the regions of Karelia and the Leningrad region, as well as from the front line. While representatives of the Finno-Ugric people remained free during these years.” At the same time, Finns, Karelians and Estonians were classified as persons of Finnish nationality (suomenheimot), and all others were considered non-indigenous peoples (veratheimot). In the occupied territory, local residents were issued Finnish passports or residence permits - a single form, but of different colors, depending on their nationality. Conducted active work on the Finnization of the indigenous population, while emphasizing in every possible way that the Russian population in Karelia has no roots and has no right to live on its territory.
A feature of Finnish psychology was a great attachment to native places. This also affected the nature of the fighting. Thus, the captured captain Eikki Laitinen testified: “...When our regiment was leaving the Malitsky Isthmus, the soldiers went into battle with less desire than now, because for the Finnish soldier Eastern Karelia is less important than its own territory. On the territory of Eastern Karelia, soldiers entered into battle only when ordered. Near the village of Suoyarvi, when we had already passed our old borders, the soldiers of my company sent a delegation to me with a request to stop the offensive. This is understandable, since a large number of soldiers in my company are natives of the regions of Lake Ladoga who wanted to defend their homelands. About a week ago two soldiers deserted from my company, but after a few days they returned and reported that they wanted to atone for their guilt in battle. I didn't punish them."
The biographical data of this Finnish officer, a participant in both wars, was awarded two crosses, the first of which he received on the Karelian Isthmus in 1940 for “valiant defense”, and the second in 1942 for “valiant offensive”. This information is given in an article by Z. Burda, which also mentions the wife of the captured captain - a military doctor, a member of the Shutskor organization "Lotta-Svyard", also awarded two crosses.
Therefore, we can trust the testimony of this officer, who held himself with dignity during interrogation when he discussed the influence of the “winter” war on the attitude of the Finns not only towards their eastern neighbor, but also towards the idea of socialism as a whole. “The Finnish opinion about the USSR, about socialism, communism has changed a lot over the past 10 years,” he says. - I am sure that if 10 years ago the soldiers of my company had to fight against the Red Army, they would all have gone over to your side. The reason that their views have now changed is the events of 39–40, when the Russians started a war against Finland, as well as the Russian occupation of the Baltic countries, by which they proved their desire to enslave small nations ... "
Soviet propaganda, as a rule, sought to paint an extremely unsightly image of the Finnish enemy. Even based on the materials of the interrogation of Captain E. Laitinen partially described above, judging by which, he showed himself to be a respectable captured officer, in the Red Army newspaper “Battle Path”, in a note entitled “Lapland Crusader”, a front-line correspondent portrayed him caricaturedly and evilly. “The thrice despised Laplander crusader”, “a seasoned enemy Soviet Union”, “White Finnish occupier”, “convinced fascist”, “Shutskorite”, “hater of everything Russian, Soviet” - he was awarded such epithets, and even the word “Schutzkor” - that is, the name of the Finnish detachments of territorial troops - was perceived among them as swear word However, the Finns in their propaganda also did not mince words when talking about the USSR, the Bolsheviks, the Red Army and Russians in general. In everyday life, the disparaging nickname “Russi” (something like our “Kraut” in relation to the Germans) was common. But this is not surprising: in wartime, harsh statements addressed to the enemy are the norm of behavior, justified not only ideologically, but also psychologically.
It should be noted that in general, in the public consciousness of the Soviet side, the Finns were perceived as a secondary enemy, not particularly distinguished from other members of the Hitlerite coalition, while on the Karelian front, in areas of direct contact with them, they acted as the main and very dangerous enemy, in terms of its fighting qualities, it pushed even the Germans into the background. All other allies of Germany could not boast of respect for themselves from the enemy: neither the Hungarians, nor the Romanians, nor the Italians with whom the Soviet troops had to deal were not particularly valiant and were, by all accounts, rather flimsy warriors.
According to the testimony of veteran of the Karelian Front Yu. P. Sharapov, at the end of July 1944, when our troops reached the state border and crossed it, going deep into Finnish territory up to 25 km, they received an encrypted message from the General Staff with an order to return immediately, since they had already Negotiations began on Finland's withdrawal from the war. But they had to fight their way back with stubborn fighting, since the Finns were not going to let them go. Comparing this situation with the situation on other fronts, the progress of the liberation mission and the subsequent imposition of socialism in the countries of Eastern Europe, Yu. P. Sharapov notes: “We, those who fought in the North, treated this differently. As soon as the code came not to let us into Finland, we immediately realized that the matter smelled of kerosene, that there was nothing for us to do there, because there would be a war there all the way to Helsinki. If they were [fighting] in the forest, and it was necessary to shoot in the back of the head so that the Finn would stop shooting because of this boulder, then you can imagine [what would have happened] if we had gone [further] and covered another 240 kilometers. Here both Stalin and his entourage understood that there was no need to get involved with anyone, but with the Finns. These are not Germans, not Romanians, not Bulgarians and not Poles...”
Among all Germany's satellites, perhaps only Finland had an element of justice for participating in the war against the USSR, which, however, was completely covered by its aggressive plans. Interestingly, the motivation for entering the war and leaving it was almost the opposite. In 1941, Mannerheim inspired the Finns with plans to create a Greater Finland and swore that he would not sheathe his sword until he reached the Urals, and in September 1944 he made excuses to Hitler for the fact that “he could no longer afford the kind of bloodshed that he suffered.” the continued existence of little Finland would be in danger” and would condemn its four million people to extinction. The delusions of grandeur have passed. And the cure for this disease was our successful offensive, which drove the Finns back to their pre-war borders.
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Finland in World War II is a wonderful example of flexible diplomacy and successful foreign policy of a small power forced to maneuver in the stormy waters of the imperialist militaristic sentiments of the powerful states of this world - the USSR, Germany, Great Britain and the USA. Each superpower never tired of putting various demands on the governments of Kallio Kyösti, Ryti Risto and Karl Mannerheim, forcing them to make concessions or show an aggressive reaction. Paradoxically, hot Finnish guys and girls have always found the most correct answer to the most complex historical questions.
Finnish Republic in World War II
If we consider the Soviet-Finnish winter confrontation as part of a worldwide massacre, then it turns out that the rulers of Finland during the period 1939-1945 demonstrated the most flexible and cunning foreign policy, having managed to independently fight with the USSR, act as part of the Axis countries, and in the second half of 1944 deftly switched to the other side, eventually ending up among the winners.A soldier with a reindeer on the ice near the village of Nautsi, in northern Lapland, Finland, October 26, 1941.
First stage: winter military operations against the Red Army. The Finns had territorial disagreements with their eastern neighbor even after the first worldwide armed conflict of 1914-1918, which only worsened with the passage of time and the increase in the economic and military power of the Soviets, logically leading to a full-scale armed conflict from the end of November 1939 to the beginning of March 1940 . The initial phase was extremely unsuccessful for the Soviet soldiers, but after several painful defeats, the leadership of the Red Army realized that they could not underestimate the miniature enemy, bringing down the full power of their military machine on their neighbor. During the first ten days of February 1940, the situation on the winter front changed dramatically and at the end of the month the Finnish government asked for peace and made major territorial concessions.
Second stage: alliance with Germany. Even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, a large number of German troops were concentrated on the Soviet border of Finland, which were joined by local detachments to capture Leningrad and subsequently advance to the east. Besides that it's small northern country provided a powerful ally with airfields and naval bases, planning to take part in the blitzkrieg and share the glory of the victors. After the failure of the German offensive on Moscow and the successful counterattack of the Red Army, the Finns for the first time thought about the consequences of an alliance with the Third Reich. Then came the terrible defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, which gave rise to doubts and fear among the people of Suomi, to which was added real public panic after the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the failures at the Kursk Bulge. The result of panic was the resignation of President Risto and the sending of a request for a truce to the Soviet government. Of course, the leadership of the USSR was not satisfied with the truce and demanded Finland’s full participation in World War 2 on the side of the Allies. Thus, the Lapland War began between the Finns and Germans, who could not believe that yesterday’s friends and allies had taken up arms against them.
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Third stage. For the time being, the Finnish army was more likely to pretend than to fight, but over time they had to fight for real - killing Germans and losing their own soldiers. In total, more than 4,000 Finnish soldiers were killed, wounded or missing during the hostilities in Lapland, and in total for the period from 1939 to 45, losses amounted to approximately 110,000 killed and 45,000 wounded.
Photos of Finland 1939-1945
Finnish anti-aircraft team in action in Helsinki. An archive of 160,000 retro photos was posted online in 2013. It covers the entire period 1939-1945, during which the brave and dexterous Suomi managed to support Germany, for which they paid only 10% of the territory and a small amount of reparations, and made peace with the USSR, which showed an unusual love of peace and did not invade the territory of its western neighbor and seize Helsinki. In the post-war years, partnerships and even friendly relations were established between the former mortal enemies, thanks to which the Finns were able to get back some of their ancestral lands, but only after the end of the Second World War.
Downed Soviet plane. 
Soldiers with a flamethrower in the forest near the village of Niinisalo, July 1, 1942. 
Pilot flying over Jamijärvi, July 17, 1942.
Snowmobile near Haapasaari, Finland. The swastika was used as the official national marking of the Finnish Air Force and Tank Corps between 1918 and 1945. 
Soldiers with binoculars near an acoustic locator. 
Finnish tank team, July 8, 1941. 
Evacuation of civilians, July 1, 1941. 
Hitler's visit to Finland. Adolf Hitler, leader of Nazi Germany, made a brief visit to the Allies in June 1942. 
Anti-aircraft fire over Suomenlinna, Helsinki.
November 30, 1939. On this day, the Soviet Union invaded Finland with 21 divisions containing approximately 450,000 troops. 
A wounded man is carried away after a civilian area is bombed. 
Explosion of the main building of the University of Helsinki, on Senate Square. 
Consequences after bomb attacks. 
Icicles inside a destroyed building in Viipuri, Finland (now Vyborg, Russia).
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Finnish armored train from World War II. 
Transporting troops in cold weather in winter. 
Hämeenlinna Military Dog School. 
Street fighting in Medvezhyegorsk, Russia, USSR. 
Downed USSR plane. 
Repair of the tram line after the bombing, February 1944. 
Two little girls in the ruins of a city near the Martin Church in Turku. 
Soviet prisoner of war during the war. 
A barge lifts a sunken locomotive from the water. 
After the bombing of the hospital in Mikkeli.
Consequences of the bombing. 
Soldiers carry the wounded on stretchers. 
Vyborg Cathedral after the bombing. 
Junkers Ju-87 Stuka bombers, July 2, 1944. 
Finnish motorcycle and tank.
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Disguised bicycle in the forest. Ontrosenvaara, August 17, 1941. 
Shooting at a Soviet watchtower near Koitsanlahti. 
Niobe (HNLMS Gelderland), a cruiser built for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, captured by the Germans in 1940 and renamed Niobe, scuttled by Soviet bombers in Kotka harbor, 16 July 1944. 
The village of Nurmoila, shortly after the bombing by Soviet bombers.
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Last month, the Finnish Defense Forces released an archive of 160,000 photographs from the era. These are photographs from 1939-1945, describing the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union of 1939-1940, the military actions of Finland when it became an ally of Nazi Germany in the war against the Soviet Union of 1941-1945, and the Lapland War - military actions between Finland and Germany in September 1944 - April 1945.
Photographs of Finland in World War II.
All captions were short and in Finnish, so some inaccuracies may occur.
The swastika is one of the most ancient and widespread graphic symbols. From 1918 to 1945, the swastika was depicted on the banners of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces, and currently on the presidential standard.
Snowmobile with propeller and swastika, Haapasaari, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Flamethrower in action. In the forest near the village of Niinisalo in Finland, July 1, 1942. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Waiting for approaching enemy aircraft. This incredible device is an acoustic locator. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Hitler's visit to Finland in June 1942. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Bombing of Helsinki by Soviet planes, November 30, 1939. On this day Finland was attacked. The number of divisions is 21, the total number of soldiers is 450 thousand. The Winter War has begun. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Wounded in Helsinki. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A building on Senate Square in Helsinki is on fire. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Streets of Helsinki after the bombing. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Anti-aircraft gun in Helsinki. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Vyborg. Back then in Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Finnish armored train. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Experimental transportation of troops in cold weather. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Military dog school Hämeenlinna. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A rocket launched from the forest. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Street fighting in Medvezhyegorsk, Russia. The city was occupied by Finland for three years. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Frozen soldier. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A soldier in a protective suit against a gas attack. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Downed Soviet plane. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Restoration of bombed tram tracks. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Two girls on the ruins of Martin's Cathedral in Turku, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Soviet prisoners of war. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Lifting a locomotive out of the water. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Bomb shelter hospital in Mikkeli, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Bomb strike. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Dead German soldier. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Cathedral in Vyborg after the bombing. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A thirteen-year-old boy in the hospital. (Photo by SA-kuva):
The burning village of Nurmoila, Finland. (Photo by SA-kuva):
Finnish motorcycle and tank with swastika. (Photo by SA-kuva):
A soldier and a reindeer on the ice in northern Lapland, Finland, October 26, 1941. (Photo by SA-kuva):
1944 turned out to be a triumphant year for the Soviet troops. In the course of several major operations, units reached the state borders of the USSR, and in the North-West it was finally finally removed. German units hastily rolled back from the city in the direction of the Baltic States, and their Finnish allies found themselves practically face to face with the strengthened Soviet units, which already bore little resemblance to those troops that several years ago were stuck in the Karelian swamps, trying to break through the notorious Mannerheim Line.
Germans in Finland: preparations for evacuation
Already in 1943, the German command, when planning further actions on the Eastern Front, assumed that at some point Finland might agree to a separate peace with the USSR. Suomi was not only an ally of the Nazis, but also a convenient springboard for actions against Russia, as well as a source of valuable strategic resources for the economy. The Pechenga region, which was transferred to Finland as a result in 1920, was of particular value for Germany - there were nickel mines there.
Especially for this task, the Germans concentrated a group of troops in Lapland and began to improve the infrastructure in the difficult conditions of northern Finland - building defensive fortifications and warehouses and building roads. At the same time, the German General Staff developed an operation to withdraw units from Lapland under the code name “Birke”. Throughout the winter of 1943−1944. The Wehrmacht worked to implement this operation and formed two defensive points in northern Finland: Sturmbock and Schutzwall. There was no need to build a continuous rampart of fortifications - natural conditions Lapland perfectly met the defense needs due to its swamps and difficult terrain.
Source: pohjoiseen. fiTruce with the USSR and Finland's exit from the war
The Germans' fears were indeed justified. Finnish political circles, observing the defeats of the Wehrmacht in and under, began to seriously consider the issue of concluding a separate peace with the USSR. The envoy to neutral Sweden became an intermediary between the Finnish and Soviet governments.
Initially, the demands of the Finnish representatives who arrived in Stockholm to determine the “starting point” in the negotiations assumed that the countries would return to the borders of 1939, that is, before. Such ideas were promoted by those sent to Kollontai, Juho Kusti Paasikivi. Of course, these demands were not accepted. Throughout February 1944, Helsinki was bombed by Soviet aircraft, which was supposed to break the government's resistance. The Swedish ministers and the king himself also hinted to their neighbors about an early conclusion of a truce.
Alexandra Kollontai. (moiarussia.ru)
However, the back and forth between Germany and the USSR continued for at least six months. Things have progressed since dead center in August 1944, when Carl Gustaf Mannerheim became President of Finland. Already on September 19, the parties concluded a truce. The countries returned to the borders of 1940, Suomi was obliged to disarm German troops on its territory and provide the Red Army with access to naval and air bases.
Gogland Island - the first skirmish of the former allies
The first clashes between Finnish and German troops, which later became known as the “Lapland War,” began not in the north of Finland, but on the island of Gogland (Suusaari) in the Gulf of Finland. Even before the official conclusion of the armistice, on September 14, 1944, the German command, in the form of an ultimatum, addressed the garrison of the island with a demand to disarm and leave this important strategic point. The Finns refused to surrender the island.
Finnish fortifications in Suusaari. (jaegerplatoon.net)
The next day, the German landing operation began to capture Gogland. Soviet aviation came to the aid of the Finnish garrison. The irony of fate was that Finnish troops in the first half of September began dismantling military equipment and evacuating the garrison from the island, so they found themselves in a weakened state in the face of military danger.
On the morning of October 15, German paratroopers managed to seize a bridgehead in the northeastern part of the island, but this was the end of the Wehrmacht’s successes. Without normal communication with headquarters in Tallinn, the soldiers were forced to surrender, exposed to incessant artillery and air attacks. As a result of the battles, the Wehrmacht's losses were estimated at 1,385 people, the Finns - 111. In addition, the Germans lost several ships in the Gulf of Finland.
Killed German paratroopers. (sa-kuva.fi)
“Scorched Earth” - Lapland after the Wehrmacht
Military operations in Lapland began a little later - already at the end of September. The German command was in no hurry to withdraw its troops from the territory of Finland, while the USSR was putting serious pressure on the Finnish government. The Wehrmacht had a group of troops numbering 213 thousand people in northern Finland. At the same time, the armed forces of Suomi found themselves in a difficult situation - the country was severely exhausted by the war, and following the truce with the USSR it became necessary to reduce the number of soldiers. In Lapland, only 60 thousand Finns fought against the 20th Mountain Army of the Wehrmacht.
The first clashes between troops took place on September 28 near Pudvsjärvi in the Oulus province. On September 30, the Finns landed at the port of Röytä near Torneo, and the army attacked Torneo itself. After short fighting, the city was abandoned by German troops.
