Opposition to the investigation and measures to overcome it. State measures to overcome the crisis
How to develop a strategy to overcome resistance to change? As a rule, this question is not easy to answer. First of all, because just as there are no two completely identical organizations, there are no universal rules for overcoming resistance. Many managers underestimate not only the variety with which people can respond to organizational change, but also the positive impact that change can have on individuals and teams. However, there are still a number of fairly universal methods for overcoming resistance to strategic change. Here we consider two groups of methods proposed by J. Kotter and L. Schlesinger.
Kotter and Schlesinger offer the following methods for overcoming resistance to change:
Ø information and communication;
Ø participation and involvement;
Ø help and support;
Ø negotiations and agreements;
Ø manipulation and co-optation;
Ø Explicit and implicit coercion.
Below we will consider the ways and conditions for the successful implementation of the methods identified by J. Kotter and L. Schlesinger, however, we will first present the results of the analysis in Table. 5.
Table 5 Methods for overcoming resistance to change
| An approach | Usually used in situations: | Advantages (advantages) | disadvantages |
| Information and communication | When there is insufficient information or inaccurate information in the analysis | If you manage to convince people, they will often help you make changes. | The approach can be very time consuming if a large number of people are involved. |
| Participation and involvement | Employees have significant strength to resist | People who participate have a sense of responsibility for bringing about change. | Approach can take a long time |
| Help and Support | When people resist change because they are afraid of problems adapting to new conditions | No other approach works so well in solving problems of adaptation to new conditions. | The approach can be costly and time consuming and yet fail. |
| Negotiations and agreements | When an individual or group clearly loses something in making changes | Sometimes this is a relatively simple (easy) way to avoid strong resistance. | An approach can become too costly if it aims to reach agreement only through negotiation |
| manipulation and co-optation | When other tactics fail or are too costly | This approach can be a relatively quick and inexpensive solution to drag problems. | The approach may generate additional resistance if people realize that they are being manipulated. |
| Explicit and implicit coercion | When change is needed quickly and change agents are powerful | This approach is fast and overcomes any kind of resistance. | A risky way, people remain dissatisfied with the initiators of change |
Information and communication. We have already noted above that one of the most common ways to overcome resistance to the implementation of a strategy is to inform people in advance. Getting an idea of upcoming strategic changes helps you understand the need for these changes and their logic. The outreach process may include one-on-one discussions, group workshops, or reports. In practice, this is done, for example, by conducting seminars by the manager for lower-level managers. A communication or information program may be perceived as most appropriate if the resistance to the strategy is based on incorrect or insufficient information, especially if the "strategists" need the help of opponents of strategic changes in implementing these changes. This program requires time and effort if its implementation involves the participation of a large number of people.
Participation and involvement. If "strategists" involve potential opponents of the strategy at the planning stage, they can often avoid resistance. In an effort to achieve participation in the implementation of strategic changes, their initiators listen to the opinion of the employees involved in this strategy, and subsequently use their advice. Researchers have found that many managers take the issue of staff participation in strategy implementation very seriously. Sometimes this is positive, sometimes it is negative, i.e. some managers believe that they should always be involved in the change process, while others consider this an absolute mistake. Both relationships can create a number of problems for a manager, as neither is ideal.
Help and Support. Support can be provided as an opportunity to learn new skills, free time for employees to learn, just the opportunity to be listened to and receive emotional support. Help and support is especially needed when resistance is based on fear and anxiety. Seasoned tough managers usually ignore these types of resistance, as well as the effectiveness of this way of dealing with resistance. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it is time consuming, therefore expensive, and yet often fails. If there is simply no time, money and patience, then it makes no sense to use support methods.
Negotiations and agreements. Another way to deal with resistance is to provide incentives to active or potential opponents of change. For example, a manager may offer an employee a higher salary in exchange for a job change, or he may increase an individual employee's pension in exchange for an earlier retirement date. Negotiation is especially appropriate when it is clear that someone is losing as a result of the change, and yet they have significant power to resist. Reaching an agreement is a relatively easy way to avoid strong resistance, although like many other ways, it can be quite costly. Especially at the moment when the manager makes it clear that he is ready to negotiate in order to avoid strong resistance. In this case, he may become the object of blackmail.
manipulation and co-optation. In some situations, managers try to hide their intentions from other people using manipulation. Manipulation in this case implies the selective use of information and the conscious presentation of events in a certain order that is beneficial to the initiator of the changes. One of the most common forms of manipulation is co-optation. Co-opting a person means giving her the desired role in planning and implementing changes. Co-opting a team involves giving one of its leaders, or someone the group respects, a key role in planning and implementing change. This is not a form of participation, because the initiators of change do not seek the advice of the co-opted, but only their support. Under certain circumstances, co-optation can be a relatively cheap and easy way to gain the support of an individual or group of employees (cheaper than negotiation and faster than participation). But it has a number of disadvantages. If people feel that they are being fooled into not resisting change, that they are not being treated equally, or that they are simply being lied to, then their reaction can be extremely negative. In addition, co-optation can create further problems if the co-opted use their power to influence the organization and implement change in a way that is not in the best interests of the organization. Other forms of manipulation also have drawbacks that can be even more significant. Moreover, if the manager continues to have a reputation for being manipulative, he risks losing the opportunity to use such necessary approaches as education, communication, participation, and may even ruin his career.
Explicit and implicit coercion. Managers often overcome resistance through coercion. Basically, they force people to accept strategic change through covert or overt threats (threatened with loss of jobs, benefits, promotion opportunities, etc.), or by actual layoffs, or by transfers to lower-paying jobs. Just like manipulation, the use of coercion is a risky process because people always resist forced change. However, in situations where a strategy needs to be implemented quickly, and where it is not popular, no matter how it is implemented, coercion may be the manager's only option.
The most common mistake managers make is to use only one or a limited number of approaches, no matter the situation. This includes the harsh boss who often resorts to coercion, the employee-oriented manager who constantly tries to attract and support his people, the cynic boss who always manipulates his employees, and the intelligent manager who relies heavily on education. and communication, and finally a lawyer-type manager who tries to negotiate all the time.
Hughes highlights eight factors to overcome resistance to change.
Factor 1: taking into account the reasons for the behavior of the individual in the organization:
take into account the needs, inclinations and aspirations of those affected by the change;
demonstrate how they individually benefit from the implementation of the strategy.
having sufficient power and influence.
Factor 3: providing information to the group:
relevant information relevant to the case and sufficiently important.
Factor 4: reaching a common understanding:
a common understanding of the need for change;
participation in the search and interpretation of information.
Factor 5: sense of belonging to a group:
a general sense of ownership of the change;
a sufficient degree of participation.
coordinated group work to reduce opposition.
Factor 7: support for changes by the group leader:
involvement of a leader in a specific working environment (without interruption from direct work).
Factor 8: awareness of group members:
opening communication channels;
exchange of objective information;
knowledge of the results of the change.
Let's consider the content of these factors in more detail.
Accounting for the causes of individual behavior in the organization. Any change must take into account the needs, inclinations and aspirations of those affected by the change. Before taking part in the process of change, a person must see a certain personal gain that he will receive as a result of these changes, then he is unlikely to resist the change.
The value of the authority of the leader. The higher the authority of the leader, the greater the influence that he can have on the process of change. In most organizations, the manager has more prestige than the members of the workforce entrusted to him, so the wishes of the leader are usually a more powerful incentive to start and maintain the process of change than the wishes of one or another of his subordinates. At the same time, the official leader of the team and the real leader (often informal) do not have to be the same person. Often, an unofficial leader with high authority in the workforce can have a great influence on the process of change. Whether or not there is an informal leader, the line manager has more power and influence than the "trainer" in the training department.
Providing information to the group. A conscious desire for change can arise in a group if it is provided with information about how the group will act in the process of change, what its task is, how its work will change, etc., especially if this data is objective and contains new information , supplementing the existing one. Information related to change, concentrated in any one organization or group, has a greater impact than general information about the activities of individuals. The more information is centralized, accessible, relevant and related to the problem, the more opportunities for successful change. For example, information obtained through a questionnaire, if used correctly, can be more useful for a particular workforce than general information about intentions.
Achieving a common understanding. A strong desire for change can be caused by the achievement of a common understanding by all members of the group of the need for change, while the initiative aimed at stimulating change will come from the group itself. To do this, employees must know what problems the organization has actually faced, what paths have been chosen to solve these problems. The facts obtained by individuals or groups, or the participation of these individuals or groups in planning, as well as in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data, have a significant impact on the change process. Information obtained by one member of the team is more understandable, more acceptable and more likely to be used than that provided by an "outside expert". In particular, participation in the analysis and interpretation of data can reduce or eliminate the opposition that arises from too slow or too fast progress. If the data is to become the actual basis for making changes, it must be correctly presented and perceived. It's all about the fundamental difference between the situation when an independent consulting firm is invited to conduct a study and prepare a report, from a situation where the study is carried out on its own with the assistance of independent experts.
Feeling of belonging to a group. The power to resist change is reduced when employees who must experience the change and those who are trying to influence the course of change feel like they belong to the same group. Change that comes from within is much less threatening and causes less opposition than change that is imposed from without. The degree of participation in changes can be different. The greatest degree of participation (usually the most effective) is characterized by the participation of all members of the group. The next degree of participation corresponds to the participation of individual members of the group. The smallest degree implies the participation of only the leader. This does not necessarily increase positive attitudes towards change, but significantly reduces open resistance.
Group authority for its members. The more authoritative a group is to its members, the more influence it can have on them. A group is attractive to its members to the extent that it satisfies their needs. This entails the readiness of each member of the group to be influenced by other members, and increased incentives for group cohesion, if this is important for her. When it comes to change, group cohesion can either reduce or increase resistance, depending on whether the group sees the change as beneficial or harmful.
Support for change by the group leader. A group that retains psychological significance for its individual members has more influence than a group whose membership is short-lived. A change process that involves organizing individual leaders into temporary teams away from work is less effective for long-term changes than a change process in which leaders participate in a specific work environment.
Awareness of group members. Information relating to the need for change, plans for change and its implications should be communicated to all affected members of the group. This principle can also be formulated as follows: the process of change requires a purposeful and thoughtful opening of channels of communication. Blocking these channels usually leads to mistrust and hostility. In particular, objective information about the scope and direction of change (knowledge of results) facilitates further change, as people imagine what awaits them as a result of the implementation of the strategy. Change processes that provide specific information about progress made to date and provide criteria against which improvements can be judged are more successful at facilitating and sustaining change than processes that do not provide such specific information and feedback.
The successful implementation of strategy in an organization is always characterized by the skillful application of a number of these approaches, often in various combinations. However, successful implementation is characterized by two features: managers use these approaches, taking into account their advantages and disadvantages, and realistically assess the situation.
Annex 3
I. Countermeasures
the global financial crisis, undertaken
in the CIS member states
The global financial crisis has affected the financial markets of the CIS member states to varying degrees, which is explained by differences in the level of development of the economies of these states, their financial markets, the degree of integration into the global economy, the depth of economic ties, including in the monetary and financial sphere, as with other CIS member states, as well as with third countries.
This section provides information on the impact of the crisis on the economic situation in some CIS member states and the measures taken in these states to overcome its negative consequences.
REPUBLIC OF BELARUS
The sharp deterioration in the second half of 2008 of the situation in the world commodity and raw materials markets led to a decrease in price indices and a drop in demand for the main Belarusian export goods (oil and oil products, metals, fertilizers, agricultural machinery, etc.). Taking into account the increase in the price of energy imports for Belarus in 2009, as well as the recession in the main developed countries of the world (USA, EU, Japan), the pressure on the current account of the balance of payments of Belarus is expected to continue taking into account the forecast by international experts.
In addition, under the present conditions, the attraction of external financial resources to Belarus on a debt basis is significantly limited. The adoption of the Concept for managing the external debt of the Republic of Belarus, which provides for a system of monitoring and restrictions on external borrowing by enterprises and organizations of all forms of ownership, is expected to contribute to the improvement of the country's economic security.
Measures to support the financial market
At present, the situation in the banking sector of Belarus is quite stable. The banks of the republic comply with liquidity norms.
As preventive measures to maintain a stable situation with domestic liquidity and attract funds from non-residents, the National Bank has taken the following measures:
the refinancing rate was increased (from October 15, 2008 by 0.25% to 10.75% per annum, from November 12, 2008 by another 0.25% to 11% per annum);
increase in the amount of guaranteed compensation on deposits of individuals from 700 thousand tenge to 5 million tenge. This measure will be introduced for a certain period of time (for 3 years);
further reduction of the minimum reserve requirements from 5% for domestic liabilities and 7% for other liabilities to 2% for both domestic and other liabilities, which will allow the banking system to release additional liquidity in the amount of about 400 billion tenge (about 3.3 billion US dollars).
The second wave of the financial crisis, which provoked a global liquidity shortage, went beyond the global financial system and had a significant negative impact on the real sector.
In this regard, the Republic of Kazakhstan has developed a Joint Action Plan for the Government, the National Bank and the Agency for Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial Organizations to stabilize the economy and financial system for years, which defines a set of measures aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of the global crisis on the socio-economic situation in the country and providing the necessary basis for future economic growth.
To achieve these goals, the Government, the National Bank and the Agency for Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Market and Financial Organizations will focus on the following five areas:
stabilization of the financial sector;
solving problems in the real estate market;
support for small and medium businesses;
implementation of innovative, industrial and infrastructure projects .
The funds of the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the amount of 10 billion US dollars (1200 billion tenge) will be used to financially support the Plan.
REPUBLIC OF KYRGYZSTAN
At the moment, the country's economy is experiencing a deterioration in the balance of payments indicators, an increased trade balance deficit requires large funds in foreign currency for financing, respectively, the demand and the strengthening of the US dollar are increasing. In this case, the situation with the lack of foreign currency, such as the US dollar, inside the market is complicated, which can provoke liquidity problems.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The global financial crisis, which entered an open stage in August 2008, radically changed the conditions for the functioning of the Russian economy and financial system. In the context of the deteriorating situation on world financial markets, the net outflow of private capital from the country increased: only in August-November of this year, according to preliminary estimates, it amounted to about 100 billion US dollars. The decrease in gold and foreign exchange reserves over this period exceeded 140 billion US dollars. Under such conditions, the situation with liquidity in the banking system sharply worsened, which developed into a full-fledged crisis of confidence among commercial banks. The solvency of private financial companies, banks and non-financial enterprises heavily dependent on debt financing has been threatened. An additional destabilizing factor was the falling energy prices. From July to December 2008, Russian oil fell 4 times in world markets. Against this background, the capitalization of the Russian stock market has fallen by almost 5 times over several months.
The system nature of the problems that arose required the development of an integrated approach to their solution, based on the coordination of the actions of the Government and the Bank of Russia. Thus, in August-November 2008, a wide range of economic policy measures was implemented to mitigate the negative consequences of the global financial crisis for Russian credit institutions, primarily to expand their ability to obtain the necessary liquidity and generate credit resources for the country's economic development. .
The Bank of Russia, expanding the existing tools for regulating liquidity in the banking system, as well as using existing regulatory capabilities, over the past few months has carried out:
The key problems of the agricultural sector of the republic are the limited availability of credit resources, advanced technologies for growing crops, poorly developed agricultural infrastructure and the lack of modern methods of industrial processing of agricultural products.
In this regard, Tajikistan needs to introduce modern agricultural technologies using elite seed material and chemical fertilizers, innovative methods of doing agribusiness, developing new areas of irrigated land, efficient use of water resources, and environmental conservation.
Severe frosts and low water in years, insufficient supply of electricity and natural gas from neighboring countries have negatively affected the socio-economic situation of the country.
In this regard, the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan has taken a number of actions aimed at preventing the deepening of the crisis situation. In particular, the country introduced a regime of severe limitation of electricity supply and saving water in reservoirs, limited the supply of electricity to large industrial enterprises, as well as to social facilities.
The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine adopted the Decision "On urgent measures to strengthen financial and budgetary discipline and minimize the negative impact of the global financial crisis on the economy of Ukraine", which was put into effect by the Decree of the President of Ukraine. These measures provide for a reduction in budget expenditures on the maintenance of governing bodies, stimulation of investment expenditures, in particular, for financing infrastructure projects, bringing tariffs for housing and communal services to an economically justified level, increasing transparency in corporate governance of banks, in particular, determining the real owners of banks and strengthening their responsibility for supporting the financial stability of banks, ensuring stability in the foreign exchange market.
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in order to prevent a decline in production and an increase in unemployment, adopted a resolution “On priority measures to stabilize the situation in the mining, metallurgical and chemical complex”, which provides for the introduction of a moratorium on raising tariffs for mining, metallurgical and chemical enterprises for freight transportation until the end current year, to increase tariffs for electricity and prices for coking coal; an accelerated mechanism for the reimbursement of value added tax for these enterprises; establishment of zero rates by the end of 2008 in the form of a target mark-up to the natural gas tariff.
In November of the current year, the Procedure for the Use of the Stabilization Fund and the Procedure for the State's Participation in the Capitalization of Banks were approved. In the shortest possible time, negotiations were held with the International Monetary Fund to obtain a stabilization loan.
Ukraine signed the Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policy developed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the National Bank together with the IMF. It is aimed at restoring macroeconomic and financial stability in Ukraine. First of all, the Memorandum provides for the need to solve the problems of the financial sector by maintaining the liquidity of banks and increasing the volume of deposit guarantees, providing financial assistance to banks, including at the expense of budgetary funds, and solving problems with credit debts of the population and business entities. All of the above will help to adapt to possible external risks (a further reduction in export-oriented production as a result of falling global demand) and will contribute to a gradual reduction in inflation through the adaptation of macroeconomic policies. This will be ensured through a flexible exchange rate policy; bringing household incomes in line with the inflation target while protecting the most vulnerable segments of the population; introducing tighter fiscal policies and bringing prices in the energy sector in line with costs.
In order to ensure macroeconomic stability and minimize possible losses for the economy and financial system of Ukraine from the financial crisis, the Law of Ukraine “On Priority Measures to Prevent the Negative Consequences of the Financial Crisis and on Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine” was adopted.
The norms of this Law also provide for the maximum preservation of indirect support for agricultural producers through special value added tax regimes that do not contradict the requirements of the WTO. This is achieved by extending the regime of accumulation of value added tax funds by agricultural producers to all transactions for the sale of agricultural products, including the sale of milk and meat, to processing enterprises.
10. Facilitate the access of banks to the resources of central banks (expanding the list of collateral or withdrawing it in crisis situations).
11. Establish a maximum level of unsecured access for banks, taking into account the solvency of the bank or the amount of its capital.
12. After assessing the potential demand for liquidity from banks, discuss the scope and mechanisms of possible support from central banks and from the government of each state.
13. Pursuing a joint fiscal policy to stimulate demand in the domestic market.
14. Implementation of recommendations acceptable to each member state of the CIS and to the Commonwealth as a whole, proposed by the countries participating in the G20 summit.
15. Refrain from introducing new restrictions on mutual trade and investment for the next 12 months.
16. Coordination of the approaches of the CIS member states to the development and implementation of monetary and financial and banking policy measures:
To increase the liquidity of credit institutions by reducing the required reserves, increasing the availability of refinancing instruments for banks, including extending the terms and reducing the requirements for collateral, increasing the limit on placing budget funds on bank deposits, etc.;
To strengthen the stability of the banking and financial sector by increasing the requirements for transparency and accountability of credit institutions, as well as coordinating the policies of the CIS member states in the field of supervision and control in national financial markets in order to protect investors and consumers of services, prevent financial risks associated with fraud and abuse.
17. Coordination of the policy to prevent bankruptcy of credit institutions in the following areas:
Allocation of state financial resources to systemically important banks to support the banking system by providing subordinated loans;
Providing central banks with the right to compensate banks for part of the losses on transactions in the interbank market as a result of lending to banks whose banking license was revoked;
Granting the right to specialized state structures engaged in insurance of deposits of individuals to provide financial assistance to investors acquiring shares/stakes in the authorized capital of banks with signs of an unstable financial situation.
18. Coordination of the policy of the CIS member states in the field of currency regulation.
It is necessary to speed up the conclusion of the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Policy in the Sphere of Currency Regulation and Currency Control in the CIS Member States.
19. Creation of conditions for further expansion of the sphere of use of the national currencies of the CIS member states for servicing mutual foreign economic relations.
In order to further increase foreign economic relations, it is proposed to conclude bilateral agreements between the central (national) banks of the CIS member states on information support for participants in the integrated foreign exchange market in development of the Decision of the CIS Council of Heads of Government of 01.01.01 on cooperation and coordination of the activities of the CIS member states in the field of organization of the integrated foreign exchange market of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States
20. Formation of prerequisites for the creation of a regional reserve currency based on the Russian ruble.
The role of the Russian ruble as a regional reserve currency implies the performance of such functions in international circulation as the currency of the price of contracts, a means of international settlements, a means of financing and investment, as well as a means of accumulation. Therefore, the agreed measures may include the creation of conditions for expanding the use of the Russian ruble in servicing the foreign economic relations of the CIS member states as:
a) currencies of contract prices and means of payment in mutual trade, including energy supplies;
b) currencies for granting credits and loans, financing investment projects,
c) a component of international reserves, along with the US dollar, euro and other currencies, taking into account the share of the Russian Federation in the mutual foreign trade of the CIS member states and the share of the Russian ruble in mutual settlements.
21. Coordination of measures to support economic activity in order to overcome the negative consequences of the financial crisis.
This area of joint action involves the harmonization of approaches to amending the national legislation of the CIS member states in order to improve the situation in the financial and banking sector, in certain sectors of the economy, stimulate domestic demand, and provide social support to citizens.
As an agreed position of the CIS member states on measures developed and implemented within the framework of the IMF and other international financial and non-financial organizations, it is advisable to consider the following measures:
22. Coordination of the position of the CIS member states on strengthening the requirements for banks when making credit transactions and for the activities of speculative hedge funds in countries with emerging markets.
An important goal of policy coordination in this area of cooperation is to ensure the minimization of sharp destructive fluctuations in the volumes of inflow and outflow of speculative foreign capital to the markets of the CIS member states. Given that factors such as deficient risk management practices, the ever-increasing separation of complex and opaque financial derivatives from underlying assets, and the resulting excessive borrowing for stock speculation, contributed to the global financial crisis, it is important to take restrictive measures when making credit transactions and for operations of hedge funds, including in the markets of the CIS member states.
Such measures include the establishment of higher standards for the size of equity capital for banks in the provision of structured loans and asset securitization operations, as well as for hedge funds actively developing speculative activities in financial markets. Such measures would help reduce the volatility of capital inflows/outflows, especially in emerging markets.
23. Development of coordinated approaches of the CIS member states to reforming the world monetary and financial system and the role of the International Monetary Fund and other structures in the new financial architecture.
Recognizing the inadequacy to the new realities of the global financial and economic world order that has developed in recent decades, based on the principles of the Bretton Woods monetary system and in order to restructure the global monetary and financial architecture, including the reform of international financial institutions, it is proposed:
Entrust the International Monetary Fund with the function of supervision and control, especially over transnational banks, in order to create an early warning system that allows you to track all major international transactions and new derivative financial instruments that appear on the market;
Coordinate the approaches of the CIS member states on the issue of sources of replenishment of the IMF's resources in order to expand its capabilities to support states with emerging markets that have been most affected by the global financial crisis;
Reform the activities of the Financial Stability Forum by expanding its membership to include countries with emerging markets and giving its activities a rule-making character, primarily on issues of supervision and control over operations in the global financial market;
Coordinate the positions of the CIS member states on the transition to a multipolar world monetary and financial system, formed on the basis of international financial centers and regional reserve currencies;
Facilitate the formation of internal and external conditions for the resumption of access of emerging markets to the resources of the global financial market on a qualitatively new basis, given that long-term private capital flows play an important role in achieving sustainable economic growth.
MEASURES TO OVERCOME ILLEGAL FELLING AND FOREST EXPORT Efforts of the government and administrationsSince 1998, the administrations of the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories have made a whole series of attempts to overcome the criminal revelry in the forests. Among them were repeated attempts to induce the Russian government to change the current legislation to limit the export of roundwood, increase forest taxes for the harvesting of valuable species, and limit exports in accordance with the limits of the logging fund.
Georgy Markov, Deputy Chairman of the Forest Industry Department of the Administration of the Khabarovsk Territory (November 1998):
"The Federal Forest Service is trying to limit illegal logging and export of ash by increasing the forest tax. But this will obviously lead to the bankruptcy of the basic loggers who are trying to work legally, pay all taxes and maintain the social infrastructure of forest villages. At the same time, this measure will not affect small loggers working illegally for cash dollars, without papers or with forged papers Banning the export of roundwood seems to be a much more effective measure Northeast China has built up to 200,000 cubic meters a year of processing capacity in our ash And if we impose an export ban roundwood, exporters will be forced to leave the wood in the Far East for processing, creating jobs for local residents and increasing tax revenues to local budgets.The main task is to get the customs service to accept such a ban.Now we are trying to do this through the government, although the resistance is obvious: customs received has too much roundwood revenue and doesn't want to lose it.
At the same time, the Far Eastern Customs Administration supports the initiative of Primorye residents to introduce a 10-day moratorium on timber exports from the moment the declaration is submitted: this will make it possible to check the entire chain of resellers. In cooperation with the Primorsky administration and customs officers, we are trying to create our own rules for the timber trade, in which ash will be presented as a separate line. Customs should meet the needs of local administrations and allow the export of ash only after confirming the legality of its harvesting. Today they don't. We are in a better position than the Primoryes, because we have a well-functioning system of control on the main points. We agreed with customs that the point of export is indicated in the declaration. In addition, the number of resale and sorting points must be strictly limited in both regions. Railway workers must also allow ash trees to pass only to special export points. Certification of ash exporters is needed. We are now waiting for the government's decision on this matter. This is important, given that we have 300 producers and 67 exporters in the Khabarovsk Territory alone."
The Primorsky Forestry Administration only started obligatory certification, but not of exporters, but of logging operations, which seems more reasonable, in 2000 at the direction of the Federal Forest Service. both regions have taken a series of important steps, including the Government Decree on streamlining the export deliveries of valuable hardwood species (No. 163 of April 13, 1998). Road police posts were created, transport coupons (in the Khabarovsk Territory) and certificates (in Primorye) were introduced to control resellers. A special technological scheme was developed for customs clearance of exports, taking into account the data of the timber ticket and the certificate. Although police posts soon turned into points of illegal requisitions, and certificates became the subject of mass sale and forgery, everyone felt the temporary impact of such a measure: in 1998, the criminal flow of ash and oak and the number of "self-driving" began to decrease. This trend was reportedly particularly robust in 1999, when hardwood exports fell by more than 30%, although the level of officially or unofficially legalized wood in this volume remains uncertain and, by many estimates, still high.
The Khabarovsk Territory Forest Management Commission has recently taken the following measures:
Mandatory quarterly reporting by exporters was introduced with a list of indicators to be submitted to Khabarovskglavles; it was decided to consider the compliance of the average selling price with the minimum prices approved by the Commission and the payment of tax payments on income as the main indicators in assessing the activity of exporters; the supply of "combined" sawlogs for export is prohibited; it was decided to conduct a comprehensive audit of the activities of 15 exporting enterprises, including CJSC Forest-Starma, LLC Krona-Pacific, Kirby-Trading, Amursibles, Kordait-les, Lesnoy kompleks, Flora ".
One of the problems that cannot yet be solved at the regional level is the lack of fear among illegal purveyors and resellers. The criminal code, which covers the trade in illegal timber, succumbs to the system of evidence that must be presented for sentencing. The Forest Code and environmental legislation do provide for ridiculously low fines for illegal logging, many times overridden by criminal proceeds from the sale of the same forest. Therefore, the main problem for squatters is the loss of wood during confiscation or the loss of money for bribes to controlling officials. Simply put, criminals lose where they are forced to share with the authorities. It is for these reasons, according to local observers, that under pressure from the dissatisfied owners of the black timber market, the main police post on the trans-Sikhote-Alin road Dalnerechensk-Plastun was closed first for the winter months, the period of the most active timber removal, and then (in 1999) and completely removed. In the end, the system, in which someone still profits from illegal felling, came to its perfection: the power and control structures of the district level began to profit. The Decree of the Primorye Governor dated December 29, 1999 No. 590 legalized the "Temporary Procedure for the Withdrawal, Accounting, Storage and Sale of Forest Resources Produced in Violation of Forest Law": 30% of the income from the timber stolen from it is received by the forestry enterprise, 30% - by the district police and 40% - municipal budget. Those who, by law, must protect the forest from illegal encroachments, from now on - on a legal basis - are directly and strongly interested in the fact that there are as many such encroachments as possible.
A few years ago, departments and the Office for Combating Economic Crimes (UBEP) and Organized Crime (UBOP) were created in the system of internal affairs bodies. They were tasked with finding a way out of the impasse by breaking the chain of dependence and interest of local authorities in unauthorized logging. However, these regional structures, according to many testimonies not connected with local crime, could not achieve much, faced with the vices of the legislation. It turned out to be very difficult, unlike criminal structures, to fine-tune their operational interaction with other bodies of the regional and regional level, to overcome mutual distrust, ambitions and differences in goals between them. In essence, the creation of new structures, initiatives and models aimed at stopping forest crime only adds to the number of criminal loopholes and models at different stages of the process. This is also shown by world experience: not a single, even the most totalitarian system is capable of withstanding the onslaught of the market. Especially if the freedom of enterprise, as happened in the new Russia, turns out to be almost the only legal right protected by the state, despite the fact that small forestry business with such a strong Chinese influence, in principle, cannot be legal.
Valery Alpatov, director of the AVF company, Krasnoarmeysky district of Primorye (February 2000).
“For three years I have been dealing with sequestered wood, that is, stolen wood, and I know the whole mechanism, from hemp to customs. The Krasnoarmeysky district was the founder of illegal logging. It attracts criminal structures with the quantity and availability of hardwood timber. But today this phenomenon has a new aspect - logging forests as theft within the law. This must finally be said, although it would have been better to talk about it 10 years ago. Now this "experience" of the Krasnoarmeysky district has gone to the south of Primorye, to the Khabarovsk Territory. I know that now about 30 brigades are working in the area engaged in secret logging. These are stable brigades, which are known to the leaders of the region, forestries, internal affairs bodies. They are more or less regularly caught, but drivers are caught, and never - customers of such felling..
These wild brigades are well equipped with equipment. If we take the number of truck cranes per capita, then in our region this crane equipment is the most. There is an official registration through the traffic police, and it is clear for what purposes: there is no construction site in the area, there is no cargo transportation. It's just that everyone goes away from this phenomenon. What a sin to hide: the whole area today feeds on the forest. And the connection between the criminal structures of the Krasnoarmeisky district and Dalnerechensk, where export shipments to China are formed, is very strong.
The introduction of the transport certificate only made the theft system more monopoly and streamlined. If earlier there were 300-400 suppliers, today there are 90 or 50 left - those who have access to the certificate. Having an estimated cutting area, now few people go into the forest on their own. He immediately sells the documents to another. And in the forest, sometimes at the place where the forest ticket was issued, the forest was stolen long ago. And tenants often become plunderers of their own leased forest, transferring it from legal harvesting to criminal."
Recently, a dangerous new trend has emerged in the region in the decision-making process in the field of forest management. The strengthened leaders of timber companies, who are ready to increase the volume of harvesting and develop new forest areas, openly put pressure on the territorial leadership, forcing high-ranking officials to ignore the environmental decisions they had previously made and to hand over areas promising for protection into felling. This happened with the quarters of the future national parks "Udege Legend" and Verkhne-Ussuriysky in Primorye, the site reserved for the future South Primorsky Natural Park was almost put up for auction. Businessmen openly flaunt their willingness to contribute money to the budget from the primitive trade in raw materials, which for many officials who are poorly educated in environmental matters is the main argument that makes it easy to violate the law.
As you can see, the efforts of the authorities to suppress illegal logging and limit the criminal timber market are met with a host of obstacles of a very different nature. But all of them have the same socio-psychological basis - the mentality of the "wild East", where disregard for laws and restrictions turns from a crime into a kind of valor. It is also obvious that the crisis of the economy and statehood has become an incredibly fertile ground for such a moral transformation that has engulfed all sectors of society, from lumberjacks, drivers and merchants to policemen, foresters and customs officers, from district leaders to Moscow legislators. In such an atmosphere, situations are not uncommon when ignoring a thoughtless or mediocre law in the interests of ordinary people turns out to be really more fair and reasonable than just as thoughtlessly executing it.
The reasons for the collapse of the system of state control of logging and exports can be presented in the following classification:
Lack of effective interaction between government structures (the State Customs Committee, the Forestry Service and the Ministry of Trade) and regional administrations. Lack of publicly available information on the dynamics of timber exports and its correlation with harvesting limits. Inconsistency of forest management information with modern requirements and practice of forest management. No prohibition on logging activities for the leshoz system. Financial dependence of regulatory authorities on fines and payments from logging companies and exporters. Reducing the budget of inspecting, law and environmental authorities. The possibility of registering foreign companies in Russia and obtaining procurement and export licenses. No restrictions on the registration of export contracts in accordance with the limits of the logging fund of the territory. Plurality and weak control in timber export points. Absence of requirements for verification of logging documents in the rules of customs control. Insufficient incentives for the export of sawn timber with a simultaneous reduction in the limits and volumes of blanks. Lack of mechanisms that encourage exporters to reinvest profits from timber exports in the timber industry complex of the territory. Difficulty in controlling specific batches of timber from the cutting area to the export point. Lack of financial and administrative incentives to guarantee the implementation of the imposed restrictions on timber exports. Lack of adequate measures on the part of importing countries to restrict the import of timber harvested in violation of environmental and other laws of the exporting country. The absurdity of the tax system, which implies a large number of payments at different levels and at different stages of the procurement and export process and pushes the harvester and exporter to illegal logging and export. Lack of an effective system of external control of state structures responsible for the control of logging and export, which leads to corruption. Weakness, insufficient equipment and low level of state financing of forest enterprises Low level of fines and insufficient rigidity of legislation in relation to the theft of forest resources in the bud. Secrecy of contract prices for exported timber. Public Efforts
Russia has a rich tradition of civilian monitoring and control. In the 1960s and 1970s, this work was carried out by the All-Union Society for the Protection of Nature (VOOP), in the 1980s these functions were transferred to the government structure of the State Committee for Nature Protection. Public control has lost its significance. However, in recent years, with the growth of a new environmental movement, public control over the activities of government bodies and companies has reasserted itself in full voice. In many cases, government structures are willing to accept and even initiate public support in solving environmental problems.
Civilian control is a very serious force in the suppression of corruption and other violations of the law in Siberia and the Far East. Environmental groups across the region are now actively involved in logging monitoring activities. They carry out hundreds of raids, alone or together with state inspectors, to detect illegal logging and curb poaching. The results very often become the subject of publications in the press, the subject of further investigation by law enforcement agencies, often the public directly stimulates the work of not very active state inspections. In a number of regions, public organizations and groups are becoming the most active assistants to the committees of the State Committee for Ecology, forest departments, environmental prosecutor's offices and administrations in ensuring legality in the process of nature management.
The environmental group "Taiga" in the Krasnoarmeisky district of Primorye more than once during the 11 years of its existence withstood real public battles with representatives of departments - Hydroproject, Atomenergo, timber companies for the preservation of the still untouched massifs of the unique Ussuri taiga. In recent years, the group has had to act in the face of a particularly tough onslaught of timber merchants, in the face of slander, misinformation and public defamation by the district administration. Today, no one has any doubts that such initiatives need the full support of not only international public, but also territorial state bodies interested in putting things in order in the forests.
The financial crisis and recession of 2008-2009 in Russia as part of the global financial crisis became possible due to the integration of the Russian economy into the world economy, when any event abroad affects the value of Russian bonds and shares, liquidity, incomes of citizens and economic growth . The global financial crisis, which gained momentum in early autumn, has come close to Russia. Government reports and plots of the country's central television channels are filled with optimism and disparaging rhetoric only about the "careless American financial system." Estimates by independent economic experts are more realistic. They warn that until the end of 2009 the financial condition of the Russians may deteriorate significantly.
According to Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, Russia will have to deal with the consequences of the crisis for at least two years. Due to the crisis in the American mortgage lending market, the Russian market continued to fall: the RTS index fell by almost 2.02%, but soon the decline slowed down. The MICEX index fell somewhat more slowly, in the range of 1.6-1%. The crisis is already beginning to affect the wages of citizens across Russia. 6. Aleksey Kudrin stated the following: “You can not be afraid for the deposits of the population. You can not be afraid for the stability of all leading banks. This is absolutely under control. But the fact that the global stock market will still drag us down, we must be prepared for this. Therefore, we entered a long period. Our measures should somewhat soften these movements ... "
Due to the lack of free money, all enterprises have problems. On the other hand, there is a deficit in the personnel market, therefore, the likely reduction in salaries will not affect qualified specialists in the most demanded areas. But others may well face short wage delays or minor pay cuts.
Planned mass layoffs. Experts have calculated that every second employer plans to lay off an average of 10% of the staff. And in some banks and retail chains every third or fourth will lose their jobs. Companies are laying off people to improve the financial situation, shaken by the crisis. Office workers will be the first to be hit. They do not produce anything, that is, they do not form profits, and their salaries, as a rule, are higher than those of "producers". Euroset has announced a reduction in personnel by several percent. This applies to the office. The company now has one office worker for every four sales assistants, and the cuts will bring the ratio to one in ten. Those departments where employees can shift some of the responsibilities of their colleagues will suffer. The "record" in terms of the number of laid-off employees is held by the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works: 3,000 people are going to be put out of work here. It is followed by the retail company "Paterson" - here 1,600 people may be left without work. More than two hundred employees will lose their jobs at the Baikal Pulp and Paper Mill, the Bank of Moscow and MGTS. The same number will leave the states of the media companies "Amedia" and RBC.
But still, mass unemployment does not threaten Russia yet, although reductions in certain sectors of the economy will be significant. However, those who have retained their seats are not particularly happy either. They will have to prepare for a wage freeze and a decline in real incomes of about 30%.
Since September 2008, when the global economic crisis began to have a serious impact on the Russian economy, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Bank of Russia began to implement anti-crisis measures. In accordance with the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev in November 2008 approved an action plan aimed at improving the situation in the financial sector and certain sectors of the economy. It includes operational measures designed to protect citizens and the country's economy from the shock of the crisis and to preserve the viability of the Russian financial system. At present, the implementation of this plan is largely completed. The anti-crisis measures taken made it possible to prevent the growth of the crisis, its transition into forms that threaten the foundations of the functioning of the economy. In today's conditions, this allows us to focus both on solving current anti-crisis tasks and on creating the foundations for sustainable socio-economic development of the country in the post-crisis period.
The program of anti-crisis measures of the Government of the Russian Federation for 2009 (hereinafter - the program) is a document that defines priority tasks for overcoming crisis phenomena in the country's economy and ways to solve them.
The program provides an optimal combination of anti-crisis measures and long-term projects aimed at building a new, more efficient economy. The priorities of the program include the fulfillment of the state's social obligations to citizens, the preservation and development of industrial and technological potential, the activation of domestic demand, the development of competition and the reduction of administrative pressure on business, and the increase in the stability of the national financial system. Macroeconomic balance will be ensured, the course for the stability of the national currency and a consistent reduction in inflation will be maintained. At the same time, actions will be intensified to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy and accelerate its transition to an innovative type of development in accordance with the Concept for the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 and the Main Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2012. These include building human potential, modernizing the health care and pension system, education and the national innovation system, and creating technological and infrastructural reserves for the future. The development of market institutions will be consistently ensured.
The program takes into account the decisions of the heads of state and government developed at the G20 summit, which took place on April 2, 2009 in London. These include measures to restore economic growth and expand the number of jobs, strengthen the financial system and financial regulation, resume full-scale lending, curb protectionism.
The socio-economic policy of the Government of the Russian Federation and budget projections for the medium term (2010-2012) will be developed taking into account projects for the implementation of the Main Directions of the Government of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2012, based on the need to:
1) carrying out institutional transformations that ensure the development of human capital, improving the efficiency of education, health care, pension provision, improving housing conditions, and developing the sphere of culture;
2) reducing the differentiation of the population in terms of income;
3) reducing the dependence of economic growth on the export of fuel and raw materials, the development of domestic demand and competition in commodity markets;
4) increasing the protection of private property, improving economic institutions, and gradually reducing the role of the state as the owner of industrial and financial assets;
5) a significant increase in innovation activity and acceleration of technological modernization of economic sectors, stimulation of resource and energy efficiency;
6) development of production infrastructure;
7) ensuring macroeconomic balance, reducing the budget deficit, lowering inflation and interest rates, stability of the ruble and increasing its international attractiveness;
8) increase the efficiency and reliability of the banking system, the formation of a stable financial market;
9) reducing regional differentiation, accelerating the development of depressed and underdeveloped regions.
The main priority directions of the policy of the Government of Russia in the post-crisis period.
The first priority is the full fulfillment of the state's social obligations to the population and the development of human potential. Support will be provided to citizens and families most affected during the economic crisis. The social protection of the population has been strengthened, the necessary volumes and quality of social and medical services have been ensured, and the availability of high-quality and safe medicines has been ensured. The scale of government activities in the field of employment will be expanded, including curbing the growth of unemployment, developing programs for retraining workers, and providing targeted support to citizens in finding employment.
The modernization of the pension system will begin. Social assistance, modernization of health care and education will be activated, including the necessary structural changes for this. The necessary support measures will be provided to citizens who purchase housing. The state will promote the implementation of the housing program and the development of mortgage lending.
The second priority is the preservation and development of industrial and technological potential for future growth. The activities of the Government of the Russian Federation in this area will be aimed at creating conditions for a significant increase in the efficiency of Russian enterprises. At the same time, government assistance will not replace the responsibility of business. Only those enterprises that are focused on updating, increasing efficiency and promoting competitive products on the market, but today are experiencing temporary difficulties due to a lack of loans and a decrease in demand, can count on support.
In order to preserve the most important industries, the state is ready to directly enter the capital of companies. At the same time, measures will be taken to strengthen the protection of the interests of private owners of companies, including minority shareholders.
The third priority is the activation of domestic demand for Russian goods as a basis for restoring economic growth. The government of the Russian Federation will make efforts to compensate for the contraction of markets, reduce dependence on external factors, and use internal resources as efficiently as possible.
An important role will be played by domestic demand from the state (state investment and public procurement) in the areas of housing construction, development of transport infrastructure, and state defense orders. Measures will be taken to protect the domestic market and provide preferences to domestic producers in accordance with international practice. At the same time, the main emphasis will be placed on restoring business activity by subsidizing interest rates, developing leasing, and supporting consumer lending.
The fourth priority is stimulating innovation and restructuring the economy. The Russian economy must emerge from the crisis renewed, stronger and more modern. The state will expand support for innovative projects, including those aimed at technological renewal of enterprises, increasing resource and energy efficiency. The presence of a program to increase labor productivity, the use of energy-saving technologies and innovative development will become a condition for providing state assistance to enterprises.
The priority of public spending on the development of high-tech industries, including aircraft and shipbuilding, the space industry, nuclear energy, electronic and radio-electronic industries, remains. At the same time, infrastructure reserves for economic growth will be created, in particular, budget allocations for the development of transport infrastructure and the implementation of projects to upgrade the passenger transport fleet will increase.
The fifth priority is to create favorable conditions for economic recovery by improving the most important market institutions and removing barriers to entrepreneurial activity. Measures will be taken to develop competition and improve antimonopoly regulation. Excessive powers of executive authorities to control entrepreneurial activity have been reduced. The list of goods and services subject to mandatory certification has been reduced. Work has been intensified to prevent and suppress actions of a corrupt nature. Particular attention will be paid to supporting and stimulating the development of small and medium-sized businesses. A set of measures will be proposed to reduce the tax burden on small businesses, to expand the access of small businesses to public procurement. Preferential tariffs for technological connection to electric networks have been established. Preferential rental rates have been determined for the lease of federal property by small and medium-sized companies.
The sixth priority is the formation of a powerful financial system as a reliable basis for the development of the national economy. The banking system should become more efficient, cleared of troubled credit institutions. Measures will be implemented in the following areas: expanding the resource base and increasing the liquidity of the financial system; increasing the availability of bank loans for enterprises in the real sector; ensuring the rehabilitation of banks. Particular attention will be paid to the promptness of the adoption and implementation of the necessary decisions.
Measures are envisaged to form a stable financial market attractive to domestic and foreign investors, to create conditions for the emergence of long-term investment instruments.
The seventh priority is to ensure macroeconomic stability and maintain the confidence of Russian and foreign investors. The Government of the Russian Federation will pursue a responsible macroeconomic policy, which assumes the stability of the ruble exchange rate and the reduction of inflation. Efforts will be made to contain the rise in prices for essential goods and tariffs for housing and communal services. Measures aimed at reducing the budget deficit will be implemented. It is necessary to carry out a set of measures to restructure and optimize spending obligations, strengthen the targeted nature and increase the efficiency of budget expenditures.
As part of the monetary policy, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Bank of Russia will implement measures to reduce interest rates and stimulate the growth of household savings.
The implementation of the noted priorities objectively requires a temporary strengthening of the role of the state in the economic life of the country. The government of the Russian Federation will approach all its actions with the utmost responsibility so as not to create the wrong incentives in the economy, distort the motivations of enterprises and the population, which undermine long-term development prospects. The priority of private initiative will be observed even in crisis conditions. At the same time, the participation of the state in the economy will decrease as the crisis is overcome.
An important role in overcoming the crisis is played by cooperation with other countries, both on a bilateral basis and within the framework of international organizations. Measures will be taken to accelerate integration processes on the basis of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the formation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
What economic measures are currently being used to reduce the debt burden on the economy and, at the same time, to increase the potential for economic growth? In the field of macroeconomic policy, this is primarily the reduction of the state budget deficit by means of a restrictive fiscal policy. In the medium and long term, such measures will reduce the growth rate of public debt and even reduce its level. Developed states - the leading debtors in the world economy - are currently pursuing a policy of so-called budget adjustment (budget consolidation), in accordance with which the budget deficit is being reduced by about 1% of GDP per year. This will allow reaching a medium-term trade-off between restoring fiscal sustainability and stimulating economic growth. Thus, in Spain and Italy, significant reductions in the state budget deficit will continue over the coming years to restore confidence in global financial markets. A distinctive feature of the programs to reduce the budget deficit in Greece, Ireland and Portugal is their support by loans from the EU, the IMF and the European Central Bank (the so-called "troika" of creditors). In the United States, the Obama administration in 2011 adopted a plan to reduce the state budget deficit by 2020 by a total of $3.8 trillion (to 2.2% of GDP).
At the same time, in the short term, cuts in government spending to improve public finances have a rather destimulating effect on economic growth. This can also be argued with regard to tax increases, which may be accompanied by a reduction in the tax base. In the modern world economy, an example of this kind of danger was the threat of the so-called “fiscal cliff” in the United States in early 2013. It was caused by the coincidence in time of two factors that have a unidirectional impact on the budget: the expiration of tax benefits and the reduction of budget spending on social needs. As a result, the world's largest economy was on the verge of recession.
A well-known way in world practice to alleviate the debt burden is the devaluation of the national currency. Under conditions of a floating exchange rate or as part of the participation of a particular country in an integration association by the type of currency area (for example, in the “euro zone”), the possibilities for depreciation of the national currency are limited. Nevertheless, "currency wars" with the aim of depreciating national currencies and increasing exports due to this have become a common phenomenon in international monetary and financial relations.
Some developed countries, such as the USA, Great Britain (since 2010), member states of the euro area (since November 2012), Japan (since April 2013) are currently using a different method of maintaining the yield of government debt securities, providing liquidity and solvency for the debt-laden economy, some relief of the national currency and stimulating demand. These goals are achieved by issuing dollars, euros and other currencies by the monetary authorities of the countries mentioned above in exchange for the redemption of government securities from the market at extremely low, almost zero interest rates. On the scale of the global economy, this is perhaps the first case of the widespread use of non-traditional methods in the conduct of stimulating monetary policy.
The US Federal Reserve was the first to implement such a policy as part of the so-called "quantitative easing" program (eng. quantitative easing, QE). As a result of the first and second rounds of quantitative easing (November 2008 - mid-2011), the Federal Reserve bought back over $ 2 trillion in bonds. Unlike the previous ones, the third round of "quantitative easing" ( QE3), which began in September 2012, is open-ended. Within its framework, the Federal Reserve System buys $85 billion worth of government and mortgage bonds every month. The signal for curtailing this policy is the reduction in the unemployment rate in the country to 7% (against more than 12% in the post-crisis period).
What is the effectiveness of the policy of "quantitative easing" in the US? As of May 2013, the following positive effects can be stated: a decrease in the yield on 10-year treasury bonds (English, treasury notes), those. raising the price of public debt, overcoming deflation, maintaining low, but still positive economic growth rates (at the level of 1.5-2%), ensuring sufficient liquidity in the banking system and financial markets, and some depreciation of the dollar. However, demand in the economy is still low, the unemployment rate is consistently high, and debt is growing at a steady pace. The main beneficiary of the unlimited infusion of liquidity into the financial system has been the global oil, gas, gold and equity markets. Thus, the S&P 500 stock index from 2009 to the end of 2013 grew by almost 150%. Oversaturation of the US economy with liquidity increases the risk of inflating "bubbles" in financial markets and possible debt depreciation.
There are also institutional measures to resolve debt problems. In many countries of the world, including the United States, this is a legislative setting of the maximum permissible level of public debt in absolute terms. It should be noted that the US Congress is forced to periodically raise the federal debt ceiling. In mid-October 2013, another increase was the 79th case in the last
53 years old. However, the legislative limitation of state borrowings cannot restrain their growing accumulation and maintenance costs. By the end of 2013, the US public debt exceeded $17 trillion (a world record in absolute terms), which is 7.6% more than the country's GDP. On a per capita basis, this is about $54,000. At the same time, the total debt of the country, which also includes the debts of states, municipalities, companies and households, is estimated at more than $60 trillion, which is already comparable to the value of world GDP, and in per capita is almost 190 thousand dollars.
Among other institutional measures in the field of regulation of debt relations, one should single out the nationalization of banks, as a rule, the largest of the problem ones, in order to prevent the threat of a banking crisis turning into a debt one. Such actions were practiced at the turn of the last decades by the government bodies of Great Britain, Spain, and Iceland.
The group of institutional measures also includes financial institutions specially created for a specific purpose. For example, in 2010 the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilization Facility were founded as instruments to respond to the acute phase of the EU debt crisis. Designed to assist EU countries experiencing difficulties in servicing public debt, the established institutions, with the complicity of the IMF, provided financial assistance to Greece (164 billion euros), Ireland (85 billion euros) and Portugal (78 billion euros) - the countries most affected by the debt crisis. These funds are disbursed in separate tranches as needed and subject to the implementation by borrowing countries of agreed budget saving programs.
At the end of 2012, both institutions were replaced by a new one - the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) with a capital of 700 billion euros. It is an independent organization, the purpose of which is to provide assistance to the countries of the "euro zone" by redeeming their government bonds. Only states that ratify the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance of the EMU countries signed in March 2012 can use the funds of this financial organization. According to this agreement, mandatory standards are created to reduce the public debt of those member countries in which it exceeds 60% of GDP; a procedure for controlling the budget deficit is being established; EU bodies are supposed to control the budgetary policy of problem countries and harsh sanctions for violation of their obligations. Thus, the provision of financial assistance by the ESM is strictly conditional on the implementation of the norms and rules of budgetary discipline adopted by countries when joining the "euro area".
In conclusion, it is necessary to note the peculiarities of the course of the debt crisis in the "euro zone", since this region is the embodiment of the modern debt problems of developed countries. The European continent most fully demonstrates the transition of the banking crisis into a debt one. This is due to the fact that the main source of business financing in Europe, unlike the US, is the banking system. Its assets exceed the GDP of the "euro zone" by 2.7 times, while in the US they are equal to GDP. The reverse situation is typical for the depth of the financial market: 37% in the "euro zone" and 82% in the US. Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus are an example of the escalation of a banking crisis in the "euro zone" into a debt one. The settlement of crisis situations in the economies of the first three of these countries was carried out mainly through the use of traditional channels for obtaining financial assistance from the stabilization funds of the EU, the IMF and the European Central Bank (the “troika” of creditors). A feature of overcoming the financial crisis in Cyprus is the conditionality of receiving financial assistance by withdrawals from bank deposits (the so-called "haircut" of deposits) and restrictive measures of foreign exchange control (the introduction of a limit on cross-border transactions). What all these countries have in common is a concomitant rise in public debt and a deterioration in its servicing.
Almost all member states of the "euro zone" were hit by a debt crisis to one degree or another, and this circumstance, as already noted, affected the quality of their sovereign credit ratings. The spread of the debt crisis that has taken place has hit first of all the so-called peripheral countries of the "euro area" - the PIIGS group consisting of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (see the debt positions of the countries of this group in Fig. 34.1). Not only national financial systems were under threat, but also the unity of the EU and the stability of the single European currency. Greece was at the epicenter of the debt crisis in 2010 with a public debt of 300 billion euros, of which 23 billion were short-term liabilities. Servicing this category of debt was not possible given the deficit of the state budget of the country, which exceeded in 2009-2010. 10% of GDP.
It should be noted that the solvency of the countries of the "euro zone" is complicated by the negative economic activity in this region. Unlike the United States, which experienced a downturn in economic dynamics only during one post-crisis year of 2009, the euro area did not signal an exit from recession until mid-2013. The European Central Bank's quantitative easing and fiscal consolidation policies have not yet been successful. This circumstance contributes to the aggravation of the debt burden of the states of the "euro zone" and significantly complicates its servicing.
It can be concluded that the global debt crisis has formed one of the poles in the system of risks associated with the development of the world economy. Therefore, the monitoring and solution of debt problems is considered by the international community as an important factor in maintaining the stability of the world monetary and financial system. Debt management issues are becoming one of the central items on the agenda of both government bodies and the business community, as well as in the activities of international organizations.
